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A STUDY OF THE RELIGIOUS ASPECTS AND MOTIVATIONS OF CIVILIZATION

BY

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To the memory of

DONALD LEROY WATERMAN

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PREFACE

AT a time when the economic resources of the entire world are being strained to the utmost to meet the exigencies of total war, the spiritual assets of civilization are bound to be a matter of earnest solicitude to all thinking people. By these assets men live, and without enough of them civilizations pass away. These resources of the spirit may, with proper definition, be conveniently summarized under the term "religion," whose true nature and effective functioning are therefore a matter of immediate world concern.

Any adequate estimate of the religious heritage of western civilization, regarded as a significant resource with which to face a hazardous future, is impossible without taking account of the higher religious developments of the Old and the New Testaments considered as a whole. This might seem to be so obvious as to be trite were it not for the fact that an estimate from that viewpoint has never been made.

The Scriptures, both Old and New, have been studied not only with sincere devotion, but with a scientific thoroughness unsurpassed in other fields. In spite of the Christian concept of the unity of the Scriptures, however, critical study has on the whole dealt with the Old and the New Testament as distinct and separate entities. As long as the Bible was regarded primarily as a source of doctrine, this division of labors occasioned little if any difficulty. But the moment historical study began clearly to distinguish different ethical levels of religious truth in the Bible, the presupposed unity of Old and New began to crumble.

Christians have never assumed the completeness of the Old Testament in itself. Thus while ethical religion in the Old Testament, as rediscovered in modern times, shows a distinct unfoldment, it has always been recognized that this type of religion never came to completion in the Old Testament period, but met with defeat and suppression at the hands of Jewish nationalism in religion. There, however, the responsibility of the interpreter of the Old Testament was supposed to end.

New Testament scholars have usually assumed the self-sufficiency of the New Testament as a base for its interpretation. But New Testament scholarship has failed to substantiate this claim. That is, on its own witness, by word and deed, it has failed to grasp and clarify the central personality of the New Testament, and the historical Jesus still remains an elusive figure. In other words, New Testament scholars have failed to achieve with respect to ethical religion what Old Testament workers have accomplished in their field. It is now demonstrable that the ethical prophets were entirely distinct from the nationalistic ones, in spite of the fact that as the record now stands every ethical prophet of the Old Testament is made responsible for nationalistic doctrines. In the New Testament field the situation is still confused to the extent that the majority of interpreters hold that Jesus regarded himself as the expected Jewish Messiah, regardless of the ethical teachings accredited to him—an impasse of ideas doubtfully tenable in the light of the results of Old Testament research.

Investigators of ethical prophecy have always held their conclusions at the disposal of workers in the New Testament, with the expectation that these results would be structurally needed in New Testament study. So far no

such use has been made of them and the intertestamental gap on the plane of ethical religion has remained unbridged.

The uncertainties and the intricate and involved character of the earliest New Testament sources raise a legitimate query whether the synthesis in question can ever be expected to arise from the New Testament approach. Fortunately, from the viewpoint of ethical religion, the ethical teachings of the New Testament have never formally been a matter of doubt. The serious problem has always been to determine their meaning, and inasmuch as this still lacks clarification, a legitimate recourse is to inquire how these data qualify when viewed from the standpoint of the ethical religion of the Old Testament. The method of attack upon the problem, as here proposed, has the advantage of proceeding from the general to the particular and from the known to the problematical. Moreover, such an approach at once relieves the discussion of either Old or New Testament limitations and places it in the broad field of Israelite-Jewish ethical religious development as a whole.

In so far as the New Testament data take their place in the scheme of ethical religion they may be expected to focus on the central figure of the New Testament. His portrait will therefore necessarily be affected. The procedure suggested will, however, take account of and verify only the data that emerge on the ethical plane in keeping with the earlier religious development. The genuineness of these data will be tested by their organic relation to what precedes. That is to say, their consistency, their reliability, and their originality will be tested by the scope of the manifest purpose to be served when these later contributions are brought into direct relationship with

the earlier ethical religion. For this synthesis, when completed and viewed in the light of the religious history of the race, should yield the highest religious guidance available for the future welfare of mankind. The need for such resource in the existing desperate world emergency calls for no elaboration or apology, and that need must be the justification for the present attempt to meet it.

I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to the Board of Governors of the Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies of the University of Michigan, for financial assistance in the preparation of the final manuscript copy. I am obligated to Dr. Edward W. Blakeman, Counselor in Religious Education of the University of Michigan, for reading certain chapters, and for suggestions. I desire also to express my appreciation to Dr. Eugene S. McCartney, Editor of Scholarly Publications of the University of Michigan, for valued counsel and advice, and to Miss Grace E. Potter, assistant editor in the same office for invaluable aid in the editing of the manuscript and in the reading of the proof.

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L. W.

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CHAPTER I

THE GENESIS OF RELIGION AND CIVILIZATION

THE functional relation between religion and civilization has never been adequately assessed. Religion appears as an aspect of all historic civilizations; it also appears among extant primitive races who through uncounted ages have never yet crossed the threshold of civilization. On the other hand, in our day the very right of religion to exist has been challenged in a way that makes a clarification of this matter one of prime importance to the welfare of mankind. Unquestionably, organized religion is on trial for its life today in a manner that is without precedent. Ever since the time of the Hebrew Psalmist there have been individual skeptics who have said in their hearts, "There is no God." It has been reserved for our generation to witness whole social groups, whole political states declare that religion is an unqualified handicap and a menace to human welfare that should be eliminated. Every such indictment is invariably confused by identifying some particular form of religion, usually of a quite degenerate sort, with the essence of religion itself. A corresponding perversity is a widespread obsession of religious folk that declares one's own personal faith to be religion, and all others so false as to be unworthy of the name.

The issue has been further obscured by the traditional Christian attitude, which has prescribed the separation of Christians from the world, with the result that there has

been a general refusal to take moral responsibility except in the matter of providing for the hereafter and a consequent disregard for human society as such. Is religion a parasite upon civilization, or is it an essential equipment without which no civilization could long continue, or, perchance, something quite neutral to it, a kind of fifth wheel, or an emotional luxury, or just an age-old habit? Nothing that has thus far been concluded about religion as a whole precludes any one of these answers. However, if the nature and primary aim of religion were clear, such ambiguity could not possibly exist.

We are thus met at the outset by the fact that in spite of all the sound work done in the field of comparative religion and the history of religions we have no standardized concept of religion, such as we have, for example, of science. Indeed the situation is so confused that there are virtually as many definitions of religion as there are writers. And there seems to be no way of stopping this increase until a strictly scientific method is employed. This is forcibly emphasized in a recent work[1] when the author cites ten such definitions, offered by distinguished scholars, as an illustration of the general confusion, and then makes another of his own that still leaves out certain recognized phenomena of religion.

It is just here that the main difficulty arises. The various attempts at definition thus far formulated usually set forth what is most significant in the religious outlook of their authors, along with certain other items that seem to be not inconsistent therewith, whereas a scientific definition can only be made by taking full account of all the observable phenomena of religion in the life of man. And only by the use of such a definition can we hope to be clear and to understand each other when we talk about religion. For

this reason it seems desirable to consider afresh the nature and the aim of religion.

Before this can be done it will be necessary to inquire into the basic potentiality and functions, not of any particular form of religion, but of religion itself as a manifestation of human life, in order to ascertain to what extent it is related to the civilizing process.

A dispassionate and fair appraisal of religion, thus considered, may perhaps best be gained by retracing the story of its rise, a process that should also permit a clearer grasp of its nature, aims, and functions. These distinctions are the more necessary for our purpose since one of the most manifest phenomena of man's spiritual life is that religion in all ages, like certain elements of nature, never appears in a free state but always as an alloy. It tends therefore to combine with other life activities such as economics, magic, and politics, and these factors may become so dominant that they completely displace the religion, and the term itself is reduced to an empty or even a misleading label.

Two preliminary observations may be helpful at the outset. The first is that religion exists for man and not man for religion. That is to say, its capacity to further the higher interests of life must be the justification for its perpetuation. The second is that all religion is personal, and outside of personality does not exist. The problem of its rise is therefore definitely bound up with the genesis of man's personality. Mind below the level of personality need not concern us here, since there is no clear evidence of religious phenomena below the human level. The emergence of personality requires the capacity to express the concept of selfhood as a thing of value. Such expression calls for the ability to use abstract ideas, which can only be accomplished when true speech has been achieved. It is

also at the point where the idea of selfhood thus emerges that the concept of values gets its primary impetus. Without these two concepts religion could never arise, but with them given in this peculiar relationship all that we know as religion will develop out of the conditions of human living.

Granted the rise of language, what phenomena can be found that will assure us that our two concepts will appear universally among men and in essentially the same connotation? Attention has frequently been called to the human shadow, the reflection of the human form in water, and abnormal mental states. Such phenomena without doubt tend to objectify the individual to himself, but they are too sporadic, casual, and external to the individual to produce a permanent concept, let alone one of universal validity among men. More fundamental still is the fact that no one of these phenomena suggests an abstract concept such as "self" requires. Above all, there is not the slightest indication that any such concept which might be aroused in favored individuals would be accompanied by any particular sense of value.

On the other hand, there is one phenomenon that meets all the requirements of our problem—the normal human experience of dreams. (Dream impressions below the human level will be excluded since speech is absent and they cannot be retold.) It is a fact of common experience that dreams that are not related upon waking quickly fade away beyond recall; but once put into words they may become as permanent a part of our experience as our waking moments. Two aspects of dreams were especially significant for primitive man. The first was the association, in his dreams, of himself with persons and places so remote that it would require days or weeks of travel to reach them. Yet it was incredible that his body had actually traveled

thither and returned again during sleep. As a result, this experience yielded the idea of an inner self temporarily separable from the body, but carrying with it no specific concept of value. The universal idea among primitive peoples of an invisible personal double has its natural explanation in dreams.

A second aspect of dreams associated the dreamer with persons whom he knew to be dead and hence to be permanently separated from their bodies. The vividness of such dream experiences, whether because of attachment to or fear of the departed, made them the most compelling and convincing of all impressions. Their reality was never questioned by primitive man. They thus yielded him certain undeniable convictions. The most immediately astonishing thing was undoubtedly that the person who had died now appeared to be still alive. The direct and compelling inference from this conviction, that a person can be just as truly alive when permanently separated from his body, was even more far-reaching and revolutionary in its consequences. Two further conclusions resulted. The first conclusion was that the real person is not the outer form but an invisible something that has all the vividness and compelling reality that the individual in the flesh ever has. The second conclusion was that life does not end with the destruction of the body. It does not end with death. There is no end. This point marks a decisive moment in the creation of man. Up to then his outlook had been almost wholly that of the animal. From that moment onward whatever was desirable in early man's short and precarious existence was no longer regarded as limited to the physical span. On the contrary, as a result of the dream, an unending vista of desirable personal existence began to open before him.

What man believed that he had gained through dreams

was one thing. The deeper and truer significance of that experience was quite another thing, and at the time beyond his power to grasp. With regard to himself, he thought he saw opened before him the gateway to endless happy hunting grounds. With respect to other human beings, his dead acquaintances seemed to live again, and in the light of this experience, he could see no limits to the life of all who had ever lived in the flesh. He thus felt himself surrounded as by a cloud of witnesses, the multitude of spirits of the dead.

As for the world itself, this conception of ancestral spirits threw a new light on man's entire physical environment, made up as he saw it of a host of warring nature forces, upon whose sufferance he lived. At times, at least, they seemed to set upon him with dire intent to destroy him, and all too often they were successful. Under the circumstances primitive man could only conclude that these forces were animated by spiritual entities like his own departed. When this happened, as it did at a certain stage in human life everywhere, it completed primitive man's crude, animistic philosophy of the universe. All these notions flowed naturally from dream experiences, and without them there is no good reason to think that such conceptions would ever have arisen. We rightly look upon them as the childish imaginings of early man's crude and untutored mind.

The significant and abiding achievement which the dream actually accomplished lay in the fact that in this experience, as in a mirror, man first perceived himself as a spiritual being—a soul, a personality apart from the body—endowed with possibilities of unending values. Man here gained his primary idea of endless reality in terms of the values of personality. With this as a yardstick, he now

began to measure and appraise his environment. And out of this process grew his conception of the most significant external realities and his relation to them.

So far religion has not arisen, but we now have all the conditions necessary for its rise. This development may now be stated in terms of its human motivation. Man, conceiving himself to be a spiritual being of endless possibilities, and already strongly equipped with the instinct of self-preservation, proceeded to try to come to terms with the dominant forces in his environment as he apprehended them. Especially did he seek to placate those superior forces that threatened his welfare or his life, first of all in order to preserve his physical being while he might, but even more to gain the favor of those spiritual powers whose help he would need beyond the grave. Here religion had begun.

Out of the concept of such Powers, when it has been stabilized, enriched, and clarified through the collective life of an organized society, God ideas emerge naturally and inevitably as more definite personal symbols of the great realities of the outer world upon which man's life and welfare are believed to depend. Christianity has voiced its faith in the reality behind the God symbol in the phrase "yesterday, today and forever the same."[2] The actual content of the idea as held at any given time never remains the same. It varies in the individual from infancy to old age. It varies from individual to individual and from age to age. It changes thus because it is always a product of a man's inherited beliefs plus his own growing, changing experience. The concept of God varies, therefore, not because the idea is an evanescent or ephemeral one, but because of man's accumulating experience and consequent changing grasp of external reality. It may thus range all

the way from indefinite multiplicity to absolute unity and from an infinite content down to one of zero. Yet through all these changes of conception man may still remain religious[3] and the entire phenomenon of his attempts to come to terms with his world is, from this approach, seen to be for the one purpose of preserving the reality of personality. This, therefore, constitutes the primary function and the basic aim of religion. All the historic faiths summarize this aim in the one word "salvation."

The methods or techniques of coming to terms—placation and worship, prayer, penance, and personal adjustment—vary, however, as man's grasp of reality changes, so that such phenomena constitute the great outer variable in religion, causing the discarding of old forms, the rise of new faiths, and all the kaleidoscopic changes that make up the history of the religions of mankind.

Nevertheless the aim of religion remains the one abiding constant throughout all time, whether it be on the lowest plane of primitive animism or in the highest realm of ethical conception of the universe. This undeviating constant holds like the needle to the pole. Herein the true nature of religion stands most clearly revealed. What self-preservation is to the animal, religion is to the essence of personality. Religion may thus be summarized as man's persistent endeavor to adjust the reality within him to the most significant realities without, for the purpose of preserving and enhancing the values of personality.

So much for the primary motivation of religion from the standpoint of the individual. It remains to point out the social nature of personality, which also becomes primary to religion. Personality cannot develop or maintain itself in a vacuum. It is well known that if a person is entirely isolated from humankind, his personality will soon begin

to deteriorate. He will "lose his mind." Insanity is a common result. The individual turns out to be only a part of himself. It is the sharing of the experience of others, mainly through the medium of language, that produces, nourishes, and preserves personality. And if this participation is lacking, the personality literally starves to death. Truly man cannot live by bread alone.

Furthermore, man's first grasp of personality as an abiding reality came to him not as a direct truth but as an inference, by an act of reasoning, from the social relationships expressed in the dream. It was the impression, upon waking, that he had associated and conversed with his dead acquaintance as though he were every whit alive which led the dreamer to infer that he too would be able to associate with others after his own demise. And with the door so opened to him, there was no reason to think it would not be open for all men. Thus the concept of personality as a priceless possession was based upon the social aspect of the dream, and without that factor there would appear to have been no possibility of drawing the primary inference necessary to its realization. The result was vividly to picture to all men that they had a common destiny and that their joint stake in this prospect was greater than all their differing interests put together. The latter were but temporary and fleeting at most, while the former was enduring and unending. Thus, both consciously and unconsciously, men from the most primitive times onward could not escape the conclusion that there was a sense in which they were allies and collaborators in the most important enterprise of their existence. This is reflected in respect for the dead, expressed in human burial rites, which it has been estimated may go back perhaps a hundred thousand years.[4]

The direct result of all these factors is that religion is

always social in character. This social factor, however, is the third great variable in the history of religion, so much so that it is often lost sight of as a necessary element, yet its perpetual working in religion can never be doubted. Even the religious hermit who withdraws from humankind and betakes himself to his lonely cell may, far from being unsocial, be motivated by the highest social aims. He may thus isolate himself in order to commune more deeply with the greatest of all personal beings, and there is often an underlying assumption that this will not only benefit the hermit himself, but that it will in some way also redound to the advantage of mankind.[5]

The thing that has most seriously reduced and obscured the social factor in religion is man's economic struggle for existence. The long period of human infancy led to the first establishment of the family, consisting of mother and children, with the mother as its head. The father was not included at this stage. This development is known as the matriarchate. It is reflected in the concept of Mother Earth and in the fact that the oldest deities are mother goddesses. Later the male was drawn into the family circle and, because of his superior fighting qualities, he soon came to dominate the family under the better-known patriarchate. The simple family, consisting of parents and children, expanded into the larger family of blood kindred, known as the clan. When two or more clans united to form a tribal organization it was often large enough and strong enough to persist through many generations, and so to develop and preserve tribal traditions and thus to have its own tribal god or gods. Each of these social groups was in turn an open competitor with all others for the food supply. Consequently, since religion expressed itself through the individuals who formed the group and since

the food supply was fundamental to existence, religion always sanctioned this competition and all that it involved.

Thus when the tribe was able to secure a permanent home and establish an independent government nationalism in politics and in religion came into the picture, and we see a nation, its land, and its god arrayed against all other peoples, lands, and gods. This phenomenon still persists to the extent that the national idea remains dominant in spite of the world faiths of individual founders of religions. In times of peace some of these may exert a real international influence, but under severe economic tension even nations that acknowledge the same god often invoke his aid to help them conquer or destroy each other.

Only in the highest ethical theory, expressed in the New Testament by the love of neighbor and the Golden Rule, is there provided that degree of social coöperation adequate to the nature of human personality and the primary aim of religion. Christianity has indeed expressed this ideal in words, but so far has proved impotent to reduce it to practice; it therefore still remains little more than a glittering generality. Its complete assertion has been hindered by reason of the exigencies of social organization in the economic struggle for physical existence, as well as by a refusal on the part of traditional Christianity to assume responsibility for the economic order under which it lives.

To cease to be religious is, therefore, in the end, to cease to be human, since he who does not respect and cherish the values of personality in himself cannot be expected to respect the rights of personality in others, and such a person becomes more dangerous to himself and to society than any wild beast. The sacredness of personality is thus perceived to be the cornerstone of religion and of civilization. Herein can be seen the innate capacity of

religion to promote civilization and the progress of the race, as well as the necessity of the presence of religion to this end. Without such a conserving force focused upon the highest values of life, no enduring civilization is possible. Likewise, the truest index and the surest measure of human progress is to be found in the extent to which there is the conserving and the consequent enhancing of the values of personality in all men.

CHAPTER II

RELIGION AND SCIENCE, YESTERDAY AND TODAY

WESTERN civilization, under the impact and tutelage of modern science, has gained such practical mastery over the forces of nature that fabulous riches, as measured by an earlier age, are now theoretically available for the general welfare, comfort, and greater security of mankind. This highly desirable outcome has fallen short of realization through the failure, first of all, to provide an effective system for the adequate distribution of these vastly increased goods. In the second place, and as a direct result of this failure, the clamor and resort to violence in order to compel a more satisfactory distribution of goods and resources has led, on the one hand, to fierce domestic turmoil and political upheaval, and, on the other, to international aggression through ruthless force on such a terrifying world scale of destruction that the issue now hangs in the balance whether existing civilization can hope to survive.

Geologists tell us that extinct species of the immeasurable long-ago perished from the earth by reason of the very amplitude of their apparatus for attack and defense. But these creatures, at least, were never conscious of that impending fate nor had they any power to avert their doom. Is our species to go to a similar fate, but with its eyes open to the catastrophe? Commenting on this analogy Sir Alfred

Ewing [1] has remarked that command of nature has been put into man's hands before he has learned to command himself. This is one clear aspect of the situation that stands as a challenge to all the moral and ethical forces of mankind.

Many of the world's greatest scientists have in the recent past, before the present world conflict, been appalled at the threatened ruin of civilization made possible by prostituting the discoveries of science to the destructive uses of war. They have naturally disclaimed responsibility for such perversion of scientific truth and have sometimes laid the blame at the door of religion, which has failed to keep pace in moral growth with the discoveries of science and which has failed to assume its share in the immense responsibility for the constructive utilization of the unleashed forces of the physical world.

Religion has indeed proved delinquent at this point. The fact is one thing; the reasons for that delinquency are quite another, and these have never received the consideration they deserve. Moreover, science can by no means disclaim responsibility for the outcome. Its earlier materialistic view of the world and its conception of the universe as a machine—beliefs based on the Newtonian physics and backed up by the claims of scientific accuracy and demonstrable truth—brought about a state of actual war between science and religion, also between science and morals, regardless of any formal declaration of hostility. The prelude to this conflict was a struggle between science and Christian theology in which science was forced to fight under heavy odds for its very existence.[2] It not only maintained its right to exist but carried the struggle into enemy territory with such vigor that organized religion gladly declared a truce and eagerly sought to minimize the

grounds of conflict. In the light of that truce it might be urged that it is not the proved results of science that have been in opposition to religion. Indeed, advocates of religion have not infrequently made this observation and, on the strength of it, declared that religion therefore has no conflict with science. The basic implications and the working hypothesis of natural science have, however, never ceased in the past century to be implacably and irreconcilably opposed to religion.

Morals cannot thrive without faith in the reality of human values. A mechanistic view of the world has no need or place for life, will, or personality, and they appear in any such system as illusions. In the struggle over this issue religion, being forced to accept the demonstrable truths of science, found itself unable to deny effectively the possibility of truth to the presuppositions of science. To have attempted it seriously would have been to lay itself open to the charge of being unscientific, which would have been too heavy a handicap and yielded no compensating advantage. Science, accordingly, has won a complete, though Pyrrhic, victory. Religion and its basic tenets have been correspondingly discredited and belittled, with the result that a highly materialistic civilization throughout most of the world, and a civilization showing increasing evidence of a lack of moral fiber, has eventuated.

This conclusion constitutes no new indictment of science from without. The basic facts and premises are all freely admitted by the proponents of the newer physics. As indicated by Sir James Jeans, the mechanistic determinism of the older physics declared freedom to be an illusion and reduced the physical universe to a vast machine. Since human bodies are physical, the human race was accordingly regarded as a cog in the machine; human life

and effort seemed to become meaningless delusions, and our minds to be made up of nothing more than highly sensitized films.[3]

Or, as sketched by another eminent physicist, science, beginning with an attempt to find some simple substance or element to which everything could be reduced, developed by basing its theory only on observed facts and excluding all entities not consistent therewith or not necessary for their interpretation. The result was the atomic view of matter, and the doctrines of the uniformity of nature, the conservation of energy, and electromagnetism. On the basis of these conclusions "a closed mechanistic order of nature was constructed, forming a rigid deterministic scheme. Into this scheme, it has been difficult, if not impossible, to fit entities like life and mind." [4]

It is freely confessed that the older science, by reducing life substantially to matter and questioning the existence of mind, produced "a predominantly materialistic view of the world." The same writer speaks of "the iron determination of the older science, so contrary to direct human experience, so destructive of the free activity of life and mind, as well as subversive of the moral responsibility of the individual." [5] The older physics is now discounted, since its proponents imagined that they studied an objective universe, existing independently of the perceiving mind.[6] This interpretation had permitted nineteenth-century science to preserve much of the common-sense view of things, including matter, space, and time; it was "a system of purified, glorified common sense," except that its determinism stood in open opposition to the common man's belief in free will.[7]

The twentieth century has brought a change in modern science which can be characterized as nothing short of

revolutionary and which was bound to have far-reaching repercussions that would basically affect all of man's working conceptions. We are particularly concerned here with the changed beliefs concerning the status of matter, life, and mind that have come about as direct results of recent scientific advances. The summary of these results may now be stated.

First, then, with respect to matter: we find that with the twentieth century science began to get at factors which were beyond observation, but nevertheless "necessary to account for the facts of observation." Hence "appeared radiations, electrons and protons, . . . and matter itself . . . practically disappeared in electrical energy." Out of this entire process there arose the mechanistic world view which, in spite of Christianity, has held sway since Galileo and Newton, and which now, since Einstein, has been a mathematician's conception "of which no mechanical model is possible." [8]

By 1908 time and space were seen to be "not separate things, but . . . elements of a deeper synthesis of space-time. Thus time is as much the essence of things as space." "The stuff of the world" immediately took on a different aspect, and "is thus envisaged as events instead of material things." The modification of space by time destroyed the older conception and "substituted a flexible, variable continuum," whose undulations "constitute, to our senses, what we call a material world." So scientific thought proclaims that space-time bids fair to become "the scientific concept for the only physical reality of the universe," with matter, energy, and the like becoming mere configurations thereof. Thus "a new space-time world has emerged, which is essentially immaterial." [9]

Over against this continuum of space-time arose, at the

turn of the century, the quantum theory of Max Planck, whereby energy is shown to be granular and "the quantum appears to behave like a particle, but a particle outside of space or time," e.g. "a quantum of light is large enough to fill the lens of a 100 inch telescope, but it is also small enough to enter an atom." "Space-time therefore does not seem to exist for the quantum." Without any scientific doubt, these discoveries of physical research "have at last completely shattered the traditional common sense view of the material world." [10]

It has accordingly come to pass that "theoretical physics is no longer concerned to study the Newtonian universe." [11] "The older mechanistic conception of nature made up of fixed material particles mechanically interacting is . . . now being modified by the quantum physics." It can scarcely be overemphasized that "the attack on mechanism thus coming from physics itself is therefore all the more deadly. Even in physics, organization is becoming more important than the somewhat nebulous entities which enter into matter." [12] "Materialism has practically disappeared" and the universe is recognized as thoroughly organic.[13]

As a natural result, the task of physical science as conceived at present is a very modest one. Instead of presuming to study an objective universe independent of man's mind, it now attempts to reduce "to law and order the impressions that the universe makes on our senses. It is not concerned with what lies beyond these gateways of knowledge. It is in fact concerned with appearances rather than reality," [14] which it nevertheless believes lies beyond, but which it can never know.[15]

Scientists are, however, careful to warn us that this should not be taken to mean that what was called matter has turned out to be an illusion, but that the reality which

lies behind phenomena, behind all that our senses report to us, is now recognized to be beyond the realm of the physical as formerly conceived. For all practical purposes of theoretical thought, from the standpoint of the newer science of physics, we live in an *immaterial, invisible universe*. It is noteworthy that scientists have themselves pointed out that the effect of this change upon our sense of ultimate values and upon the meaning of life and human destiny can scarcely be overestimated. We have already seen how it eliminates the mechanistic view of the universe. And according to the same physicists, "this liberation of life and spirit from the iron rule of blind necessity is one of the greatest gains from recent scientific advances." [16] Its full significance from the same standpoint of the newer physics remains to be assessed by an examination of the place of life in the newer scientific concept of the universe.

As already mentioned, the older science had no room for life in its scheme of things. How then does life fare in the newer frame? "The space-time relativity concept of the world has destroyed the old concept of matter by reducing it . . . to a special organization of the basic world structure"; and furthermore, "if matter is thus essentially immaterial structure or organization, it cannot fundamentally be so different from organism or life, which is best envisaged as a principle of organization." [17] Thus does science suggest a way of bridging "the great gulf between the material and the vital." [18]

A complete appraisal of the place of life according to the newer thought cannot be made apart from a consideration of mind, but enough has been indicated to show that far from being a troublesome supernumerary, as in the older science, its structural place in the nature of things is now fully recognized. It would be difficult to

overemphasize the new dignity, worthfulness, and poise that are thereby conferred upon life.

We find, then, that, as matter is declared to be "fundamentally configuration or organization of space time," so life is described as "a principle of organization whereby space-time patterns are arranged into organic unities," and mind is recognized as "an even more potent embodiment of the organizing whole-making principle." The manifestation rises from the lowest levels of life up to conscious mind, "an active, conative, organizing principle," ever making "new patterns . . . thoughts or principles, out of . . . its own experience"; "beginning as . . . blind tropisms, reflexes, and conditioned reflexes . . . in man, it has become nature's supreme organ of understanding, endeavor and control, not merely a subjective human organ, but nature's own power of self-illumination and self-mastery: 'The eye with which the universe beholds itself and knows itself divine.' "

Free creativeness of mind is recognized to be scientifically possible "because . . . the world consists not of material stuff but of patterns, of organization, the evolution of which involves no creation of a world out of nothing. The purely structural character of reality thus helps to render possible and intelligible the free creativeness of life and mind, and accounts for the unlimited wealth of fresh patterns which mind freely creates." [19] To the scientist "life through the ages shows clearly a creative advance to ever more complex organization . . . while mind is responsible for the creation of a whole realm of values," so that he feels "justified in stressing . . . an increasing measure of freedom and creativeness in the world sufficient at least to account for organic evolution and for the appearance of moral law."

It is asserted that "materialism and the unintelligible trinity of common sense (matter, life, and mind)" are now put "on the way to a new monism"; [20] matter and life are now seen to be "approaching each other in the ultimate constituents of the world." Nature is envisaged "not as a closed physical cycle but has the door left open to the emergence of life, mind and . . . personality, and in its open, flexible physical patterns, has laid the foundation and established the environment for the coming of life and mind." No more is there evidence of a "deadly struggle between cosmic and moral law" (Huxley). Scientists now recognize that "the very possibility of knowledge and science depends on an intimate relation between mind and the physical universe. Only thus can concepts of mind come to be a measure for the facts of the universe, and the laws of nature come to be revealed and interpreted by nature's own organ of the human mind." "Matter, life and mind thus translate roughly into organization, organism and organizer." Attention is called to the all-or-none law of the quantum, life, and mind "as another indication that they may all be but different stages or levels of the same activity of the world," and that all three thus evolve "as members of a genetic series, a growing, evolving, creative universe." [21]

It is clear that compulsion still causes change, "but it no longer seems impossible that part of the compulsion may originate in our own minds." Nature has ceased to be regarded "as a closed system detached from the perceiving mind." Perceiver and perceived are recognized as "interacting parts of a single system," and whereas the old physics rated freedom as illusory, the new grants that it may be real.[22]

It is a noteworthy event as well as a distinct spiritual

asset when eminent scientists can and do say that the "highest reach of this creative process is seen in the realm of values, which is the product of the human mind," that no less great than the physical universe is our evaluation of it in language, literature, culture, art, science, morals, and religion, and that "without this revelation of inner meaning, the external world would be but an empty shell or a crumpled surface." [23]

It may not be too much to assert that among the human values "science ranks with art and religion," that "in its selfless pursuit of truth and in its vision of order and beauty" . . . it is beginning to appeal to the aesthetic and religious in people, or that "science is perhaps actually the clearest revelation of God to our age." It is heartening to realize that among scientists there is a growing sense of obligation that, whereas science is still separate from art and religion, "one of the greatest tasks before the race will be to link up science with ethical values." Science is thus becoming aware that "it must help to close this dangerous gap." Hence it may well be true that "science is destined to become the most effective drive towards ethical values and in that way to render its most priceless human service." [24]

The scientist can therefore feel warranted in declaring that "the human spirit is not a pathetic wandering phantom of the universe, but is at home, and meets with spiritual hospitality and response everywhere," and that "our deepest thoughts and emotions and endeavors are but responses to stimuli . . . from an essentially friendly and kindred universe." [25] He may also properly claim that "in the emergence of life and mind we witness the birth or revelation of a new world out of the physical universe," that we are "spectators of what is perhaps the grandest event in the

history of our universe," and that "the great values and ideals retain their unfading glory and derive a new interest and force from their cosmic setting."

"Instead of the animistic or the mechanistic or the mathematical universe," we are called upon to behold "the genetic, organic, holistic universe," and to realize that "in this . . . universe, man is in very truth the offspring of the stars" and that "the world consists not only of electrons and radiations, but also of souls and aspirations." Beauty and holiness are admitted to be "as much aspects of nature as energy and entropy." [26]

Today there is a wide measure of agreement, which on the physical side of science approaches almost to unanimity, that the stream of knowledge is heading toward a non-mechanical reality; the universe begins to look more like a great thought than like a great machine. Mind no longer appears as an accidental intruder into the realm of matter; we are beginning to suspect that we ought rather to hail it as the creator and governor of the realm of matter—not of course our individual minds, but the mind in which the atoms out of which our individual minds have grown exist as thoughts.

The new knowledge compels us to revise our hasty first impressions that we had stumbled into a universe which either did not concern itself with life or was actively hostile to life. The old dualism of mind and matter, which was mainly responsible for the supposed hostility, seems likely to disappear, not through matter becoming in any way more shadowy or insubstantial than heretofore, or through mind becoming resolved into a function of the working of matter, but through substantial matter resolving itself into a creation and manifestation of mind. We discover that the universe shows evidence of a designing or controlling power that has something in common with our own individual minds . . . and while much in it may be hostile to the material appendages of life, much also is akin to the fundamental activities of life. . . . Those inert atoms in the primaeval slime which first began to

foreshadow the attributes of life were putting themselves more, and not less in accord with the fundamental nature of the universe.[27]

These are not the speculations of philosophers or theologians, but the considered opinions of eminent exponents of present-day scientific thought. No attempt has been made to give systematic completeness of detail, nor is it assumed that all competent scientists would subscribe to all of these statements, or that the picture thus presented is to be regarded as in any sense final.

We do venture to claim that enough has been offered to justify the statement that the war, any kind of war, between science and religion is, for the most part, over. No longer can it be claimed that science is the inevitable antagonist of religion or indifferent to spiritual values. On the contrary, the new advances of the twentieth century make science potentially the outstanding champion of spiritual values of our age, not excepting religion, and especially so because it has liquidated mechanical determinism and because it has opened the door of the here and now to an immaterial universe in which mind and thought, personality and values, are real factors.

In this connection traditional religion, having retreated and withdrawn its main line of defense of spiritual values from this world to the borderline of the hereafter, cannot be considered to be on equal terms with modern science in relation to human advancement today.

From this approach the relation of science to religion as a factor in human progress becomes clear. Science can contribute nothing to the nature or aim of religion. It is, however, particularly the province of science to interpret the meaning of the external world, and thereby to bring about sweeping changes of all sorts in the technique of

religion. Assured progress can never come from either one working alone, but only by the fullest coöperation of the two, for only so can man's truest adjustment to the clearest and fullest grasp of his environment be achieved.

The history of modern science is comparatively short, and in the recent past it has made enormous strides, strides that bring it into line with a spiritual interpretation of the universe. The history of organized religion, on the other hand, is enormously long and carries straight back to prehistoric times. Since the rise of modern science no decided change or striking forward advance has been made by religion. A true appraisal of the present effectiveness of organized religion will require a number of extended probes into the past.

CHAPTER III

RELIGION AS AN ALLOY[1]

1. Magic and Religion

WHEN religion first appeared at the dawn of history it was already institutionalized under the State. Temples had been built and priesthoods organized and placed in charge of public worship.[2] But long before this stage was fully developed, religion experienced its first serious conflict, a conflict between faith and reason, in many respects strikingly analogous to the more recent contest between religion and science.

Back in the very beginning of man's career as man, when he had acquired a crude but real language and, along with that, a new concept of spirits, he began not only to bow down to the superior threatening powers in order to gain their favor or avert their wrath, but also to observe and use his mind. In spite of many mysterious and inexplicable happenings in nature, there were also certain regular sequences of events that could be relied on. He noted, for example, that clouds regularly preceded rain and that thunder accompanied storms. In regions where there was scarcity of rain men began to ask, how can we have more rain? At this point some keen individual began to reason: clouds precede rain, therefore clouds are the cause of rain; if one could only produce clouds one could get the desired rain. But what is a cloud? Well, there are clouds of smoke and also clouds of dust, either quite easily pro-

duced. Let us make clouds and we shall control the rain. Or again, since thunder often accompanied storms, they reasoned: if one could but make thunder, one could get the rain that way. Well, what is thunder but a big noise in the sky? Let us make a huge drum that can be beaten with a noise like thunder and we shall compel it to rain.

Among primitive peoples all over the world rain-making rites, having many variations but all based on these premises, are known.[3] And this is but a sample of a vast number of similar prescriptions for controlling all the forces of nature and bending them to man's will. This was magic.[4] Reduced to the simplest terms its basis is: A precedes B, therefore A is the cause of B. Produce A or a substitute in some striking sense like it, and you will get B. Here was a real attempt to apply reason to natural phenomena, a genuine effort to be scientific and utilize the causal category; and when extended and systematized, it was made to cover the whole realm of nature. *Ex hypothesi,* by the use of certain formulae and symbolical acts, it put the physical world entirely under man's control. Our estimate of it is that it was a total failure, because it failed to use the causal category correctly. We know that what precedes is not necessarily the cause of what follows; and the presumption that like produces like is unscientific and totally overlooks the quantitative relation that must be assured between true cause and effect. Nevertheless, there was such apparent reality about the results that for thousands of years magic was accepted by mankind as an essentially valid system—as true science.

These people were not fools, however. They were in error about the causal category as well as in its application, but modern scientists have recently found themselves in the same sort of error, an error which eluded the keenest

scientific minds for over a century. Everybody supposed that the scientists were right. They have been proved wrong, however, and as a result the mechanistic theory of the universe has been discarded. Moderns cannot find too much fault with the adherents of ancient magic. But they can afford to look upon its earlier use tolerantly, as an episode in the childhood of the race and one now largely outgrown.

The relation of magic to religion is an entirely different matter and stands on quite a different footing. If magic can control the forces of nature, whether they be regarded as spiritual powers or merely physical, why should man ever think of bowing down to them? The question is pertinent, and if magic as a system had commended itself completely, men would naturally have given up religion as unnecessary and a waste of effort. As a matter of fact, this never seems to have consciously occurred anywhere; nevertheless, magic made such a strong appeal, especially when it came to the treatment of physical ills, that people were inclined to abandon the official priest of religion for the private magician. The appalling conditions that still obtain in many backward countries today because of lack of medical knowledge and skill give a faint idea of how desperate the situation must have been in actual primitive times.

There was therefore nothing capricious or accidental about the popular attitude toward the magician as a healer of disease. Nor was it due to the superior ability or cleverness, either to heal or to hoodwink, of the magician over the priest.

Appeal to the gods for healing, both directly through prayer and through the mediation of a priest by means of special offerings, was the normal procedure. But when

these acts had been performed, there was nothing more to do but wait for the Divine to act. This constituted no real treatment of the patient. Not so with the methods of the magician. From start to finish his procedure dramatized the process of driving out the demons of disease. The patient was made as aware as possible that he was the center of strange but impressive activities and ceremonies. The magician was waging a battle over him against the evil forces, and the ceremonies climaxed in symbolizations of victory. The sufferer was never left alone, but saw himself constantly dramatized as part of a spectacle. No matter how often the magician lost patients, there was here an undeniably sound basis for real gains in restored health. Here, then, was definite competition, with magic openly challenging religion. Organized religion saw in this a menace to its own prestige. How should it meet the challenge?

It is to be noted that religion did not find itself in a position to criticize either the premises or the seeming results of magic. People believed that they had been healed by the magician and that crops were made abundant by magical means. Religion accepted those results as genuine. Magic said that like produces like and that effect is preceded by cause. And religion could offer no protest. What religion did insist upon was that religion was greater than magic, that the power of the Deity as exercised through the priest was greater than the power of the merely human magician. If the magician could work wonders and heal diseases, religion through the priest must have the power to work greater wonders in the same circumstances. Such was the enormous concession that religion was willing to make to insure victory. Nor could there be any question as to the success of the procedure.

From that time forth, religion was always safely in the ascendant. Though independent magic was not eliminated, yet henceforth it played a more or less discredited, minor, and clandestine role.

The loss to religion was of staggering proportions, however. Whatever false claims had been made by the magician were now transferred to religion. Whatever sleight of hand or false reasoning had been used in magic was now transferred to the Deity. All the great gods of the early religions were consequently also recognized as great magicians.[5] Whatever false powers were attributed to the magicians, greater powers of the same character were always attributed to the Deity.

Thus religion conquered magic by incorporating its worst errors into the nature of the godhead, thereby putting magic into the very citadel and heart of religion and sanctifying utter nonsense and delusion as religion's most genuine marks of authenticity. This, therefore, constitutes religion's first great defeat, from which it has as yet by no means recovered, for far more of magic remains in all the historic religions than is generally recognized.

This was the unfortunate result of the first great contest between faith and reason. Religion was right in assuming that faith should be superior to reason; it was right in assuming that the power of religion was greater than the unaided skill and cunning of any individual; but it was deceived and led astray when it put false reasoning and the baseless claims of magic into the very heart of God. The marvel is that it could have survived at all after such a catastrophe. The error does help to explain why our own religion has progressed so little in two thousand years, and also why the spiritual progress of the race has been unable to keep pace with its scientific advances.

2. Organized Society and Religion

In early human society, before the rise of individualism, the course of religion and hence the extent to which it could achieve its primary aim were largely determined and controlled by a combination of three major factors: one popular, one political, and the third priestly.

The popular element expressed itself in the making of myths and sagas, which represent the play of popular imagination upon the common experience of the community in relation to the personified nature forces and the mystery of the world. This element produced myths of the creation of the world and of the origin of life and man upon the earth. Out of the same matrix of thought came the saga that set forth the character, functions, and activities of the great gods and also explained the rise of all lesser divine beings.

This manifestation threatened to reach fantastic proportions, since it represented the unbridled imagination in a field where the unknown, the awe-inspiring, and the terrifying were dominant, but it was restrained and held in check by the main organizing force of society, which, in settled life, usually becomes the State. The god of the ruler quite naturally became the state god; and all other cults tended to take a subordinate place because the ruler controlled the economic power of the community.

This outcome was still further assured by the introduction of the third factor, the state priesthood. In the earliest city-states the ruler originally considered himself to be not only the priest of his god, but, as in ancient Sumer,[6] regarded his religious and priestly functions as the most distinguished and important of his official position. Nevertheless, as the state expanded or came into conflict with

other states, the ruler was forced to devote more and more time to political matters and consequently to delegate an ever-increasing number of religious functions to subordinates, until these subordinates finally took over the cult services in the guise of a state priesthood, directly under and responsible to the ruler.

It was to the interest of the priests to see to it that the god of the ruler was supreme over all other gods of the realm. They could do this because their closeness to the ruler enabled them to command the necessary wealth to make the temple and the worship of the state god the most ornate and impressive in the country. Also it fell naturally to this priesthood to see to it that the popular myths and sagas about the various deities should be interpreted so as to redound to the supremacy of their own god. Particularly was it their task, if the state by conquest incorporated new territories containing highly cultured populations with their own philosophy and religion, to see that the resultant interpenetration of myth and saga, no matter how confused in other respects, should always contribute to the exaltation and glorification of their own god.

Long-continued political supremacy could thus not only bring about the supremacy of the state god over the realm controlled by the state, but could also, if the empire idea of government arose, promulgate a theoretical supremacy of that god over the world and its creation, preservation, and control, so that the divine prerogatives might approach universality. But this development would not of itself lead to monotheism, and it did not do so because there was in the ancient monarchies a political motivation against such a result. Just as the ruler gained more glory by having more and more subordinate rulers under him, so the god of the state was felt to be honored and exalted in

proportion to the number of deities over whom he stood triumphant. This is why nearly every Assyrian historical inscription of the empire period begins in the name of Asshur, the state god, and continues with a long list of subordinate deities.[7]

Thus politics was dominant in religion when all three factors were in full operation. And since the ruler was inevitably a despot, the religious benefits to the individual depended almost entirely upon the chief aims of the ruler. Like Hammurabi, of ancient Babylon, he might feel that he was divinely called upon to make justice prevail and to see that the strong did not oppress the weak; [8] or, like Khufu, of Egypt,[9] he might be obsessed with building a great pyramid as a mausoleum for himself, and have not the slightest thought or concern about how many thousands of helpless slaves were sacrificed in order to realize his ambitions. In any event, whatever religious values came to the individual depended largely on the political stability of the government; and when that fell into decay and disappeared, most of these values went with it.

In those societies in which a continuous tradition of political leadership was lacking, as in India, or had ceased to operate, as in Judaism, the priestly group took the place of political leaders and a ritualitic priestly religion eventuated, a religion whose first business was the safeguarding and promoting of priestly privileges and prerogatives. When this was made an end in itself, a caste system, with the priests as a fixed aristocracy at the top of the social scale, could arise, as it did in India. When the priesthood had as its main motive the restoration of national independence, its efforts, if unsuccessful, might end in a nationalistic church without a nation, as in Judaism.

Either of these outcomes may prove more stable and

enduring than a civilization dominated by politics, but in both the primary aim of religion for the individual will be obscured and perverted by the technicalities of priestly ritual and the primacy of class interest. Direct religious progress from this point is difficult. It may come if there is a revolt within the priestly ruling class from an overdone ritualism, as in the Upanishad movement in India; [10] or progress may take the form of a popular revolt, a religion of personal protest that may eventuate in the faith of an individual founder, as in Buddhism.[11]

In the early stages of civilization oral tradition was the great stabilizing factor in religion. We may liken religion in those times to a river where use and wont form the banks. As long as life moves on uniformly from generation to generation the religion of one age will also serve for another; but this no longer remains true when conditions radically change. As a rule, the masses of men do little more than withdraw their support when older religious forms cease to meet living needs and conditions. As this inadequacy is realized, religious ardor gradually cools and zeal for official religion slackens. But beliefs continue for long periods after their lack of assured application is felt. Moreover it is a far cry from belief to open skepticism, and even when the latter stage is reached by some individuals, the *mores* of the community, in conjunction with official sanction and support, often keep an outworn form of religion in operation for generations after it has ceased to serve the higher needs of the group. Such forms are usually worn down by attrition rather than by any open hostility, and especially are they affected by the withdrawal of people to other cults that seem to promise more or that are, at least, different.

As has already been emphasized, there is a constant in

the aim of religion which urges men to seek to conserve personal values. When a given form of religion seems to the individual to fail to do this he turns away from it reluctantly, but as naturally as the animal does from food that lacks taste or nourishment. Avowed rebels against a religion are rare. The general reaction is one of disappointment and disillusionment rather than of resentment or criticism. Nevertheless, from time immemorial there have been outstanding individuals who have openly revolted against existing religious usage, but here again seldom if ever with the deliberate intent to set up a rival cult. This has been so because the very impetus to revolt against, rather than to desert, a given form of religion was possible only when the individual had a deep and abiding faith in the fundamental truth of the religion concerned. He saw it as true, but as badly handled by the officials of religion; or he saw it partly misconceived and poorly applied. Always the stimulating and decisive thing was that religion was working badly; it was manifestly not conserving the values of life. Our individual accordingly protested against misapplications of an accepted form of religion. So far as theory was concerned, any correction had to be gauged by past usage. From the standpoint of present application the measure of inefficiency was apprehended in the light of past conditions. The revolt, therefore, was, on the whole, almost entirely due to an effort to purify existing religion and to purge it of excrescences and perversions. It can also be confidently asserted that such protests have usually arisen when religion had been overloaded with magical, political, and economic elements.

The protesters have, consequently, nearly always been positive, not negative, constructive, not inconoclastic. They have sought to benefit society by restoring religion

to a purer state. In spirit they were unselfish benefactors of society and religion; but they have scarcely ever been so regarded in their own times. For no matter how great was the need of redress from the standpoint of the common man, he was neither organized nor articulate, whereas the official custodians of religion were both, and stood to lose in power, emoluments, and prestige by any modification of religious forms that might benefit the average individual. Through the ages, therefore, the official spokesmen of religion have, almost without exception, been against any decided change in the status quo of religion. The protesters against abuses and manifest perversions of religion, who had every right to expect that official religion would welcome correction and improvement, almost invariably found the door to reform shut and bolted and themselves very soon on the outside—the objects of obloquy and persecution. The result was that, according to their strength of character and enlightenment, they either subsided and disappeared, or became leaders of new movements. Out of such perseverance came the founders of new religions. There is no evidence to show that any of these ever said: "Go to now, let us start a new religion." On the contrary, the proofs are manifold that these leaders clung desperately and pathetically to the older household of faith until forcibly ejected and compelled to fend for themselves.

The further back we go in recorded time the more ironclad and absolute we find the force of tradition to have been, particularly with respect to religion. In the earliest times, accordingly, it is mostly by inference that we discern individual dissenters. As isolated individuals in a world where individualism was yet unrecognized and unknown, their power was negligible and the fear they could inspire

was little more than that caused today by a person who has run amuck. They might furnish an unpleasant episode or so, but the existing order had nothing directly to fear from them. Such persons could safely be treated with scorn, contempt, and condescension, or, for that matter, utterly ignored.

The one thing that could free society to any extent from the crushing weight of outworn tradition was the social upheaval which came from war-provoking national rivalries. The resultant sweeping changes in religious theory, no matter how destructive of human goods and values, nevertheless furnished some opportunities for fresh starts and for new experiments in faith and practice.

3. Nationalism and Religion

Nationalism and religion grew up together as two aspects of organized society. But the nation existed for itself, whereas religion existed for the welfare of the nation. Furthermore, every nation, as an economic unity, was potentially the deadly enemy of every other; and, no matter how refined, kind, and just any nation might become within its own borders, the world, viewed as a congeries of nations, was little short of a jungle of wild beasts ever ready to devour one another and so to turn all the love and kindness engendered within them individually into hate and cruelty toward outsiders. There was thus nothing in nationhood itself that could keep a nation from destroying the values of life which it had nurtured and fostered internally or that could prevent it from destroying itself by conflict with other nations. This still remains true.

Unless religion, which centers primarily in the individual and whose aim is to conserve the values of personality, is able to curb and transcend nationalism, no per-

manent civilization, no enduring world of humanity can be expected to emerge. No religion thus far has been able to tame the wild beast in nationalism. Both the reach and the limitations of the world religions in this matter may be seen in Christianity, a religion advocating world brotherhood, but without the power to curb nationalism and hence to restrain it from destroying civilization. If this were the whole story, we might feel compelled to say that the organization of society had proved an utter failure and to admit that complete anarchism might be more desirable.

Fortunately, this is not the whole story. On the contrary it is heartening to realize that twenty-seven hundred years ago nationalism in religion in ancient Israel produced a thought revolution which repudiated this ideal and provided in its place the first sound formula for saving nationalism from itself, thereby supplying the foundations for a higher working synthesis of human society. That such a priceless tool could have been in existence and unused so long is only another indication of the slow and halting process of the education of the race.

The conditions and factors which brought about this revolution are found in varying degrees in the life of all nations. That it came to full realization in only one is in accord with the highest achievements of man's spirit in other fields. Since this particular development is with little doubt man's most significant single accomplishment for his future welfare on this planet, it deserves as full an understanding and therefore as complete an analysis as possible.

We have already found that religion always centers in the effort to preserve the values of personality; also that in order to preserve these values, social organization was at once necessary, and that it went forward, on an ever-increasing scale, until nationalism was reached.

Furthermore, we have seen that when nationalism was achieved in the organized state, politics and religion were fully amalgamated. The head of the state was de facto the head of the national cult. But increased political duties made it necessary for him to delegate his priestly functions to others.

The persons first selected for this purpose would, as a rule, have already been known as religious experts and would have been recognized for their skill in dealing with the unseen world. Theoretically in primitive society any person could perform religious rites; but, as in other fields of human endeavor, certain persons developed special abilities in dealing with the spiritual world and thus gained the reputation of experts in religion. Such were the so-called medicine men of early times. Their ability to deal with the occult powers made them outstanding individuals in the community; at the same time they were private practitioners. When such a person entered the service of the ruler, he became both the special medicine man of the king and a public official subsidized by the state. His chief business hitherto had been to satisfy the demands of individuals made upon him in special emergencies; now his whole time was devoted to the securing of omens and oracles for the king and in performing sacrifices to the national god.

The regularizing of these functions through a long period of use and wont gradually produced a more or less stereotyped ritual that monopolized the time of the priest and so left little or no room for the practice of other functions associated with the medicine man, such as the manifestation of abnormal mental states, physical ecstasy, visions, and soothsaying. The demand for these things arose from the crises of private life, including birth, sickness, and death, and hence did not develop an official class.

These functions did, however, call for special aptitudes and qualities of personality, which, as society became more stabilized, produced the magicians, prophets, and seers of ancient times, men who were "possessed" by the Deity, "filled" with the Divine and hence often "beside themselves," "seized" by God, so that what they spoke was the "Word of God," not their own. Official state control and the solidifying of tradition, as we have seen, tended to hold ancient religion in a very rigid, unchanging pattern; but through the seer, the man who held converse with the mysterious spiritual powers, there was an outlet for private initiative in religion. In an age before the rise of individualism, here was a chance for the individual to assert himself with authority, because he spoke with the voice of God and could also through magic bid the forces of nature do his will. The magic, we know, was false. The seizures and states of frenzy and ecstasy were due to unbalanced physical and mental conditions which are well understood today to be pathological. Nevertheless, they served the purpose of opening the door of prophetic inspiration to certain unusual individuals, thus enabling them to utilize their personal experience to interpret religion and affording them a channel of direct communication with the Divine. The prestige of this ability could act as a counterbalance to the stereotyped authority of official religion and the status quo imposed by tradition.

As long as such persons remained unsocial in their attitude and used their occult power simply as a means of gaining personal prestige for themselves, official religion had to protect itself from them as best it could. We have already seen one result of this in the incorporation of magic in religion. The fact that this aptitude furnished almost the only avenue to personal power and distinction for the

individual unless aided from without, tended to make the possessor guard it jealously. On the other hand, there were many occasions such as the occurrence of drought, pestilence, famine, or invasion when the man of occult powers was called upon for assistance, and he may then have felt a very definite community of interest with his patrons. Usually such occasions were too sporadic and local, and the individualistic tendency was too strong a counterbalance, to socialize the private religious practitioners; besides, the jealousy of official religion was ever present. There was always the possibility, furthermore, that such free lances in religion would align themselves with certain elements in the community against an oppressive regime. Or a man of strong personality might break away from the administration of official religion and take an attitude of opposition under divine guidance. These alternatives, however, belong, on the whole, to later and more complex stages of political and social development.

If men of mantic powers should be touched by a spirit of patriotism in the formative stages of a nation, so that they would have something vital to do with the establishment of the nation, we should have a situation well suited to socialize this aspect of religious experience and thereby to lend it the possibility of becoming fruitful in the promotion of higher religion in man.

CHAPTER IV

NATIONALISTIC RELIGION IN ISRAEL

THE conditions described in the preceding chapter were realized historically in their most complete form by the people of ancient Israel, during the process of establishing the monarchy in the eleventh century B.C., in what is known as the "prophetic movement." The initial story is told in the first book of Samuel.

It so happened in the thirteenth century B.C. that two peoples, at about the same time and quite unbeknown to each other, sought to get possession of West Jordan Palestine, the Israelites coming in from the east and the Philistines from the west. The clans of Israel had crossed the Jordan from the east and pressed into the hill country, capturing a few fortified cities, but for the most part living in unwalled villages as a rural population. The period of the "Judges" followed. There was open conflict between the fortified Canaanite cities and the Israelites.[1] The newcomers were frequently preyed upon by desert Bedouin,[2] and there was a certain amount of fighting among themselves,[3] but all of these incidents were among people of the same racial stock, who shared common religious traditions and customs and who pretty well understood each other. The Israelites, however, had hardly gained a foothold in the hill country of Central Palestine and come to some sort of realization of their common tribal interests, when they found themselves in conflict with a people of a totally different race and religious background.

The Philistines were from Asia Minor, having been dislodged and swept southward along the eastern end of the Mediterranean in a great southern surge of population made up of what are known as the Sea Peoples,[4] which threatened even Egypt. When the tide ebbed before Egypt's successful resistance, the Philistines gained lodgment in the coastal plain of Palestine; and, finding themselves thus in possession of the richest land in the country and astride its greatest trade route, they gradually pushed their way into the less attractive hinterland of the hill country. The exploits of Samson [5] reflect the earliest contacts of the two peoples, representing a period of mutual reprisals and border forays.

In the events which are the basis of the traditions that now cluster around the prophet Samuel the conflict of the two peoples reached a climax. Dedicated from his birth to the priestly service of the temple at Shiloh in the hill country of Ephraim,[6] Samuel is best known as a prophet whose career marks the end of the period of the "Judges" and the rise of the monarchy in Israel. While Samuel was still a child the sacred ark in the temple at Shiloh was carried into battle against the Philistines and captured by the enemy.[7] Thereafter the temple from which it was taken disappeared, very probably having been destroyed by the Philistines; [8] this signalized their initial triumph over the Israelites and the establishment of their dominance over certain sections of the hill country. The child Samuel likewise disappeared at this time and did not reappear until, as an aged seer, he suddenly became the rallying point of Israelite nationalism against the rigid overlordship of the Philistines.

The Israelites were denied the right of public assembly [9] and the possession of weapons of war.[10] To make doubly

sure that they remained unarmed, no forges were permitted in Israel; hence, to sharpen their plowpoints Israelite farmers were obliged to go down to the Philistines.[11] Furthermore, the country was garrisoned under such stern repression that a religious patriotic movement in the name of Israel's God broke out; it too is represented as centered in the prophet Samuel.[12] His leadership first becomes evident on the occasion of Samuel's private anointing of Saul, the son of Kish, to be king.[13]

Saul's initial act thereafter was to identify himself with the prophetic movement.[14] This incident gives us our earliest historic view of that movement in Israel. Saul, it is said, on his way home from the house of Samuel met a band of prophets (*nabiim*) coming down from a place of worship on a hilltop where there was also a Philistine fort. Their progress was accompanied by music on four different kinds of instruments; through the excitement of the music, and perhaps also by means of sacred dancing, they wrought themselves into such a frenzy that Saul, an innocent bystander, was involuntarily drawn into their circle and acted as one of them.[15]

His behavior is described by a Hebrew word that later comes to mean, "to prophecy" in the customary manner. But other terms used at that time for the same phenomena signify, "to foam at the mouth," "to act like a madman," "to act like one possessed." In keeping with this idea, Saul's behavior on that occasion is explained as a violent seizure by the spirit of the deity, that is, as a form of divine possession.[16] This corresponds with a general conception back of all such phenomena at that level of religious development. It is assumed that when the person has worked himself into a frenzy or trance in the name of a god his own personality is displaced and the deity takes

possession, so that whatever is said or done in such a state is not to be attributed to the man himself but to the deity who has thus taken possession of him. This, in Israel, is sometimes called ecstatic prophecy.

In this earliest historical phase of prophecy there is no record of anything of importance that was said by any person possessed, nor is there any indication that anything that might have been said under such circumstances was cherished as important. At this time the emphasis seems to have been upon the fact of possession and upon what one did, or was empowered to do, in that state. Other primitive features, such as the stripping-off of clothing, swoons or trances and seizures that showed by what happened that the person was not using his own will, are all later illustrated by Saul in his attempt to arrest David.[17] The range of phenomena described leaves no doubt as to the psychological nature of such "possession" or its religious level. It was in no sense peculiar to Israel; on the contrary, an example of it is recorded in Palestine before Israel ever arrived there.[18]

The new thing, then, was not the phenomenon, but its association with the spirit of patriotism in devotion to a common god. Private and largely personal utilization of these manifestations is noticeable by its absence. The community interest of the movement did more than dominate, for it was creative of national leadership and a stimulator of patriotic fervor at a time of hopelessness and despair and against great human odds. From this standpoint the movement was unique. On the one hand, its devotees relinquished reason in devotion to the national god; on the other, they were ready to give their lives with singleness of purpose for the deliverance of the community from the heel of the oppressor.

Here were religion and nationalism in process of becoming; yet neither could well have come to fruition without the other. Under the circumstances, patriotism, without more than human aid, was virtually hopeless. Likewise, devotion to their god to the extent of swooning and falling into trances could do nothing of itself to relieve the rigors of oppression. But the two allegiances combined gave new strength and direction to both.

From a human standpoint it was the difference between a man unarmed and repressed and a man empowered and possessed by a god. A practical outcome was the gift of courage: first, the courage of leadership, the leadership of Saul; then, the courage of the people to stand and fight (when the Hebrews first tried to face their foes most of them ran away); [19] and, finally, the courage to carry on guerilla warfare for over a generation against heavy odds, never acknowledging defeat.

From the standpoint of religion the change was even more significant. The belief that certain individuals could not only communicate effectively with the spirit world, but could also become the instrumentality through which a divine being directly and authoritatively expressed himself to men was very general from the most primitive times. This power, however, tended to become the monopoly of the few and to be used for the exclusive personal advantage of its possessors. In Israel there was now the same manifestation, but with the added technique for extending it to an ever-widening circle and with its purpose definitely focused upon the welfare of the community in time of crisis. Under such circumstances, this necessity called above everything else for heroic action, and thus put a very definite restraint upon trances and abnormal mental states, since guerilla warfare requires the utmost

alertness, and the possession of all one's faculties. As has been said, the struggle for freedom from the Philistine yoke went on for over a generation, and the more devoted one was to the national god the more active in mind and body he needed to be. National freedom and national consciousness were finally gained in the name of the national god; the prophets were the primary sponsors and supporters of this cause.

It is easy to understand, therefore, why, when the kingdom was established, the prophets received a place of honor as advisers to the king. Their numbers were considerable. It is said that there were four hundred at the court of King Ahab.[20] In times of peace these prophets tended to become idle courtiers, and therefore to degenerate into social parasites.[21] Nevertheless, as a class, they never lost their prestige. Kings consulted them when about to make war, and in other matters of national concern, because they spoke as oracles of the Lord.[22] Indeed the much-repeated "Thus saith the Lord" of the Old Testament goes back to their form of utterance. Moreover, whenever a crisis or disaster threatened, so long as the nation existed, these prophets stood out prominently as its defenders and as the defenders of its god against all other nations and gods.

The climax of Israel's nationalistic philosophy is reached in the narratives of the so-called Judean and Ephraimite prophetic schools of writers, who, in the ninth and eighth centuries B.C., related the epic of Israel from the creation of the world to their own day, all to the glory of the national god. The nationalism of both schools is explicit.

The Judean is openly pessimistic about humanity as such.[23] According to this narrative men were disobedient to God from the first and were put under a curse.[24] They

not only failed to learn by experience but, on the contrary, became more and more corrupt, until God felt compelled to destroy the entire world by a flood,[25] preserving only the one family that was found to be righteous. Nevertheless, the descendants of Noah failed to live up to the reputation of their father and speedily revealed the evil tendencies of their more remote ancestry.[26] However, the Lord was again able to find a righteous man, Abraham by name, and he chose him and his descendants through Isaac and Jacob-Israel to be his peculiar people.[27] And about these the Judean account is completely optimistic.[28] Its national ideal is Jacob, who is here identified with Israel. Jacob, therefore, in all his dealings with others signifies Israel in its dealings with other peoples.

Jacob's name is interpreted to mean "the heeler," "the supplanter," and this is illustrated by Jacob's relation to his elder brother Esau, who represents the earlier settlers south of Israel in Edom. These were recognized as an older tribe, yet one so close to Israel that the relation was expressed uniquely as that of a twin brother. It is said that although Esau was born first, yet when Jacob came forth he already held Esau by the heel.[29] As the first born of Isaac, Esau had the right to inherit the major portion of his father's estate,[30] here interpreted to include the land of Canaan as promised to Abraham,[31] but Jacob deprived his brother of it through a sharp bargain in which he took advantage of Esau's hunger.[32] Again through trickery, Jacob deceived his blind old father and got the paternal blessing, which promised him supremacy over Esau.[33]

Furthermore, by superior cunning and deceit, Jacob became rich at the expense of his father-in-law Laban in Paddan-Aram.[34] On his return to Palestine he warded off the possible wrath of his brother Esau by a gift cunningly

devised to seem greater than it really was.[35] He made a marriage alliance with the Canaanites of the city of Schechem but used its provisions to slay treacherously all the inhabitants and to plunder the city.[36]

Jacob always succeeds, and by his own shrewdness and initiative. He shows the same spirit also in religion. Although God appears to him in a dream [37] at Bethel, when he is on his way to seek his fortune, and promises to make him the head of a great nation and to give him the land whereon he rests, Jacob makes no immediate commitments. On the other hand, he lays down very definite conditions: if God will indeed protect him and give him success on his venture through the next twenty years and bring him back again in peace to his father's house, then the Lord will be accepted as his God; [38] and when these conditions are fulfilled God shall receive a tenth of all that he gains. Again, on his way back to Canaan, when he is plagued by fear of his brother Esau so that he cannot sleep, he wrestles on the bank of the stream called "The Wrestler" (Jabbok) all night with God as one man wrestles with another. Jacob on this occasion expresses no consciousness of sin or penitence for past wrongdoing, of which there has been much. He merely insists on further blessing and particularly on protection and safety from his brother Esau, whom he has doubly wronged. And since, according to this narrative, it was necessary for the Deity to withdraw before the light of day, and since Jacob, evidently well aware of this, refuses to release him, the narrative admits that God was virtually forced to yield to his requests.[39]

All this is told of Jacob with the relish of complete approval. Jacob's conduct is never criticized, nor are any ill effects from Jacob's actions pointed out. The reason is

obvious. Jacob in all his dealings stands for the nation. This becomes explicit in a final burst of national optimism:

> The Lord his God is with him
> And shouts in honor of a king are in his midst . . .
> Now can it be said to Jacob and to Israel,
> What hath God wrought!
> Behold the people rises up as a lioness
> And as a lion does he lift himself up.
> He shall not lie down until he eats the prey
> And drinks the blood of the slain.[40]

The lion is clearly the nation, and the slain, other nations.

This is unmitigated nationalism in religion. There are no human rights beyond the national boundary. Nothing that may be done against other nations is wrong, for they are the enemies of God. The writers are prophets who see the world in national perspective. They are aware of the providence of their God through many centuries.

The Ephraimite prophetic narrative traverses essentially the same ground, and is generally conceded to be of considerably later date. It is, however, in its present form at least, much less complete. There is here no story of the beginning of the world or of the race. Its interest starts and ends with Israel. Its nationalism is no less rigorous and confident than the Judean:

> How goodly are thy tents O Jacob,
> Thy dwellings O Israel . . .
> He has as it were the strength of the wild ox;
> He shall devour nations that are his adversaries,
> And shall break their bones in pieces.
> He couched, he lay down like a lion
> And like a lioness, who dares arouse him?
> Blessed be every one that blesses you,
> And cursed be every one that curses you.[41]

Nevertheless, it differs markedly in the appreciation of ethical relations. In other words, it has come to see the deleterious effects which the ideal of a ruthless nationalism might have upon human relations within the nation itself. Abraham, the friend of God, the first chosen progenitor of the Israelites, is on the whole presented as the "exalted father" of the nation, as his name, Abram, implies. Yet in the Judean narrative Abraham openly prevaricates. Thus, in order to avoid bodily harm when in Egypt, he passes off his wife as his sister and allows her to be taken into the harem of Pharaoh without protest, so that only divine intervention brings out the truth and rescues Sarah from shame.[42]

The Ephraimite narrative has a strikingly similar story about Abraham and Sarah in a foreign land,[43] but the motivation and the outcome are quite different. Abraham does indeed declare that Sarah is his sister,[44] but the narrative is very careful to have Abraham explain: "and moreover she is indeed my sister, the daughter of my father but not the daughter of my mother." [45] Such relations of consanguinity were well known in the ancient Near East and in polygamous countries generally, the result being that the patriarch Abraham did not tell a lie; he simply failed to tell all the truth. Furthermore, Sarah is not allowed to be polluted by being taken into the harem of the ruler. God is represented as being very scrupulous to warn Abimelech in a dream against such a heinous offense, and so to save him from the sin, as well as Sarah from the sinner.[46]

As for Jacob-Israel, he is the same tricky character in the Ephraimite account as in the Judean, but his motivation is decidely different. He never does anything underhanded of his own initiative. His mother prompts him to deceive

his father.[47] His other transactions of a questionable character are first commanded by God, usually in a dream.[48] Jacob is, therefore, not a treacherous person; on the contrary, he becomes, rather, the great example to the nation of the God-directed man. The narrative shows no awareness that the transfer of unethical qualities from man to God raises, in the end, greater ethical problems than it solves; and this is so because nationalism in religion is still unquestioned. Hence, however the deity may deal with other peoples, such treatment can furnish no analogies for the Israelites' dealings with one another. These writers nevertheless have come to see that national well-being is not entirely assured by the power of the national god and by loyalty to him. They also see that wrong conduct, as a result of wrong national ideals of character, may affect and undo to a considerable extent the benefits of a powerful god and of religious devotion.

This emphasis on the ethical character of the patriarchs shows that they have ceased to be mere symbols of the national entity and are coming more and more to be looked upon as personal ideals for human living within the nation. This is understandable in the Ephraimite narrative, since it also sets forth for the first time in Israel the essentially spiritual character of God. The gross anthropomorphism of the Judean narrative, which tells of the Lord walking in the garden to catch the cool evening breeze,[49] or being entertained as a guest, having his feet washed and partaking of fresh veal and unleavened bread,[50] or appearing as a man and carrying on a direct conversation in broad day,[51] is no longer thinkable to the Ephraimite prophets. God is a spirit: "No man hath seen God at any time." A single exception is made of Moses, who is regarded as a unique personality of the distant

past,[52] and the phenomenon has not been repeated. God's principal way of manifesting himself is now in dreams, when deep slumber falls upon men.[53] It was only natural that this realization of the purely spiritual nature of God should also cause these prophets to lay new emphasis on the spiritual in man, and hence to discriminate ethical qualities and motives.

In the Judean and Ephraimite narratives the ethical prophets of the eighth century B.C. had before them two classical expressions of nationalism in religion. Here were mirrored half a millennium of the good providence of their national god; here, too, was apparent his creative activity in the world, as well as his rulership over nature and the destinies of men, though he was by no means assumed to be the only god. His power to protect the people was unquestioned. His general good will toward Israel was assumed to be proved on the basis of the nation's past. His partiality to Israel and his attitude of ruthless cruelty toward other peoples, however, as well as certain unaccountable outbursts of wrath against Israel itself, showed that he was regarded as essentially capricious in character; it was to meet this situation that the sacrificial system of the day had been fostered and perpetuated.

One other feature of nationalistic prophecy calls for comment at this point. Since the prophets were primarily instrumental in inaugurating the kingdom and the kingship and since they later became the advisers of the crown, it is logical to expect that they would be loyal supporters of the government. They very early began, however, to show sharp discrimination between the prosperity of the government and the welfare of the nation. The schism which divided the kingdom was, according to the present Hebrew text, instigated by a prophet. This tradition is

now shown to have been due to later editing.[54] If the prophets felt that the national religion was imperilled or seriously compromised, they were ready not only to defy the ruler but to overthrow the reigning house by bloody revolution.[55] As a rule they stood by the king, but it was possible in the ninth century B.C. for a prophet squarely to oppose him.[56] Considerably later, a school of prophets decided that the kingship was a pernicious institution which God never intended.[57] Thus independence in thought and action were never entirely destroyed by government subsidy. Yet by the middle of the eighth century B.C. their general reputation had degenerated so far that the first great ethical prophet felt obliged to say that he was neither a prophet nor a prophet's son.[58]

It is, moreover, against these prophets, as the champions of nationalism in religion, that the advocates of ethical religion in Israel from the eighth century B.C. onward inveigh as the "false prophets." Yet after the nation had fallen and a new hope of a restored nation had arisen, the nationalistic type of prophecy was perpetuated and its adherents became just as ardent exponents of the ideal of religious nationalism as they had been formerly the champions and defenders of the actuality. The teachings of this entire group, so far as preserved, are found in the Pentateuchal prophetic narratives, in the "Former Prophets" of the Hebrew Canon—Joshua, Judges, Samuel, and Kings —in post-exilic minor prophecies, and in later additions to pre-exilic prophecy. Owing to later editors, these additions often appear as the direct words of pre-exilic teachers, who were nevertheless avowedly opposed to nationalism in religion.

CHAPTER V

ETHICAL RELIGION IN NORTH ISRAEL

WE come, therefore, naturally to that group of thinkers in Israel who started out with all the fundamental presuppositions of the nationalistic prophets, but who worked through to an ethical basis of religion and so repudiated their former nationalism. With little doubt they constitute one of the most remarkable and significant groups of thinkers that humanity has ever produced. Other peoples have brought forth here and there a man of similar character; but nowhere else in the world has such an extended group existed, originating, perpetuating, and fashioning into universal form a specific ethical strain of religious thought, which took eight hundred years to reach its climax. It will now be our purpose to trace the course of this development.

1. The Prophet Amos

The pioneer figure of this movement was the prophet Amos. At first glance his break with nationalistic prophecy seems to be very sharp and clear-cut, since he denies that he is a prophet.[1] Yet the very fact that he felt it necessary to make the disclaimer shows how closely he approached the prophetic technique of his time. Moreover, his phraseology itself is in the language of ecstatic prophecy. "The oracle of the Lord" is his regular preface to a fresh topic. "Thus the Lord showed me," found five times in his re-

ported utterances, is in the language of ecstatic vision. Furthermore Amos himself believed in the prophets at their best. He believed that God in times of crisis communicated his will to men through them.[2] He was like the prophets too, in that his primary concern was the welfare of the nation.

In spite of so many likenesses, his differences are equally striking. First of all, it is very evident that his phraseology, though taken from the language of ecstatic prophecy, is scarcely more than a literary device through which he is enabled to express his own deepest religious convictions. There is no appeal to the miraculous or the occult in his book. Instead the prophet's thought is based on the logic of common sense. Secondly, he is the first prophet to assert that national prosperity is not necessarily a sign of God's favor, and then to declare that, in spite of it, the nation is doomed to destruction by God himself unless the people mend their ways. "The Day of the Lord," therefore, to which the nation had always looked forward as the day of final triumph of their god over their foes, would be instead a day of judgment and doom. This was revolutionary and contrary to nationalistic religion. Thirdly, although admitting the intimate relationship between the nation and its God, Amos regards this only as the basis for severer judgment,[3] because of the greater responsibility. Israel is no more God's chosen people than the remotest nation on earth.[4] Fourthly, God is ethical and therefore demands justice of all men in their dealings with each other. He will punish all men and nations who fail to observe justice, and nothing else can make up for its lack. Therefore, fifthly, sacrifices and offerings are useless; their efficacy is a delusion, a false reliance. Sixthly, the rich and powerful in Israel have

treated the weak and helpless with such gross injustice that the only salvation for the nation is to correct these wrongs.

These six propositions, which ramified into every nook and cranny of the nation, were a basic challenge to Israel's entire philosophy of life and religion. At first glance they might seem to be quite heterogeneous. Yet no involved argument is needed to show that all of them directly or indirectly flow from the proposition that God is ethical. That is to say, Amos has clearly made the transition from a capricious, nationalistic god to one who is wholly ethical. We realize this not only by his direct statement, but also by virtue of the fact that he has accurately set forth the bearing of this truth upon virtually all phases of human conduct in his day.

His book is written from the standpoint of his ethical achievement and neither it nor the outline just given offers any direct hint as to how that achievement was gained. It is this which fundamentally concerns us. Why was religion so slow and comparatively late in making this discovery, in reaching this level? We are here at the heart of the problem of revelation itself, from the standpoint of the apprehending mind of man. The absence of the occult and the mentally abnormal from Amos's book makes it evident that the form of his expression presents no solution. "The oracle of the Lord" was a familiar expression of ecstatic prophecy, but nothing comparable to the thought of Amos had ever come through it. Why not? One answer is that none of the prophets before Amos, or of his time, would have been able to admit that Amos's teaching could be an oracle of God. Their conception of God as a nationalistic, capricious god made that impossible. But we have every reason to believe that Amos started out with the same conception of God. "Thus saith the Lord" with Amos

is therefore to be regarded as a result rather than a cause; and when we have said this, our problem is seen to be one of interpreting human experience. The only question is whether Amos has left enough traces in his book to enable us to follow his thought processes. Even a cursory examination shows that the book deals with a purely human problem, and one for which the prophet proposes a purely human solution, a solution that is just as valid without as with religion. It will simplify our task if we consider this solution first quite apart from its relation to religion. I refer to Amos's diagnosis of the national life.

First of all, we must recognize that Amos, by reason of his station in life, his occupation, his place of residence, and the age in which he lived, had an unusual vantage point from which to observe contemporary Israel. Secondly, he lived at a time of almost unrivalled national peace, unity, and prosperity. In the middle of the eighth century Judah was virtually a province of North Israel; Jeroboam ruled a kingdom scarcely rivalled by that of Solomon. It was a time when both the virtues and the vices of nationalism in politics and religion were at a maximum. Thirdly, the international situation was one that threatened no immediate crisis or catastrophe to the state.

Amos's home was in the village of Tekoa[5] in Judah, twelve miles south of Jerusalem, on the border of the wilderness of Judea. His rural environment and the fact that he was a dresser of sycamore trees indicate that he led a settled life. Nevertheless his vocation as a shepherd[6] and his location on the border of one of the worst desert areas of the world brought him into daily contact with nomad life. Furthermore, the annual disposal of his wool must naturally have taken him to the nearest good market

in North Israel. Such was Bethel, where he later delivered his message. Bethel was a royal residence[7] and a leading sanctuary. There Amos would have come in contact with the main political, economic, social, and religious currents of the country. The contrast between rich and poor, between city and rural nomad life would have been particularly sharp and striking to him. These infrequent visits to an important center of the nation's life, followed by many months of lonely vigil with his sheep in the vast silences of the desert, must have given him ample time and opportunity to ponder what he had seen and heard in such a totally different setting.

We must also think of Amos as a devoted patriot, who had often considered from various points of view the precarious position of Israel as a very small nation.[8] It is very natural to expect that he would have had an interest in the economic state of the nation, since he had a direct stake in it as a seller of wool. Nearly every page of his book testifies not only that his great interest was economic and social, but that his formal religious interest was quite secondary. We learn nothing of the evils of the fertility cult from him, though this occupies the major attention of his near contemporary, Hosea. It is the same with idolatry; he has nothing to say against it, yet he spoke at the chief center of the bull cult of Israel.

It will be found, furthermore, that his real religious interest grows out of his diagnosis of the economic situation, and that it began for him, therefore, as a purely secular, a purely human problem. His primary, detailed, and oft-repeated indictment of Israel is for economic injustice.[9] Other charges there are, but they are quite incidental and never repeated or elaborated; nor is any cure proposed. For example, prostitution, that age-old evil of

all society, is barely mentioned,[10] and it is merely stated that the Nazirites were made to drink wine and the prophets commanded not to prophecy.[11] Every other charge is either directly economic or has an economic basis.[12] It is far from improbable that in the prophet's mind these three also were regarded as due to the greed and moral laxity that comes with economic injustice.

Such are the evils which the prophet declares are sufficient to destroy the nation unless they are corrected. But he has a cure, directly stated, somewhat elaborated, and often repeated. In a word, it is economic justice. This thought constitutes the climax of his book.[13] We are not here directly concerned with the correctness of the prophet's diagnosis at the time. As for the general proposition that economic injustice among nations may destroy nations—that is no longer a matter of academic theory. Our day has witnessed to its truth over the whole world. Its significance is evident in our time to many thoughtful persons; but as yet the world has not definitely heeded its lesson or even faced it as a reality. Amos, however, deals primarily with the internal, the national rather than the international, aspects of the problem. But here, too, his conclusion has not yet been accepted as a demonstrable truth. The essence of Amos's contention is that economic injustice within a nation may, if left uncontrolled, so undermine and honeycomb its structure that any sort of sudden blow from without will cause it to collapse like a house of cards. Our economic theorists, on the contrary, have, until recently, unanimously held that *laissez faire* was the road to national prosperity. Many of the evils of this view are now recognized and more or less effectively legislated against; yet no recognized substitute has been generally accepted in place of this principle—the highly

complex character of modern economic life doubtless being one cause. We are at first surprised, therefore, that anyone could have formulated the problem so early. In particular, we are concerned to see, so far as possible, the living situation out of which Amos conceived the issue and the reasons for that situation.

We know that there was no problem of industrialism, for all industry was home industry. We also know that the bulk of the nation was made up of small peasant farmers who gained their livelihood from the soil and who lived in unwalled villages or even in walled towns.[14] The cities were small and congested and were the home of the rich and the official classes as well as of the very poor. They served as local markets and also as emporiums for carrying on trade. At the bottom of the social scale were the slaves, made up for the most part of foreign captives taken in war and of the native Israelites who had fallen into slavery because of debt. In the days of Amos, under Jeroboam II, there had come the unwonted outward prosperity that might be expected to accompany peace at home and abroad, an enlarged territory, and brisk foreign trade. The results were typical of such conditions. The rich, who were few, were becoming vastly richer, while the many poor were being reduced to serfdom, and often to slavery.

Amos is by no means unique in having made an economic diagnosis of the society of his day. Egyptian thinkers had done the same for their day a thousand years earlier.[15] To be sure these men lived at a time of social confusion and political anarchy, in the feudal age in Egypt, and they proposed that better government might restore the national well-being. The contrast with Amos is nonetheless very sharp, both because their solution was

more a hope than a diagnosis, and because Amos spoke at a time of unusual political stability, peace, and outward economic prosperity.

What then would have caused Amos, a country peasant, to attack the deeper economic problems of his day, especially when the nation was, apparently, at a peak of prosperity? The prophet indicates nothing in his own experience that would explain his economic approach. If he had merely seen his own class being liquidated, we should expect him to show some consciousness of the relation of this event to himself, but that is not the case.

It has been said that Amos, far from being a radical, was really a conservative, a social reactionary[16] opposed to the changes going on in his day. This may in a sense be true, but the bare statement does not clarify the issue. The only thing that can give it point is the relation of these changes to the welfare of the nation as that was conceived by Amos.

We know that the clan ownership of land, like the claim to a desert range, was regarded as inalienable and that the land was not subject to barter or sale. This was naturally the first step in land tenure by people passing from the nomad state to settled life. There is much evidence to show that, as might be expected, this system continued longer in the poorer and prevailingly pasture lands of Judah than in North Israel, with its more extensive agriculture and trade. The next step, that of private ownership, was recognized in principle in North Israel by the middle of the ninth century B.C., but at that time there was still strenuous opposition to it.[17]

The personal right to dispose of landed property, coupled with the law providing for enslavement for debt,[18] opened the door to the reduction of the peas-

antry to serfdom, as well as to the accumulation of large fortunes. This system was in full swing in Israel in the eighth century B.C., as the book of Amos clearly shows. Amos, living on the border of the desert and the sown, at Tekoa, could be relied on to manifest the personal independence of the bedouin, while at the same time favoring and perhaps sharing in the communal holding of land as a peasant farmer. He thus occupied a peculiar vantage point from which to observe the system of private land ownership in North Israel and to appreciate the dangerous extremes to which it was leading in his day.

Amos speaks as the champion of the poor and needy against an unbridled and ruthless commercialism which was able to bend the courts to its will[19] and which stopped at nothing, not even confiscation of property and the physical slavery of the poor who were caught in the meshes of the economic net. The whole middle class of the time was threatened with liquidation, so that the prospect became imminent of a social order consisting of a few very rich people at the top, and beneath them a mass of slaves. It is this against which Amos specifically protests.[20] To him such a result would undoubtedly not have constituted a nation, but would have been in itself the destruction of one.

It is to be noticed that Amos does not deal with political tyranny. To one of his background, a man of the self-respecting farmer-peasant class, with a tinge of the bedouin independence and bedouin hatred of the curtailment of personal rights in his blood, the outlook presented above was a real threat, for it would carry with it the destruction of all patriotism and loyalty to the state, all freedom and good will in society, and would substitute instead force and the degradation of personality. Amos would undoubtedly

have said that such an agglomeration of persons could never constitute a real human society, and that, whatever it might be called, it could neither strike a blow against outside oppression, nor unite to repel an attack. This feeling accounts for his rather vague warning of overthrow in battle[21] or captivity beyond Damascus[22] (actually a veiled reference to Assyria). It is notable that both possibilities are stated more as result than as cause. In a word, any such blow from without would, under the conditions, be fatal.

Amos saw so many evidences of the process leading to this end that he necessarily became a prophet of doom. He does not say the doom is inevitable, or when it will come, or that it will actually ever come; he only says that, if present practices and tendencies continue, that end will be inevitable. Seen in this light, Amos's reasoning is so clear and cogent that we are not so much astonished at his conclusions, as we are at the fact that he still remains, in several respects, unique in drawing them.

This dearth of analogous conclusions is not due to Israel's economic experience being different from that of other peoples, then or now. The lack of modern parallels is attributable, first of all, to the other-worldly character of Christianity and to its refusal in time past to take responsibility for the affairs of this world, even in a society that had become Christian, at least in name. Secondly, the greater complexity of modern industrial life and the interplay of world forces no longer permit the existence of a clear-cut issue within a single nation. And thirdly, modern societies rarely if ever present the simple extremes of Amos's day, for at the top wealth and politics are inextricably mixed, and conditioned, as a rule, from without, and at the bottom, no matter how terrible the poverty, actual slavery is almost wholly abolished. Amos had the advan-

tage of dealing with a quite simple society, in a relatively small area, at a time of unusual peace, and in the absence of foreign entanglement. All this enabled him to see the economic problem of the nation in very simple, direct lines, and hence he was able to formulate a solution equally simple and direct. He made no revolutionary or drastic demands. He called for no capital levy or redistribution of wealth. He did not even suggest new laws. Honesty and fair dealing, the absence of greed and coercion, respect for personality in all human relations regardless of economic status—these things, said Amos, would correct the evils already perpetrated and provide the basis for a sound national life.

Amos's appraisal of Israel and his proposed solution were not made in order to save himself personally or to save his own group, which in Judah was scarcely as yet touched by the economic ills of the poor in North Israel. They were made solely because he sensed the nation's peril and offered the one escape that he could see. That the fate of the nation did not work out according to his theory has nothing to do with the validity of his reasoning; that circumstance was due primarily to the changed international situation.

A close parallel to Amos's experience is to be found in that of Confucius two centuries later in China. His too was a purely human difficulty for which he offered a human solution. His main problem was political rather than economic. He lived at a time when government in China was breaking down into the feudal stage, and to Confucius this seemed the disintegration of society. Consequently, he sought to stabilize government, but believed that the political breakdown was due to the decay of private virtue. He therefore proceeded to the most thor-

oughgoing analysis that has ever been made of the elements and motivations of a stable character as the proper basis for a stable society. His essential differences from Amos were that he thought in terms of man rather than in terms of a particular nation and of society instead of a single state; and he began and ended with the human factor, as Amos did not.

It is thus possible to understand Amos's diagnosis of Israel's peril and his proposed remedy without involving religion. From this standpoint, too, it is possible to understand Amos's own religious advance. Had he stopped where Confucius did, all that he said of human relations would lose none of its validity. He may well have proclaimed his theory in the market place. But having, like Confucius, stated his case, there was very little more that he could do about it from the standpoint of oral appeal. What would be the nation's reaction? The probability is that he did not have to wait long to find out; in fact, he may not have been able to present the first statement of his views before he was challenged by the outraged community. His book bears evidence to a number of such interruptions.[23]

His basic assumption, that outward prosperity gave no assurance of divine favor and that national doom could be impending while the people had a national god who had prospered them for centuries, was to their religious nationalism unthinkable, not to say sacrilegious. They believed that God was with them,[24] that they had his favor, and that they knew how, through the technique of the sacrificial system, both to win and to keep his goodwill. Therefore for Amos to threaten national doom was to deny the existing favor of the national God. It was to them both disloyal and irreligious.[25]

Amos was thus obliged to face this religious aspect of the issue or give up his thesis. What could he say in reply? An outstanding feature of his book is his unequivocal and repeated condemnation of Israel's entire public worship at the great sanctuaries, including the one at Bethel, where he delivered his message.[26] When the people claimed the authority of antiquity for their sacrifices, Amos declared that in the period of their desert wandering, they were idolaters.[27] The grounds for this wholesale condemnation of existing religious usage, when there had never been any other known in Israel, are not immediately evident. It is only when the accepted religion is brought into the field of Amos's problem that we can see the reasons for his reactions.

Official religion felt no need for considering the ethical relations of individuals, whether in seeking the divine favor for private persons or for the nation. This favor was all provided for and made sure of by the age-old performance of lavish sacrifices at the great shrines. Since religion therefore believed the nation to be secure in its assurance of divine favor, it had no complaint to make against existing usage in business. The elaborate offerings were a considerable economic drain on the community, but the officials of religion did not question how they were obtained nor the ethics of rich worshipers who made lavish gifts. They did claim that if any such had sinned, they had the means and the formula for getting their sins forgiven.

Anyone who could analyze the general business situation in Israel, as Amos had done, could hardly fail to note that religion was directly abetting and encouraging the economic injustice which threatened the nation's existence. Instead of helping matters, religion was actually making them worse. It had always been assumed that God would

be pleased with sacrifices and offerings; but if sacrifices blinded men to injustice or made them indifferent to it, and, especially, if sacrifices were regarded as a substitute for justice and as able to make up in the sight of God for injustice, then official religion was just another factor leading to the downfall of the nation, all the more dangerous and deadly since it had the highest sanction of society, yet gave only a false sense of security.

But did God want sacrifices? The assumption that Amos had no idea of raising that question[28] belies the natural force of all his words on the subject,[29] as well as the witness of later prophetic writers.[30] Had Amos had no recourse but to answer in the affirmative we might well conclude in view of his utterances that he would have felt compelled to cast off the national cult entirely, since it would have been an institution entirely against the welfare of the nation. But there was one proposition on which all parties were agreed, one indeed without which any national religion would be unthinkable, and that was that the national god would want the nation preserved. Having its welfare at heart, he could not want what would certainly destroy it, but would be bound to want what would surely preserve it. Since the religion of sacrifices and offerings was an ally and promoter of the injustice that threatened the nation's existence, God could not want it, no matter what tradition and the past said about it. On the other hand, since Amos was convinced that justice alone could save the nation, God must want justice instead of sacrifices.

This constitutes Amos's first great step toward an ethical religion. Perhaps it is the greatest single step in all religion. But it was only a first step, and did not yet make him the great ethical prophet which he ultimately became.

For hitherto, although all national gods were thought of as having the welfare of their people at heart, they were also all thought of as capricious and so in a measure changeable in their attitude toward the nation. In Amos's struggle with the religion of his day there must have come to him somewhere the question, How much and how often does God want justice? For Amos the answer lay at the heart of his problem of justice as the preserver of the nation. To be sure, he was dealing with a particular situation, but to see that justice could give the desired solution at a particular time was eventually to see that justice would always be needed for that purpose. God, therefore, always wanting the nation preserved, would always want justice.[30a] Thus there could never be a time when he would not want it. There would never be any time for him to be changeable. He could still be angry and punish the nation for being unjust, but it would not be because he was capricious but, quite the opposite, because of the justice which he himself always exercised and which was therefore a part of his nature.

Here Amos had grasped the instrumentalities which could lift him up and out upon the ethical level of religion. And it changed everything. For the first time he found himself in a universe, an ethical universe, a part of the moral order of the world, and to that extent a different person. His own nation took on a different significance, as did other peoples also. He had thought of his nation as God's chosen people,[31] but a truly ethical God can have no favorites. God is over all nations.[32] There can be no chosen people. He had thought of other nations as enemies, as God's enemies. But he now saw that God's providence is over all alike[33] and only if they treat one another unjustly and inhumanly will God punish them.[34]

Furthermore, if men do justly, Amos realized, God will be on their side; and if they do unjustly, he will be against them. And since he is moved only by justice, any attempt to gain his favor by offering him gifts can have no meaning except as an affront, since it assumes that God is not wholly ethical and so can be bribed. It is from this realization that Amos acquired his great drive of repudiation and scorn for the religion of his fathers, the religion of sacrifice. He was thus no longer merely the propounder of a certain national economic theory. He had become indeed a prophet of humanity, backed up by the moral grandeur and support of the ethical God of the universe. He was still the same ardent patriot and lover of his nation, but his nationalistic religion and outlook were gone. The concept of humanity had become possible, and the basis for a religion of humanity had been laid.

The religion of Amos, that the divine favor cannot be found where men do not treat each other justly, that in God's sight there are no substitutes for justice and no other avenues to his favor, has never received community approval, whether in Amos's day or our own. Always something more, which has made it definitely something less, has prevailed.

With Amos, then, we begin to see not ethical religion but an ethical theory of religion as a way of life, openly declaring the inadequacy and doom of nationalism in religion, and of ritualism as a means of securing divine approval. Amos, true to the spirit of the preceding prophetic movement in Israel, propounded his teaching in order to save the nation from disaster. The ethical prophets followed the motivation of Amos as long as the nation lasted.

2. The Prophet Hosea

The next notable contribution to ethical religion is made by the prophet Hosea, a native of North Israel, who began teaching not more than a decade later than Amos. In his case there can be no doubt that his teaching grows out of his personal experience; indeed, whatever significant advance he makes is conditioned by our interpretation of that experience. This is related in the first three chapters of his book. Older interpretations of these chapters have been largely vitiated by lack of appreciation of the significant religious background. Today the fertility cult under various forms is well authenticated for the entire ancient Near East. In Babylonia it was known as the Tammuz-Ishtar cult, in Egypt it was Osiris-Isis, in Palestine-Syria most of the local Baals were agricultural deities and so definitely associated with the fertility idea.

When the Israelite nomads settled down to till the soil, since their God of the desert had nothing to do with the raising of crops they inevitably took over the agricultural gods with their agriculture. And in doing so they were conscious of no disloyalty to their own tribal god. In time, however, when they had gained national independence in his name, they were able to say that the Lord had given them their land and therefore that the crops were also due to him; and as the word "baal" (lord) was not a proper name, they were further led to say that Jehovah was their Baal. Moreover, since they had already for a long time practiced the baal fertility rites in order to assure their crops, it was only natural that they should continue these rites in the name of the Lord as their national Baal of the soil. The result of this process was to incorporate into Israelite religion virtually all the

Canaanite baal worship, including the fertility rites. How deep-seated this became in the religion of Israel can be seen from the fact that all the Israelite feasts except the passover were really baal festivals. The baal fertility rites included sexual promiscuity at the sanctuaries, where sacred prostitutes, both male and female, were a regular part of the official religious celebrations. It is this situation which supplies the background for the first three chapters of Hosea's book.

Three theories have been formulated to interpret these words of Hosea: the Lord said, "Go take a wife of whoredom and children of whoredom."[35] The three theories are: (1) It is unthinkable that God would command such a thing or that the prophet would do it, hence the entire description is symbolical and not the account of a real experience. (2) The description is realistic, God commanded it and Hosea obeyed, knowing exactly what he was doing. He therefore knowingly married a sacred prostitute. The prophets did some very strange things and they never hesitated to do what they felt the Lord had commanded. (3) The entire account is reminiscent of past experience; it represent Hosea's later reflections upon the experience.

All three theories contain some truth either in themselves or in their presuppositions, but all three are inadequate apart from the fertility cult. Yet when this is admitted they all become unnecessary. The reminiscent theory alone still has some force, because all interpretation of one's experience has to be more or less reminiscent.

Granted the fertility cult in Hosea's day, officially recognized as a part of Israel's religion, and granted that Hosea became a man of family and then revolted against the fertility rites which his wife accepted, as did Israel gen-

erally at the time, and these chapters tell a straightforward story that requires a minimum of explication. Hosea's reference to his marriage[36] is primarily the expression of a value judgment concerning the fertility cult in relation to himself and as practiced by his wife. To his wife, Gomer, the rites were a regular part of the national faith and therefore sanctified as religion. Hosea saw them as human customs only; to him they were nothing but moral pollution. At the same time, he realized that what he was opposing was not just his wife's religion, but the religion of the community. This is expressed in chapter 2, where Israel is pictured as the unfaithful spouse of Jehovah because she has gone after the baals and forsaken her true husband. But how was it that Hosea alone was able to see this, while everybody else took the fertility cult for granted? First of all, Hosea was also a poet and a man of deep emotions, a fact evidenced throughout his book; in particular, he had a deep and tender affection for his wife. When, therefore, he saw the fertility rites come between them and thus pollute the very citadel of his soul, his outraged moral sense revolted and he did not hesitate to declare that such rites were no part of the religion of their national God, but just a borrowing from Canaanite baalism.

It so happened that in doing this Hosea made a historical discovery of the highest importance, although it is not clear how fully he grasped its historical aspect. He did, however, realize that in the desert, from whence Israel came, there were no fertility rites. It was easy from that point to declare them to be no part of the worship of the God who came with them from the desert. The prophet thus allowed his own deepest experience to be used in reinterpreting religion. But the heartbreaking tragedy of

his thinking was that Gomer shared none of his new convictions. So far as we can learn she remained loyal to the traditional religion of the time, and almost certainly had the sanction and the support of the community on her side. Older interpreters have urged that if he did not realize Gomer's unfaithfulness till after his marriage, Hosea was too cool about it. He should accordingly have sought a divorce. But, actually, under the conditions of the fertility cult there were no grounds for divorce, especially from the standpoint of religion. A wife could not be divorced for being devoted to the approved religion of the time. By the same token, there was no forsaking of her husband by Gomer. That, as a profligate woman, she sold herself into slavery and Hosea bought her back is pure fantasy, based upon the translation of a doubtful Hebrew word.[37] The one thing that Hosea could do under the circumstances was to exercise his right as a husband and refuse to allow Gomer to participate in the worship of the sanctuaries; and this he did. To be sure, this accomplished no permanent result unless it was to make her something of a martyr in the eyes of the community. Certainly there is no evidence that it changed in the least her religious faith or outlook.

Granted these facts of the situation, what was it that led Hosea to expose his domestic tragedy to public gaze? The explanation of the realistic theory, that the tragedy was brought about purposely to emphasize the incompatibility between Israel and Jehovah, is doubly weak.[38] In the first place, if the aim was simply to show incompatibility without a cure, there was no motive left for talking about it, especially by a prophet. Moreover, there is no ground in the figure thus conceived to assume that any reform was to be expected. Certainly the book gives no evidence to

show that Hosea felt called upon to marry a bad woman in order to reform her, and much less so if she had been a sacred prostitute. Secondly, for Hosea to have married a sacred prostitute and then to have denied her religious freedom and marital rights would not have proved incompatibility or been any ground for complaint to Hosea's audience; it would merely have shown him to be a religious fanatic; and Hosea would know this as well as anyone. In the third place, Hosea's choice of such a religious degenerate as a wife could not properly represent the relation of Israel to Jehovah. Hosea is explicit that Israel's childhood was a period of innocence, and, as such, Israel was the object of God's loving approval. Indeed it was only after Israel had come to power that religious degradation set in.

The only terms, therefore, of a marriage bond which could adequately set forth the nation's relation to God would require the prophet to marry a pure woman, who later became corrupted by baalism. It was precisely this which, according to the book of Hosea, was a rather common occurrence in Israel at that time. And if such a misfortune had befallen Hosea, we should expect a reaction from him in no respect less drastic than that now recorded in chapters 1–3.

In order to justify laying bare such poignant human sorrow and frustration something significant needed to come out of it. Moreover, Hosea seems to glory in revealing it at its worst. Back of this there are two outstanding facts in Hosea's experience. The first was that after he had expressed his utmost condemnation and loathing for the fertility cult and of Gomer for her support of it, after he had denied her the right to attend the sanctuaries, and had at the same time cut her off from himself as his wife, there

came to him a strange and unexpected realization. He found that in spite of all that had happened, he still loved her as of yore. The strangeness of this was due to the fact that he had repudiated all that she stood for religiously; and any hope of harmony, reconciliation, or reciprocity of any kind between them had vanished. Still he found that his love for her persisted and would not die. But with this thought came another out of his deeply religious nature. He could not but feel that the entire nation's worship through the fertility cult must be just as repugnant and loathsome to God as it was to himself, for this was the very thing he condemned in his wife. God might, in the language of 2:2–4, be expected to repudiate his people and abandon them to their fate.

But Hosea, being a man of deep religious emotions, could not conceive of his God, who, like a husband, had cherished Israel as his spouse for so many generations, as caring less for his people than Hosea himself did for his misguided wife. Considering that baalism made the nation faithless to God, as it made Gomer faithless to him, Hosea realized that God must know the pangs of unrequited love, a love that, while asking nothing for itself, would nonetheless hold its object to strictest moral accountability, and yet a love that would not die. Even so the undying ethical love of God intrudes into human experience through the deep travail of a sensitive soul. Hosea could not deny it and be true to himself. He also realized that the idea of divine love would never have dawned on him but for the tragedy in his own life. Here was the adequate reason for its unveiling to the common gaze. The new concept of God transcended his personal experience as the rising sun does the candle flame of the night sufferer. How could he refrain from pointing out that this bitter burning flame that seemed to consume his very soul had guided

him through the dark labyrinth of his experience to an open window where there broke upon his astonished gaze the sunrise of the love of God, a vision of love at the heart of the universe? And how could he fail to feel that his personal tragedy stated at its worst was divinely ordained to lead him to that open window? Nothing less than this result, we venture to say, adequately explains these three chapters, in view of the religious background.

Moreover, the rest of the book presupposes both the results and the background. Hosea saw that Israel was lavishly performing sacrifices at the sanctuaries;[39] but these were accompanied by a corrupt worship[40] that only polluted the national life; and God could not accept such worship.[41] In other words, the whole sacrificial system was nothing but a system of moral corruption, surely destroying the nation at its core. Therefore Hosea is quite as outspoken against ritualistic religion as was Amos, but he proposes the distinctly different substitute for ritualism which grows out of his particular experience. Thus he interprets God as saying: "I desire loving-kindness and not sacrifices,[42] and the knowledge of God and not burnt offerings."[43] Nothing short of Hosea's experience, which gave him a vision of the ethical love of God, is adequate to account for such a revolutionary formulation of divine requirements. Hosea's indictment of the religion of his day is not merely on the grounds that it is false worship[44] and idolatrous, for he uses the words "adultery" and "whoredom" as applied to the current religion in a way that leaves no doubt that he is speaking of immorality in worship.[45] He especially singles out the priesthood as monsters of iniquity that feed on the sins of the people,[46] and as the polluters of Israelitish womanhood.[47] These charges have their adequate explanation only in the fertility cult of Canaanite baalism and would have applied equally well

to Tyre and Carthage and wherever baalism was practiced.

Up to this point, "love" has not been a term that could be used in religion. From this point onward, it is, because of the experience and insight of the prophet Hosea, the highest term known in the religious vocabulary. The justice of an Amos is needed to keep men from outwardly doing wrong to each other. The love of Hosea is required to bind men to one another and to God from inner compulsion based on sympathy and the widest self-interest. With these two principles recognized as regnant and normative in the heart of God and the heart of man, we have the essential requirements of an ethical religion. It is also a question whether anything less can produce a human society which will not result in cataclysms that will periodically destroy the best fruits of man's toil and travail.

As far as the direct influence of Hosea is concerned—if the justice of Amos failed to impress his age, much less did the more intangible inward motivation of loving-kindness. Justice, as a term, had long been known and used in legal matters, but the language of loving-kindness had hardly yet been spoken. Its nearest approach was to be found in mothers' lullabies. There is also another note in Hosea's contribution, one that has often been overlooked in later ages, and that is the severity of love. It comes out in his effort to save the nation from its downward road. In their corrupt, misguided worship the people were cutting themselves off from God and putting themselves beyond His help. The growing evidence of anarchy[48] and political disintegration,[49] the frantic effort to make foreign political alliances,[50] and the imminent threat of Assyrian invasion,[51] all pointed to the doom of a nation that had cut itself off from its God, who desired only love.

CHAPTER VI

ETHICAL RELIGION IN JUDAH

1. The Prophets Micah and Isaiah

THERE remain two other ethical prophets, who confined their activities to Jerusalem and the South. Roughly they cover the period from 740–701 B.C. They made no essential advance over the teachings of Amos and Hosea, but proclaimed the same ethical viewpoint in the South.

Since the prophet Micah warned of the downfall of both North Israel[1] and Judah,[2] he must have prophesied before 721 B.C. He repeats the standing charges of both Amos and Hosea, but not as though they were new or unheard of. On the contrary he seems to assume that they were well known. Economic injustice is his prevailing complaint,[3] but he also reiterates the indictment of false worship in the language of Hosea.[4] Micah appears to have been more especially a disciple of Amos and by his teaching[5] shows that he had grasped and accepted Amos's message. This is brought out still more clearly by the sharp contrast which he makes between the nationalistic prophets and himself.[6] Nothing is known of his occupation or background. Like Amos he came from a small country village, Moresheth-Gath, in the western foothills of Judah. He shows himself to be a rugged, fearless, clear-thinking person, few of whose words got recorded. Never-

theless in the following century he looms up as the greatest prophetic figure in Judah's past.[7]

The remaining eighth-century prophet who calls for comment is Isaiah of Jerusalem. His name is traditionally the best known among those of the prophets, and the book called after him is the longest, save one, in the Bible. A consensus of scholarly opinion more than a generation ago limited his own part in it to the first thirty-nine chapters. Further study has more than halved the amount then claimed to be genuine Isaianic material. In one respect the book is unique. No prophetic writing is sharper in its pronouncements of national doom, but as the contents now stand practically every prophecy of doom is offset, and often consciously so, by a corresponding prophecy of hope. This phenomenon requires examination if for no other reason than to clarify the prophet's psychology.

As the book is now arranged there never was such a vacillating prophet, one who blows hot and cold almost with the same breath, and keeps it up consistently. The prophets of Israel were primarily not prognosticators but interpreters, and hence they might change their message if conditions changed. But a prophet of national doom could only change his prophecy if the attitude of the nation toward nationalism changed. We happen to know that there was no essential change of national attitude in such matters, not merely in Isaiah's day, but as long as the nation persisted. Furthermore, we also know that there were always nationalistic prophets, who rarely if ever prophesied anything but hope and ultimate victory over all national enemies under the leadership of their messiah-king.

Possibly, therefore, Isaiah was neither an ethical prophet nor a nationalistic one, but a hopeless vacillator between

the two. It would be unfair to him, however, to draw this conclusion until all other avenues have been explored, and there are several factors which are strongly against it. First, there is a considerable amount of apocalyptic material now assigned to Isaiah [8] which historically is known only from 200 B.C. onward. Secondly, there are sections [9] that definitely presuppose the exile. Thirdly, the book of Isaiah is especially famous for its glowing messianic passages,[10] virtually all of which assume a break in the rulership that is only provided for by the exile. Messianic prophecy was always primarily nationalistic and in that sense unethical, but in Isaiah's time there was no particular occasion for it.

Readers unfamiliar with Hebrew are often unaware that every king in Israel was first of all and above all a messiah. The term stood as the symbol of divine approval and expressed the basis of whatever divine right of kings there was in ancient Israel. Its meaning "anointed" arose from the act of the pouring of oil upon the head of the royal candidate by the highest religious official of the community. This act made the king the Lord's anointed,[11] and gave him the highest religious sanction.

Now in Judah there never was but the one dynasty, the house of David; nor are there recorded any attempts to substitute another; and as long as the nation lasted there was no lack of royal candidates for the throne. Furthermore the succession did not readily lend itself to prophecy, since it was largely a matter of royal-harem intrigue. After the nation had fallen and a new national hope had arisen, however, it was the most natural thing in the world for the nationalistic prophets to point forward to a coming messiah, that is, to a king who should have the divine sanction. Moreover, after the exile and the revival of the

national hope there was a strong incentive to offset the pre-exilic prophecies of national doom by corresponding expressions of hope. It is generally recognized that all pre-exilic prophecies have been so supplemented. Sometimes this consists of a consciously post-exilic addition at the end.[12] At other times the added sections are sandwiched into the book.[13] The book of Isaiah constitutes a classic example of this latter method, as is shown by the nationalistic material clearly identifiable in chapters 1–39. In other words, there are no necessary grounds for questioning the ethical motivation of Isaiah.

When these nationalistic elements, whether contemporary or later, are removed, Isaiah is seen to be as clear-cut and consistent as Amos or Micah. He was not, however, an original prophet and no essentially new contribution to ethical religion comes out of his experience. He knows the language of Hosea,[14] but, like Micah, he is mainly dependent on Amos.[15] He gives a higher spiritual interpretation of the earlier idea of the physical holiness of God.[16] This may not be his own contribution. If it is, he tells us nothing that would indicate his realization of the idea through his own experience. The fact that he makes no further use of it whatever favors the thesis that it is not original. It is also safe to say that his later fame was due neither to his style, which was notable, nor to his message of doom and his repudiation of the sacrifices and offerings of ritualistic religion, but to the much larger part of his book which glorifies the nationalism of the Jews at the expense of other nations.

Thus in the eighth century B.C. an ethical theory of religion was grasped, formulated, and promulgated in both North Israel and Judah for the purpose of saving the nation from the results of its nationalistic faith. Its

chief success in North Israel in half a century was to win two farseeing, fearless men of Judah to accept it and become its advocates. Its principal achievement in Judah in a century was to gain three more distinguished advocates before the nation came to an end, Zephanaiah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel.

2. The Prophets Zephanaiah and Jeremiah

Three quarters of the century of respite which Judah gained after the invasion of Sennacherib[17] slipped away without a single echo of the higher ethical religion. The first occasion that called forth new prophetic voices is believed to have been the movement of peoples known as the Scythians westward across Asia Minor and then south along the eastern end of the Mediterranean. The "foe from the North" in the book of Jeremiah[18] supposedly refers to them, and out of that occasion came also Jeremiah's call. The same situation may have occasioned the message of the prophet Zephanaiah.

Slightly less than one half of Zephanaiah's short book of three chapters deals with ethical religion.[19] The rest is nationalistic and in part apocalyptic in tone. Of the ethical prophecy the major portion is occupied with the description of coming destruction. The primary charge is that of false, idolatrous worship.[20] There are hints also, of political corruption,[21] oppression,[22] and social injustice.[23] Emphasis is placed on ordinances,[24] and concern is manifested for the purity of the sanctuary[25] and the keeping of the law. This last aspect associates Zephanaiah with the Deuteronomic reform of 621 B.C., and so introduces a legislative note, which marks the beginning of a transition to nationalistic religion on the part of Zephanaiah.

Zephanaiah's greater contemporary, Jeremiah, came of

a most distinguished priestly family, one that reached back to the rise of the monarchy and the leadership of David.[26] According to the record of his book, his career began in 626 B.C.[27] He finally disappears in Egypt in the company of certain fugitives of Judah after the fall of Jerusalem in 586.[28] Jeremiah therefore lived through the first and only serious attempt at religious reform of the nation, as well as through the final disintegration of Judah. The most of his authentic teaching is included in the first twenty-six chapters of the book that bears his name.

His main message is one of unmitigated doom for the nation at the hands of the Chaldeans. Conditions have become such that, unlike earlier prophets, he makes no proviso that repentance may still save the nation. His standing charge against them is false worship and idolatry, and he emphasizes the conditions that led to the Deuteronomic reform, as well as those that followed the failure of that movement at the death of King Josiah in 609 B.C. This indictment is supplemented by censure for false reliance on the temple ritual during the life of the reform.

His immediate hope for the future and the basis for his urgent and consistent exhortation is the saving of the city from sack and pillage and the people from deportation by yielding to the threatened invasion while there is still time. After the first captivity in 597 B.C., however, he shows no confidence at all in those left in the land, but centers his hope entirely upon those already carried away.[29] His exhortation to the exiles is to make themselves at home where they are and to expect to live and die there.[30]

That he assured them of their descendants' return to Palestine is exceedingly doubtful because, first, 29:10–14 interrupts the context.[31] Secondly, the promise is not

directed to the first captivity alone, but applies to all the exiles in all lands.[32] Thirdly, the assumption that they can have his favor, with peace and prosperity, by praying to Jehovah where they are[33] does not agree with verses 10–14, which require seventy years of prayer and seeking him with all their hearts before the Lord will hearken. Fourthly, the implication of these verses, that to be found of God is to return to Palestine, is contrary to verse 7, which assumes that this favor can be had at once; furthermore, if it could not be had for seventy years, scarcely any of the prophet's audience could hope to enjoy it. Fifthly, the assumption that the exiles could have the Lord's favor away from Palestine and without the temple ritual implies such a transcending of nationalism that no particular purpose would be served by a return thither. Sixthly, the supposition that Jeremiah could have assured the return of exiles about whose life and motives he could know nothing and without specifying what those motives should be shows that no ethical principle or purpose is involved; but it does conform to the axiom of a necessary return for a restored nation, which is considered as the primary evidence of God's renewed favor.

On the other hand, in the prophet's conception of this social group, separated from their nation and their land, who are exhorted to seek and expect the favor of God where they are, we are able to see the transition in his mind from nationalism to individualism. Jeremiah's attack upon the national evils of his day follows the lead of Hosea directly.[34] He accepts Hosea's diagnosis of baalism,[35] but the religious decline of the nation has been further aggravated in his day by the introduction of many foreign cults.[36] Jeremiah therefore has a multiplicity of reasons for repudiating the ritualistic religion of sacrifices

and offerings[37] and substituting one of ethical demands only. Theoretically, this religion applied to the individual wherever he was and irrespective of the nation or group. But what was to be regarded as the favor of God, and how it would be expressed to the individual apart from the nation had not been faced or formulated.

Jeremiah's thinking does not go beyond the problem of peace and well-being for individuals, advantages that are to be gained by seeking and praying for the welfare of any city, or larger community, of which they happen to be a part.[38] The fact that this is deemed possible shows the prophet's advance beyond nationalism. Emphasis on the idea that each individual shall suffer not for the sins of his ancestors but only for his own sins finds expression once in the book of Jeremiah,[39] but it is used in a context that is purely nationalistic, and its only application is to assure the restored nation that it will not have to suffer for the sins of the fathers. This is clearly a secondary use of the proverb, later than Jeremiah, and on the nationalistic level. In like manner, the new covenant described in 31:31 ff., while it refines the idea of law from mere outward ordinances to something written within the heart of man, is given no explanation or elaboration of how it is to find expression in life. The emphasis remains on law, and the field of application is confined to nationalism.[39a]

Jeremiah's contribution to ethical religion is not so much in new aspects of truth added or emphasized as in the demonstration that ethical religion could pass through the downfall of nationalism, out of which it was born, and itself survive. Earlier prophets had looked forward to that possibility but they had not been compelled to meet the actuality. Jeremiah, a devout soul, a loyal citizen, an ardent patriot and lover of his kind, lived through the storm

that wrecked the nation, facing the loss of all things that were dear to him together with the scorn, contempt, and persecution of his people, who labelled him a false prophet, a renegade, and a traitor. Nevertheless, throughout his career he exerted himself to the utmost to ease the shock of coming disaster and to salvage spiritual values from the wreck. Through it all he stands four-square to all the winds that blow[40] and all the waves that beat upon and at times overwhelm him. Never once does he lose his clearness of vision, his certainty of duty, or his faith in God.

True to the spirit of the prophets, Jeremiah gave himself unreservedly to the task of delivering a warning to the nation of the coming disaster, together with an enumeration and analysis of all the accumulated wrongs which were making it inevitable. With the only world he had ever known crashing about his ears, he spared himself in nothing, but sold his life as dearly as he could to mitigate if possible the worst horrors of disaster. And when the end had come, when Jerusalem had fallen and nothing more could be done, and when he had the opportunity to end his days in comfort assured him by the conquerors,[41] he chose instead to cast his lot in with the last miserable remnants, the dregs of the population, left in the land, and to stand by them in all the vicissitudes of their hopeless career, until he and they disappear in the gloom in a foreign land. The last echo we catch of his words is his protest against the worship of false gods.[42] He died a martyr to his love of God and to his loyalty to his people, a fitting archetype of the true servant of God, an unwitting builder of more stately mansions for the soul of man.

CHAPTER VII

ETHICAL RELIGION AND THE RISE OF JUDAISM

1. The Prophet Ezekiel and the Dynamic of Judaism

THE book of Ezekiel contains the record of a prophet, known traditionally by that name, who was an advocate and contributor to ethical religion. This is assured from the prophecies of final doom on Jerusalem and its inhabitants that make up the major part of chapters 1–24 of the book, and also from the clear statement of individualism in chapter 18, which is a distinct advance in ethical theory. The book can no longer be regarded as having the simple unity formerly claimed for it.[1] It contains the writings of two sharply opposed schools of religious thought: first, the religion of the ethical teacher, wherein the fate of the nation and the individual depend solely on conduct; and second, the religion of the advocates of nationalism as an end in itself, in which the favor of God depends primarily on the ritual of sacrifices and offerings. It has always been recognized that these two types of religion are found in the book, but it was assumed that one writer was responsible for both because of a precise dating system running throughout which seemed to require this conclusion in spite of the contradiction involved. This method of dating is now seen to be quite artificially attached to the book and, when it is removed, the chronological requirements of the subject matter are

such that the time span is too great for one life. There is no need therefore to regard the book as the work of a divided personality. Certainly more than one writer is involved—just how many more may have to be regarded as indeterminate for some time. Sufficiently divergent points of view and settings are in evidence to require the book to be regarded henceforth as a conglomerate, a compilation by several hands, rather than the work of a single author. Their number is not so important as are the two kinds of religion they represent.

Our first consideration is to determine the limits of the ethical prophetic element of the book. And for this nothing is found that seems to require more than one personality, whom we may designate as Ezekiel. He is indubitably the author of the prophecies of doom pronounced upon Jerusalem and its inhabitants, and probably delivered them in Palestine during the period between 597 and 586 B.C. The prophet was therefore quite likely a younger contemporary and perhaps a pupil of and coworker with Jeremiah. The book as it now stands is insistent that Ezekiel also addressed the exiles of the first captivity in Babylonia before, as well as after, 586 B.C. This is reasonable enough to expect in view of the prophet's complete denunciation of those remaining in Jerusalem after the first captives had left and in view of Jeremiah's estimate of the two groups and his letter to those carried away,[2] as well as in the light of Ezekiel's conception of his own responsibility.[3] Just what he said to them, however, is by no means clear. Chapter 33:10–20 fits this group in some respects, but other features are against it. Exiles are referred to definitely in 11:15, 17:11–13 and probably in 14:21–23. Chapter 18 would, of course, apply in principle to the exiles or to men anywhere, but what setting

there is[4] and the accompanying exhortation are appropriate to none so much as to the dwellers in Jerusalem.[5] There are besides a series of references that are sometimes interpreted as expressing Ezekiel's hope for reconstruction.[6] These all, however, have the strictly nationalistic point of view, and are therefore not in harmony with Ezekiel's ethical prophecy. They do not, moreover, confine themselves to the first captivity, but include in their scope all Israelites scattered among all the nations and would therefore apply to the captives of 586. But Ezekiel had doomed all of these to destruction, and hence was not in a position to make such blanket inclusions as the passages in question presuppose. With such passages quite naturally go the denunciations of foreign nations,[7] which are also definitely nationalistic in character.

When these eliminations have been made there remain no messages of Ezekiel to the first captivity; furthermore there is no word of reconstruction by him, nor is there any direct evidence that he was ever carried into captivity, to Babylon or elsewhere. On the other hand, as the book now stands, all that the prophet spoke to the people left in Judah and Jerusalem is now as if addressed directly to the first captivity. This we believe was precisely what the later compiler of the book in Babylonia wished to convey. Ezekiel, like Jeremiah, may have addressed the exiles by letter. If so, his message has been lost. If the compiler knew of it he may have felt that with the present arrangement there was no room for it, or no need for it. He was no doubt an admirer of the prophet, and heartily endorsed his denunciation of the people left in the land as entirely hopeless. By the same token, he saw in the first captivity the only hope of the future. Why then did he wish the exiles to "listen in" to Ezekiel's denunciations?

They had been carried captive; but as long as Jerusalem remained intact their fate was still in doubt, and their religious philosophy of nationalism could still be held. But if the city fell their whole philosophy of life would be destroyed. The evidence that the Lord had failed them would, from their standpoint, then be complete. In 586 B.C. this happened, the nation came to an end. Their national religion also came to an end. That which followed was something other and different, and it depended directly on Ezekiel that anything at all followed.[8]

Sometime before or after 586 the message of Ezekiel was probably brought to Babylonia, perhaps by some of the new exiles who had listened to and cherished his words. In themselves the exiles could only say the Lord had failed the nation. But if one got Ezekiel's message, it was impossible to say that. Quite the contrary, it was a more terrible and yet wonderful thing that had happened. The nation had failed God and God had destroyed it because of its sins, and yet through Ezekiel he had warned them both collectively and individually of their sins and their moral responsibility. It had been frequently repeated that God delights not in the death of the wicked but rather that the wicked turn from his wickedness and live. "Turn ye, turn ye, for why will you die, O House of Israel?"[9] Here was a new and unheard-of situation. A nation had come to an end, but its God still persisted, and with a new and awesome majesty never known before. Here was the dynamic with which to formulate a new order. A nucleus began to take shape. All who accepted the message of Ezekiel had still a right to believe in the Lord. Indeed they were unable to escape from the idea, not only that God existed, but that he held sway in some sense over the Babylonian conquerors, for had he not

used them as instruments for punishing Israel? There was in this fact also an implied superiority over Marduk, the god of Babylonia. This thought would, however, have to wait for another prophet to be made effective. But so far as the future was concerned there was no plan for social, let alone national, reconstruction. Indeed Ezekiel's individualism definitely eliminated nationalism as a factor in religious theory. God's favor was no longer dependent on any group relationship and hence the form of religious organization was left as a matter of purely social convenience. There was no ground therefore for Ezekiel to be a messianic prophet. In fact a new theory of nationalism had to be established before messianic prophecy was possible.

The approach to this development came in trying to answer the query, What is the evidence of divine favor? It was clear to those who accepted Ezekiel's message that the sins of the nation had caused God's disfavor and anger until he had destroyed it. How could one be assured that his anger was past? Ezekiel had said to the nation, "Turn from your evil ways. Why will you die, O House of Israel?" Evidently pardon would follow repentance, and there was the implication that had the people repented the nation would not have perished. But now that the nation was no more the situation was without precedent. Suppose they did repent, what would be the evidence that they were pardoned? Individualism was just emerging. No precedents existed for its application. It was still an untried theory, as strange then as the fourth dimension is to the average person today. The only terms in which the exiles had ever thought of divine favor were those of national prosperity. Jeremiah had written to them to seek their welfare in the prosperity of the community where

they happened to be. There were two major difficulties involved in this: First, any such community was under the patronage of a foreign god; it was difficult to seek the prosperity of the community without paying homage to its god, and this was, to say the least, disloyalty to Jehovah. Second, the exiles had no opportunity to organize politically, but were more and more scattered, so that, if they should merely join with the community life around them they would tend to become absorbed and so lose their solidarity with their Jewish kindred.

On the other hand, their renewed faith in a common God who was not confined to national boundaries tended to draw them together. This was further enhanced by the antithetical character of the prevailing religion of the land. As a result a community of spirit arose among them, but they were still faced with this problem: How could they ever hope to have the favor of their God while they lived in a land under the dominion of foreigners and a foreign god? It was beyond the first exiles, to whom formal monotheism had never been presented, to assume that the god Marduk of the conquering Babylonian empire was no god. In order then to maintain faith in the reality and power of Jehovah they had to think of him as being able to do at least proportionally for them what Marduk was now doing for the Babylonians. In order to satisfy these requirements, he should be able to provide them with a place where they would be free to worship him without being under other peoples and their gods. And when that thought came and they asked themselves where that place might be, the easiest and the inevitable answer was their former homeland, which had belonged to Jehovah throughout their history.

One other line of thought in this connection was im-

portant. If the Lord had punished Israel for its sins, other nations who must also have sinned, especially those who had wronged Israel, would have to be punished. This expectation is now covered by the prophecies against foreign nations. And such justice might in itself eventually clear the homeland of foreign domination. These various lines of thought were, under the circumstances, sufficient to force nationalism back into the picture for the exiles. Once this was accomplished, faith in the Lord also meant faith in a return to Palestine and restoration of the nation, for in that achievement the Lord's favor would be unmistakably manifested. The realization by the exiles of this renewed faith in the Lord as their national God, and of faith in his power and willingness to restore the nation to Palestine as the ultimate proof of his favor, provided the essential foundations of Judaism and determined its primary scope.

As will be seen, this new nationalism differed in no fundamental from the old. In fact its ultimate aim would be satisfied in national restoration. The essential difference between the two was that between faith and realization. Judaism was as yet simply a faith, a faith in the Lord as their God and in the restored nation as his people. The primary objective of faith was thus the return to Zion, or Zionism, a doctrine which became to the Jewish exiles something very analogous to the Second Coming of Christ to the early Christians. There was, however, one difference in the conception of God, which, while it did not basically change his character, did have a profound effect upon his worship. Their religion while they were a nation had held that no national god could allow his own people to be destroyed. They now accepted the fact that the Lord had destroyed their nation for its sins, and con-

ceivably this might occur again. They were therefore faced with the double problem of regaining his favor, and of retaining it by as sure a method as possible. So far as this involved worship—and the more nationalism was stressed the more it centered in worship—the problem could not be solved in captivity where there was no temple of the Lord, and moreover the foreign land from the standpoint of nationalism was unclean and thus an unfit place in which to build one.[10] The solution therefore had to be worked out through a plan of restored temple worship in Jerusalem.

It is at this point that the Babylonian compiler of the book of Ezekiel makes his contribution, in the last eight chapters of the book. A return to Palestine would in any case call for a restored place of worship, most probably following the temple usage which preceded the exile. But since that usage had not saved the nation in the past, it could not now be regarded as adequate for the future. The compiler of Ezekiel deals directly with this problem.[11] At the outset he raises the question concerning just what the specific sin was which caused God to destroy the nation. His diagnosis is understandable only from the standpoint of a priest and a strict nationalist. Accordingly he finds the paramount sin to have been ritualistic and to have culminated in the custom of employing foreigners, *e.g.* captives taken in war, as slaves to do the menial work in the temple.[12] The presence of these foreigners in the Lord's holy temple, according to the writer, so enraged the deity that he regarded the people as having broken the covenant that bound him to them and so he cast them off.

It should be noted that there was no law known which forbade such a use of temple slaves nor any earlier hint

that it was ever frowned upon. Thus, the exclusiveness of this writer's nationalism goes far beyond that of the nation before the exile. And upon this diagnosis he makes his plan for safeguarding worship in the future so as to retain the Lord's favor: first, no foreigner henceforth must ever be allowed to enter the temple of the Lord; secondly, the menial service of the temple was to be performed by the Levites, but even they were not to approach the altar itself; and thirdly, the priests were to be solely of the house of Zadok, since only members of this house had ever been in charge of the pre-exilic temple. The ordinances and prescriptions for the offerings as well as the semi-annual cleansing of the temple were all provided for the purpose of assuring a ritualistically pure form of worship.[13]

The plan of these chapters was never carried out in its details, but in principle it was accepted; and upon it the later religion of the Law under Ezra was set up, which has remained the norm of Judaism ever since. This sequence of Jewish thought in the exile, as the ground for the rise of Judaism, shows in outline how the Jews lost their old nationalism only to reëstablish another even more rigid and exclusive in character. Yet this was only made possible by the ethical religion of the prophets, and specifically by that of Ezekiel, who finally established for them the thesis that a national God might destroy his nation because of its sins; and they therefore were enabled to conclude that he must be a just God, who could accordingly be relied on for the future. However in interpreting him they confined themselves to the ideas of the narrowest nationalism.

2. The Great Unknown and the Resurgence of Nationalism

Was the only contribution of ethical religion then to be the establishment of the ideal of a more exclusive nationalism? Ezekiel only carried over indirectly into the exile. What would ethical religion have to say when the message of doom had been fulfilled and the nation was no more?

We come now to the great unknown prophet of the exile, sometimes called Deutero-Isaiah, whose message is also contained in the book of Isaiah.[14] The prophecy places him late in the exilic period, with Cyrus the Great well above the horizon, the latter having already, perhaps, swept across Asia Minor; and the prophet sees Babylon as the next to fall before him, which it did in 538 B.C. This coming event is looked upon as the key that is to release the Israelite captives from their prison house of exile and open the way for their return home. It is evident that the doctrine of a return to Palestine was already well established. Our prophet gives no hint that it is a new idea needing explanation, nor is there any reason given why a change of sovereignty should be taken for granted to mean release from captivity. The point of view seems to be rather that return had long been anticipated and here was the prospect of its fulfillment. The emphasis of this entire prophecy is to stimulate the exiles to return when the opportunity permits, and the prophet says that that is now imminent. In this he seems to agree with the nationalism of the book of Ezekiel. It is only when we begin to examine his interpretation of motives and aims that his ethical character becomes manifest. At the outset he proclaims that their iniquity is pardoned. God does this of his own initiative[15] because of their sad and

humbled condition, due to the penalty for their sins. He also carries the implications of the prophecies against foreign nations to their logical conclusion. If it is the Lord who will mete out just punishment to the nations who have sinned, then he and not the gods of these nations controls them and their destinies. These gods are therefore no-gods, and the Lord is the only God.

Absolute monotheism is here given its first formal expression in Israel, in language that makes it classical for all time. The majesty, universality, omnipotence, omniscience, and eternity of God are superlatively expressed, but at the same time not less his tender loving care, as the Good Shepherd. As the creator and preserver of the universe he is so infinitely great that all the animals in the largest forest in the world would not be sufficient for a burnt offering to him, nor would all the trees of that forest be sufficient to make the fire.[16] By this sweeping hyperbole the prophet disposes of and eliminates the ritualistic religion of sacrifices and offerings. Moreover there is no place for them, since God of his own accord has already forgiven the people's sins.

Again, he considers Israel not as a political entity but as the divinely chosen servant of God. In this figure of the servant the writer focuses Israel's past, present, and future. For the past, he emphasizes the dignity of the chosen one of God, who has never been forgotten or cast aside.[17] In the present, the servant is a people robbed and plundered, snared in holes and hidden in prison houses, as a prey with none to deliver.[18] There are several other aspects. The servant is described realistically as blind and deaf;[19] but there is also the faithful servant,[20] and from this point the prophet proceeds to portray the ideal suffering servant in whom the prophecy climaxes.

Through this impressive figure the prophet sets forth the exalted world-wide mission of Israel. Quite frankly he declares to them that if the return to Palestine is to be made merely for the purpose of restoring the tribes of Israel to their former habitat, it is not worth the doing.[21] It is at this point that he transcends nationalism and puts a universal outlook in its stead, for he goes on to state the mission thus: "I will give you for a light to the nations, that you may be my salvation to the ends of the earth."[22] With this prophet then we have for the first time a universal ethical concept of God and religion and a plan for its extension to all mankind. In this missionary function the concept of the servant culminates; but the prophet remains true to the spirit of the preceding prophets, who sought always for the welfare of the nation, by his provision for the salvation of Israel in the salvation of the race. The idea of a chosen people, from the nationalistic standpoint, has been eclipsed by the larger idea of the Servant Israel, chosen to bear a universal message to the rest of mankind for the salvation of humanity.

In line with his world outlook and his transcendence of nationalism, our prophet is able to do what no other Biblical writer ever did: to declare a foreign conqueror and a pagan, Cyrus the Great, to be the Lord's Messiah.[23] He is moved to do this because he regards Cyrus as the coming deliverer of Israel from captivity, and beyond that function he never mentions him again, nor does he allow him any other political or religious significance. In a word, he regards Cyrus as an instrument chosen of God for a definite purpose in direct line with Israel's world mission. The fact that he could use the most sacred term of Jewish nationalism for such a temporary service shows that nationalism for him has no vital or permanent

significance left. And there is some reason to think that he went out of his way, by this means, to make this clear and unmistakable.

Under the figure of the suffering servant he presents what one may venture to say is the most profound and sublime conception in the history of religious thought. The portrait has been almost completely drawn in Isaiah 52:13–ch. 53.[23a] It has suffered distortion at the hands of both Christian and Jewish interpreters. The former have on the whole insisted upon viewing it in isolation from its context and so upon making it prefigure a single person, identified as Christ. This was done because certain lineaments seem to correspond to the life and death of Jesus. While this is true, there are other features that are quite as strongly opposed to such an interpretation. When viewed in its context the servant pattern of the entire prophecy requires that it represent some aspect of the nation (though not the nation as such), and hence no single individual is adequate to interpret it.

Jewish interpreters, on the other hand, have usually gone to the other extreme and claimed that the suffering servant is the nation itself without reservations. This is a very natural approach from the standpoint of nationalism. But it overlooks the fact that from this approach the blind and deaf servant is just as truly the nation as the suffering servant, yet they cannot be the same since the suffering servant endures willingly and gladly unto death in the path of duty in order to fulfill his mission for the salvation of the world. The nation itself never assumed any such role and nationalism is necessarily directly against such a procedure.

The true majesty and significance of this passage has thus been largely obscured. A genuine approach to the understanding of this figure should have led both Jews

and Christians to ask the question: Why did the prophet use the figure of the suffering servant? We can be quite sure it was not because the exiles were badly treated before the time of Cyrus. This can be seen by what followed the permission in 538 B.C. for Jews to return to Palestine. The whole trend of the evidence goes to show that a very small minority availed themselves of the privilege. The writer of Ezekiel 40–48, though perhaps at least two generations away from Palestine, knew that it was a barren and difficult land from which to gain a livelihood. And his proposal to have it miraculously rejuvenated[24] did not enthuse many to risk their future on the basis of such divine aid. There is no report of harsh treatment of the Jews in Babylonia,[25] and moreover it became and remained one of the most influential centers of Judaism well on into the Christian era. There is no evident reason therefore to think that the writer deliberately chose the above figure, but much to show that he had it thrust upon him.

We know that there was a group of exiles who were faithful and who were ready to listen to this prophet,[26] but when he put before them his startling world program they felt themselves overwhelmed by its magnitude. They knew of and believed in the prophets who had preceded them. These had tried manfully to save the nation, but they had all failed even to do that much. The task of saving the Gentile world was by comparison appalling and all the more so as these faithful souls were not prophets but just common folk. How could they ever do it? The immediate fact with which they were faced was that the faithful servants of God, the prophets, seemed to have labored, suffered rejection, and died in vain. What then could they themselves hope to accomplish?

Our prophet could not dodge the issue. He was obliged

to meet the challenge and show a way out or admit he had asked the impossible. This he therefore proceeded to do, first, by freely admitting that the great faithful servants of God had died in the past not only unappreciated, but despised and rejected of men, as though under the curse of God. It was the sins of the nation that fell upon them and crushed them, because of the failure of the people to understand the prophetic teaching. So that instead of being saved by their message, the nation went blindly to its doom. However, he pointed out, although the faithful prophets of God had died, the Servant of whom they were but individual expressions is not bound by death. The prophet's own presence was the living evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, so far as the faithful exiles were concerned, our prophet says, whether the Servant goes on to live in a form adequate and commensurate with his world task depends primarily upon *you*.[27] For the moment you recognize that the aim, the attitude, and the spirit of the Servant in the past was the only right attitude, you will share his spirit, and the Servant will then live again in you as he lived in the prophets before you; and others who come after you will do the same, and thus the Servant of the Lord will continue to live and prosper and his work will go on toward its goal. Thus the prophet met his challenge; it is the challenge which is always made to those who are alive by every worthy cause that temporarily fails; and unwittingly he stated the one solution of the problem of the suffering of the righteous that is found in the Bible.

The reason the Servant suffered was because of the stupidity of men, because of their fixed ideas, their false conservatism, their slowness to see their own best interests, their dullness to the truth. The suffering and humiliation

of the righteous servant is one way of expressing the cost of getting certain new truth into the world. In the language of the New Testament this is sometimes expressed as the mystery of the cross, as though it were something inscrutable in the providence of God, since God is made responsible for it. But actually no theological frame of reference is required. Men alone are responsible. Israelites alone in the time of Deutero-Isaiah and earlier were responsible for the sufferings of the Servant, for his rejection, for his oppression, for his grave with the wicked. Some of them came to see the true state of the case and admitted they were wrong and the Servant right, but with the implication that it was then too late. It is this which the prophet denies, and he points out the way of hope. Theoretically, and, granting his premises, the prophet had won his case. For he had indicated the path and laid down the formula by which alone higher truth about human living can be realized in a world like our own—by its extension through the contagion of its presence as embodied in personality.

The theory was correct, optimistic, and sublime but it lacked implementation. The group which rallied to the prophet was too small, too weak, and ineffective, even to start a movement. The total direct effect of the prophecy was to stimulate the exiles to return to Palestine and to feel that the universal God was with them in this enterprise. That is, only those nationalistically minded did anything about it. They perceived in this prophecy their own ideas of God and a return from exile stated in far more lofty and impressive language than they had hitherto been able to conceive.

This prophecy, therefore, instead of furnishing a sharp antithesis to nationalism, had the opposite effect of stimu-

lating nationalism, and its own universalism was, for all practical purposes, submerged and lost from view in the growing tide of nationalistic ambition. This effect was further directly enhanced by an external political event already foretold in our prophecy—the capture of Babylon by Cyrus.[28] By virtue of this approaching event the prophet had declared Cyrus to be God's chosen Messiah to release the exiles from Babylon, and clear the way for a return to Palestine. The prophet also saw in the coming downfall of Babylon a clear demonstration of the fact that the gods of Babylon were no-gods[29] and that the Lord was alone supreme. It is a noticeable fact that although Cyrus took Babylon and soon thereafter issued a decree for the restoration of the temple in Jerusalem, thus completely fulfilling our prophecy about Cyrus, no writer gives any recognition to the prophecy in Isaiah, but II Chronicles 36, Ezra 1, and I Esdras 2 give all the credit to Jeremiah,[30] who had said nothing about Cyrus; furthermore, the whole emphasis is put on the interval of seventy years—incorrect in any case—during which the nation's life was to be interrupted by captivity. That is, the entire emphasis centers in nationalism and its restoration as an end in itself.

To all the exiles who were nationally minded the decree of the foreign potentate to restore their temple in Jerusalem seemed to be providential and the strongest kind of assurance of national restoration. And if that could come so swiftly and unexpectedly and with such powerful backing, no more remote goal could gain a hearing with this other in close proximity. Even the most enthusiastic followers of Deutero-Isaiah may well have felt that all immediate attention must be centered on the prospective return. Inasmuch, furthermore, as the prophet had at

least permissively allowed the resettlement in Palestine to be expressed in terms of nationalism,[31] it would have been no more than natural if his disciples came to look upon it as the essential prelude to Israel's larger mission. And thus the prolonged delay in its achievement caused these disciples to pass off the human stage without action, until only nationalists were left.

Nevertheless, the effort of the nationalists to regain the status of an independent nation was from the first, we now know, foredoomed to failure virtually throughout the entire post-exilic period. The decree of Cyrus to permit the Jews to return to their native land and restore the temple worship had no such outcome in mind. Quite the contrary, it represented a reversal of the state policy of the Assyrians, who systematically uprooted and scattered peoples in order to keep them submissive. Cyrus proposed that such uprooted peoples be allowed to return to their old habitats and restore their religious customs as a better means of assuring their loyalty to his empire.[32] We are not surprised therefore that the first attempt of the Jews in Jerusalem to declare their political independence by setting up a king of their own ended in failure and disillusionment.[33]

The triumph of Alexander the Great over Persia did not make the pathway of Jewish nationalism any easier. In fact Hellenism under the leadership of Antiochus IV, Epiphanes (175–163 B.C.), undertook to blot out not only Jewish national hopes but likewise the Jewish religion; had it not been for the desperate and heroic resistance of the Maccabees, the scheme might well have succeeded. Yet as it turned out, the Jews for this one and only time gained somewhat less than half a century of independence, with their rule at times extending over a territory equal

to the united kingdom of Israel. But this independence never adequately represented a restored nation, and it broke down as much from inner intrigue and political corruption as from external pressure. In the light of the larger history, this short-lived triumph of the Jews is seen to have hinged upon the shift in empire control from Greece to Rome; and with the coming of Rome, Jerusalem as the center of Jewish national hopes was finally destroyed and the Jews banned from Palestine for centuries. As a result, this hope has never risen again in the same form (modern Zionism has so far seen its existence as possible only under the aegis of the British Empire).

CHAPTER VIII

ETHICAL RELIGION IN POST-EXILIC JUDAISM

IN order properly to appreciate the problem facing ethical religion in Judaism from the exile to the Christian era, it is necessary to take account of the dominant idealism of Judaism, together with its changing philosophy of history during that period. This can be summarized under the terms "messianism" and "apocalyptic." Actually, whether or not there was a messiah in the picture was not vital, for, after all, the restoration of the nation and not a particular leadership was the most important thing. From the popular standpoint, however, the personal messiah remained the chief rallying point of nationalism until the destruction of Jerusalem by Titus in 70 A.D.[1] Furthermore, the disillusionments, opposition, and bitterness engendered through centuries of unavailing effort to realize the messianic ideal under the impulse of religious nationalism, resulted in a supernatural philosophy of history and a literature that is expressed in the word "apocalyptic." This material found its way into the Scriptures as an enlargement of the Prophets.

As repeated attempts to reëstablish an independent community in Palestine met with failure, the Jews were compelled to face the international situation of the larger world. Virtually always they constituted a small provincial minority in a larger empire. Wars and the shifting of empires tended to aggravate, rather than relieve, their

situation and still further to thwart their national ambitions. With the passing centuries it became increasingly clear that the Jews could not hope to win back their land by their own strength; always the forces arrayed against them were too overwhelming. They were therefore faced with the prospect of giving up their national ambitions and their religion. Instead they fell back upon their God, now regarded as universal and omnipotent, as their only hope, and so committed themselves to supernatural intervention as the solution to their problem. The assumption of this resource gave an artificial stimulus to a flagging nationalism, while at the same time it served as an outlet for the accumulated bitterness and thirst for revenge engendered by generations of oppression and persecution. They had been ground under the heel of the oppressor; they would like to see the figure reversed for the rest of the world.[2] They had been thwarted in their national ambitions by other nations; they would rejoice to see the armies of the nations arrayed before Jerusalem and to behold them miraculously destroyed before their eyes.[3]

There is a growing impression among scholars that the number of Jews directly affected by this type of literature was relatively small and confined to the literary classes. Its indirect effect, however, upon the ignorant and illiterate may have accounted in no small degree for the fanatical resistance of the Jews to Rome that climaxed in the fall of Jerusalem in 70 A.D. and for its obliteration as a Jewish center in 135. During roughly five hundred years of Judaism, from Ezra to the fall of Jerusalem at the hands of Rome, nationalism in politics and religion held complete sway and ethical religion was almost wholly submerged so far as the literature is concerned. Only a single voice of protest in four hundred years is recorded, and

that, so far as we know, had no influence on the prevailing pattern of thought. That protest is embodied in our present book of Jonah; and it not only maintains the tradition of ethical religion, but carries it to the highest point reached in pre-Christian times. The writer might well be called the first Protestant, for he is the first open protester against organized Judaism.

The Prophet Jonah

The character Jonah is one of the strangest figures in the Bible. It is transparently evident that he has no parallel among the prophets, least of all among the ethical prophets. The only claim he could have as a prophet is that he made a single flat prediction,[4] which did not come true.[5] It is, however, from the standpoint of ethical prophecy that he appears as only a caricature of a prophet, and no real man. That is, when commanded of God to deliver a message to the city of Nineveh,[6] he made every effort to flee from his task as far as possible in the opposite direction.[7] Only when he was thwarted from suicide and death by drowning, cast up upon the shore of the sea and unable to escape his mission, did he accept the divine call to prophesy,[8] and even then only in the most grudging and perfunctory manner. Without interpretation or explanation, he repeated a single sentence of doom upon Nineveh;[9] this constituted his entire effort as a prophet. After having done this, he sat down outside the city[10] to see what would happen.

It becomes evident at once that he did not want the city to repent, that he was afraid it would repent, and so be saved; and when he learned that Nineveh had repented he was not only displeased but exceedingly angry,[11] so that he prayed that he might die.[12] His mind was at this point

diverted from Nineveh entirely; he suddenly gained a renewed joy in life because of a gourd that grew up beside him; but when it was killed overnight his depression knew no bounds, and he was once more angry enough to die. When God expostulated with him for his new anger over the loss of the gourd, his last words were: "I do well to be angry even unto death." Thus the book closes with him sitting under the blazing sun, east of Nineveh, filled with a petulant, soul-destroying anger over the loss of an ephemeral object of no value or importance. The anomalous quality of Jonah's character is matched by the anachronous function of his mission. Nowhere in Israel before the exile is there the least indication that the nation itself or any prophet felt charged with a mission to the rest of the world.

The unhistorical nature of this caricature of a prophet is paralleled by the unhistorical picture of Nineveh. The city's history from prehistoric times is, thanks to archaeological research, quite well known. There is not the slightest evidence that it ever accepted the religion of Israel in any form. It was, however, known throughout the Ancient Near East as the seat of the most cruel, the most inhuman, the most ruthless rule of all cities of the ancient world. The first real clue to the writer's historical position comes from the fact that Nineveh, which fell in 612 B.C., was to him a great city of the remote past.[13] This safely locates him in the post-exilic period and, when coupled with the fact that the language of the original has marks that tend to place it among the latest books of the Old Testament, leads to a provisional dating at about 200 B.C.

Once it became clear that the writer's purpose was not historical, the age-old controversy, whether a fish could

swallow a man and the man live to tell the story, ceased to dominate the interest felt in the book; it then became imperative to formulate the purpose or aim of the writer from the terms employed and the use made of them. It was always clear that the book was addressed to the Jews by one of them. It was now equally clear that Nineveh was not just a city, but a classical focal point of power, wickedness, and ruthlessness of the Gentile world. If it could be made to reform and accept the God of the Jews the rest of the world could confidently be expected to do likewise. But if the message of Israel's God was to reach the people of Nineveh, it could only come through the Jews; therefore, at least to that extent, Jonah represents the Jews. Furthermore, the writer assumes it to be the most natural thing in the world that a Jew should be asked to carry the message of repentance from the true God to the worst of the Gentiles. Jonah himself shows no consciousness that his call represents a new idea; on the contrary, his early conduct is clearly a confession that he is trying to run away from his duty. Such phenomena presuppose the background of teaching of Deutero-Isaiah. There, however, it was not simply an individual, but the community of Israel as a whole that was divinely commissioned to take the message of true religion to the rest of the world. From this standpoint, consequently, Jonah did truly represent the Jews as a whole. But the identification is much more explicit. Could it be said that the Jews had tried to run away from this divinely appointed task and as a result were swallowed up? It was certain they had never accepted such a call. It was also true that they had been swallowed up by Babylonia. By 200 B.C. there was no harm in calling Babylonia a big fish since as a political power it had succumbed to

Cyrus more than 300 years previously. There was also no possibility that the Jews would misunderstand the figure, since it was the process of disgorging the Jews from Babylonia following the decree of Cyrus that had definitely brought Judaism into being. But was it true at this time that the Jews were so embittered against the Gentiles that they wished to see them destroyed rather than converted? We have only to quote from psalms contemporary with this general period to gain the answer. "Surely thou wilt slay the wicked, O God."[14] "Do not I hate them O Lord, who hate thee?"[15] "I hate them with perfect hatred."[16] "Let the high praises of God be in their mouth and a two-edged sword in their hand; to execute vengeance upon the nations and punishments upon the peoples."[17] "O daughter of Babylon thou art to be destroyed, happy shall he be that takes and dashes your little ones against the rock."[18]

But it might be urged that Jonah had complied with the divine call, which the Jews had not done. The difference, however, is only formal. The content of his words was no clear message. There was no word about the character of God. He voiced nothing more than the desire of the Jews as expressed above in the Psalms and in the apocalyptic literature generally: "Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be destroyed." This was their sentiment, and it differed only in the time limit set. There is every reason to think that they would have been just as much depressed as was Jonah, if the Gentiles had repented and so been pardoned.

There still remains one episode which, at least at first glance, seems to be personal with Jonah—his forgetting about his chagrin and discouragement over Nineveh and his sudden elation over the gourd as it grows up and

furnishes him a little shade from the sun. But when the gourd withers, his former discouragement comes back with added force until he loses the desire to live and, against the kindly and solicitous expostulation of God, wishes himself dead. After what has been said, it is natural to expect that the gourd is used symbolically, but in any case the episode represents a value judgment on the part of the writer. And since he is an ethical prophet, to whom nationalism must be repugnant, we must be prepared to look for a caricature of nationalism's fondest hope. When we ask ourselves what this hope was in the specific case of Judaism, it can be summed up as the leadership of the restored line of the house of David, whose scion, as God's Messiah, should sit on the throne of David in Jerusalem. This was at once the simplest, the most direct, the most dignified and imposing symbol of a restored nationalism. Efforts to realize the ideal led to an enthusiasm that submerged all other troubles and then, when the hope was suddenly and prematurely cut off, gave way to a corresponding disillusionment and despondency. This is well illustrated by the prophecies of Haggai and Zechariah.[19] With each recurrent failure, the national despondency naturally deepened. This outlook found expression in a shifting of the messianic ideal from man to God, voiced in many late messianic prophecies. "The Lord is our judge, the Lord is our king." [20] To writers of such sentiments the course of events had demonstrated that there was no place left for a Davidic or any earthly king. But as time passed, the depression of mind went still deeper, as witnessed by late apocalyptic literature, until there was no hope left of an earthly kingdom, and so nothing left on earth to live for.

Jonah, therefore, does not exaggerate either the elation

or the despondency of Judaism over its messianic aspirants and their ephemeral careers. Actually he may be said to represent a close-up of an average Jewish nationalist of the period, seen from the viewpoint of an ethical prophet. Our writer's great predecessor, Deutero-Isaiah, had definitely made light of nationalistic aims,[21] and, from the standpoint of the Servant's world mission, the Judaism of his day was indeed a caricature, an absurdity. From this approach Jonah and all his experiences fall into a clear-cut understandable pattern, and the purpose of the book stands out sharply and distinctly. It is true that Jonah is left, as it were, hanging in the air, but that is because the writer is holding the mirror up to nature and asking the Jews if they like it. The absurd character of Jonah is seen to be intentional. If only the Jews could be made to laugh, even to smile, at themselves and at the absurdities to which their nationalism was leading them! Our author is the only prophetic writer to use caricature, irony, and humor in attempting to gain his ends. But in this respect his book was a failure. There is no evidence that anyone smiled. The Jews had suffered too many rebuffs and were too depressed. They could understand and sympathize with the character Jonah, but only as one of themselves; and they could say with him wholeheartedly, "We do well to be angry even unto death," in deadly seriousness.

With these matters disposed of, we are now enabled to look at the higher religious contributions of the book. These consist, first, of the writer's faith in men's willingness to repent, and, secondly, of his conception of God and God's willingness and eagerness to forgive even to the uttermost all who repent. Deutero-Isaiah had said, "I will also give you for a light to the Gentiles, that you

may be my salvation to the end of the earth";[22] but he did not say what men would do about it. Our writer, by emphasizing the readiness of the entire population of the worst-reputed city in the world to repent at the totally inadequate message of Jonah, makes it inescapably clear that he regarded all men as amenable if given anything like a clear call to repentance. That is to say, all men are redeemable. Their redemption is to be expected, and if it does not occur it will be the fault of those who already know the truth. Therefore, so far as man is concerned, there is no reason why there should not be a kingdom of heaven on earth. Moreover, God on his part takes the initiative persistently to urge men who know him to tell others, and to make that task their inescapable mission. God's attitude toward the ignorant and erring of all mankind has all the solicitude of a father for headstrong, misguided children. There is no intermediary needed between them and him, except someone to tell them that the heart of the universe is with those who repent and turn to him. In short, the book of Jonah comes the nearest of any book in the Bible to presenting a completely ethical program of religion for mankind.

The book never bore direct fruit. Its gentle humor, its biting sarcasm, and its tender compassion were lost on a depressed, embittered people. Its one great and surprising achievement, in view of the summary rejection of its message, was that it got recorded in the Jewish Scriptures. It is to be doubted that this was because of any true appraisal of its significance. It seems more probable that it was owing to the fact that it was misunderstood, and so its preservation may have been due to the marvelous element in the story of Jonah and the fish, and perhaps also to the message of doom against a Gentile

city. Certainly, had it been recognized as containing a national caricature of current Judaism, it could hardly have been approved by the Jews.

Ethical religion receives no further exposition or elaboration up to the appearance of the Christian movement. To what extent that movement can be described under the terms of ethical religion we must now endeavor to determine. This will be undertaken by keeping in mind the degree of ethical religion already achieved in the Old Testament and by noting how far nationalism and the ritualistic religion of Judaism influence and shape the course of the new movement.

CHAPTER IX

THE CHRISTIAN MOVEMENT AND THE JESUS OF ETHICAL RELIGION

1. The First Followers of the Nazarene and St. Paul

INASMUCH as the founder of Christianity has, through all the ages since his advent, been regarded as the ultimate authority by all who bear his name, the most natural and simple procedure at this point would seem to be to examine his life and teachings. We are, however, at once met by the fact that the record of his life is now obscure and the teachings ascribed to him in our earliest sources are to a considerable extent uncertain and confused. We actually know less of him directly than of any Old Testament writer, since no written document has ever been attributed to him.

It has been traditionally held that the space of his ministry was not more than three years, and there has been a growing consensus that it was considerably less. Challenging evidence has more recently been adduced to show that it covered a little more than a year and three months.[1]

Jesus apparently did not himself write, and his closest followers, upon whom we are dependent for our primary knowledge of him, were of the humble peasant class. Did members of that circle attempt to record the teachings of Jesus, and, if so, how soon after his death? Christian tradition has it that two of their number, Matthew and John, did make such an attempt. But if this is true, their works

are not the gospels that now bear their names, but lost compositions in Aramaic, which probably was the disciples' only available language. The possibility of contemporary creative Aramaic literature remains a matter of animated, scholarly debate.[2] Evidence for increased pertinent gospel material in Aramaic gains in advocacy.[3] The precise form and nomenclature used in the first Christian century, however, still remain uncertain.

The episode of the feeding of the multitudes has been used to help answer the question: How soon after Jesus' death was this material written down? It is evident that enough time had elapsed for a miraculous oral account to have arisen and likewise enough time for a variant to have branched off from that account before both were stabilized in Aramaic, so as to constitute the bases for Greek versions of this incident now to be found combined in our gospels of Matthew and Mark.[4] Both cannot be the accounts of eyewitnesses. A more serious question is whether either one is such. Repeated telling by various persons over a considerable period of time, rather than faulty observation or bad reporting, is a sufficient reason for the appearance of such diversity.

A similar interval, devoid of writing activity, is a legitimate expectancy in view of the first disciples' basic faith in the apocalyptic return of Jesus. Since that event was believed to be imminent and as possible of immediate fulfillment as it was desirable, there was a complete lack of motive to dwell upon the earthly life of Jesus; indeed, his brief public career must have been thoroughly eclipsed by that climactic supernatural event momentarily anticipated. Only when its delay had extended far enough to put considerable strain upon faith in its certainty should we expect his followers to turn their attention to his previous

life among them, and then chiefly to gain confirmation of their faith from what they remembered of his words.

Since they had known him for little more than a year, the things they would recall and those that would in time be recorded could not be expected to give the story of his life. Accordingly, we find that neither our oldest existing gospel (Mark) nor that associated with the disciple reputed to be nearest to the Master reveals anything of his earthly life before his baptism.

Furthermore, since the disciples were acquainted with such a very small arc of his life, culminating for them in his hoped-for return, no motive is evident for their adhering to strict chronological sequence in reminiscence of him. Their own need of a strengthened faith, their manifest interest in Jesus, and their emphasis all indicate that his challenging teachings rather than the time sequence and place of utterance were their chief concern. This is confirmed by the fact that our existing gospels have no fixed order of events; furthermore, their oldest Greek sources record sayings of Jesus but without indications of time or place.[5] These sources would naturally go back to Aramaic originals. Such originals may have been oral or written or both, but in any event we should not expect their Greek successors to curtail or omit time or place sequence, since our later gospels of Matthew and Luke tend to create settings of their own where these were lacking in the sources.

In view of this situation, after what has recently been accomplished in establishing the chronology of Jesus' life,[1] the restoration of the chronological order of his sayings becomes a problem of historical research in a sense never before possible. Whatever degree of ultimate solution the nature of the data permits, the gain in historical reality

and perspective for the life of Jesus is certain to be epoch-making. And the historical search for the real Jesus is bound to become more insistent and at the same time more hopeful. This task must be pursued in spite of the fact that the dearth of sources may never make it possible to write his biography, no matter how many "lives of Jesus" may continue to be published.

It must also be admitted that there are still more disturbing factors in our primary informants. His first disciples confess repeatedly that they misunderstood him.[6] On their own witness their earliest continuing interest in him was a purely nationalistic Jewish hope that he was the coming Messiah, and some of them planned to get the first offices under his rule.[7] This hope probably died with the crucifixion,[8] but the appearances to some of his followers after his death [9] caused its revival.[10] In view, however, of the temporary and fleeting character of the appearances, which ended in his complete disappearance from the earth, this ideal could only continue to be held if the proposition that he would speedily come back to earth could also be maintained. The consistent Jewish concept of the Messiah as the divinely sanctioned king of the Jews was such that the ignominious death of Jesus was enough to kill the idea of his Messiahship, had it not been for the subsequent appearances. That the end of the appearances meant that he as Messiah had gone to Heaven could be allowed only if his return was regarded as imminent. The anomaly of his departure and stay in heaven, like the anomaly of his death, could be granted so long as it did not shut off the prospect of his immediate return to earth, where alone he could exercise his real and true function as Messiah. It will thus be seen that the doctrine of the Second Coming was absolutely essential if the earliest

followers of Jesus were to believe in him as Messiah at all after his death.[11] Who made the first suggestion of it is now hidden from us, although it may have arisen simultaneously among a group as a result of the reports of the appearances of Jesus after his death; but this point, interesting as it would be to know, is of far less importance than the fact that, once proposed, the doctrine was accepted without any evidence of misgivings or controversy.[12] That is to say, in the atmosphere of apocalyptic thought of the first century A.D. the idea of the return to earthly life of a person who had died and whose body had perished presented no insurmountable obstacle to its acceptance. Moreover the followers of the Nazarene did not have to create any new pattern of thought in order to establish the doctrine. The Jews had proposed and long expected the return to earth of Elijah.[13] The same possibility was also held out for the return of Jeremiah and other prophets, and, more immediately, they were prepared to see the return of the recently beheaded John the Baptist.[14]

The first disciples were thus enabled to revive their national messianic hope in Jesus, after his death, and on the basis of it to organize his followers in Palestine[15] and to make their appeal to the Jewish nation to accept Jesus as their Messiah.[16] This appeal, however, received no significant response, in spite of the enthusiastic notice in Acts.[17] These activities did not take the first disciples outside the national religion of Judaism either in their program or their conception of Jesus himself,[18] and there is no evidence that either they or their organized following ever did move beyond these bounds. This can be verified by the nature and outlook of the Jerusalem leadership. Within ten years after the crucifixion certainly—and prob-

ably it was after a much shorter interval—James, the brother of Jesus, who had not been known as a disciple in Jesus' lifetime, had become the first of his followers and the leader of the movement. This is clear from the Epistle to the Galatians.[19] Peter is the spokesman of the apostles in the opening of Acts and in Galatians,[20] but Paul definitely puts James at the head[21] and forcefully illustrates his dominance of Peter.[22] At the same time Paul shows very clearly that the Jerusalem group not only felt no urge to go beyond the Jewish pale, but they were definitely against doing so.[23] When, therefore, the Jews failed to respond to any significant extent to the appeal of Jesus as their Messiah and when his return did not take place speedily, as promised, this delay became a far more serious matter to the Jews than it ever did to the Gentiles. To the Jews, the vital question was: Did this proposed Messiah have the power to deliver them from Rome, and so, specifically, to save Jerusalem from the Roman legions? They waited for the answer a full generation; when Jerusalem fell in 70 A.D. that event very probably, and for all practical purposes, brought to an end the Jewish messianic claim for Jesus, and his strictly Jewish following was soon liquidated. Had it not been for St. Paul we might very well never have heard of it or of Jesus. Furthermore, by the time Paul became the apostle to the Gentiles, Jesus had gone; and Paul himself had never in the flesh seen or heard him. There was thus no further direct access to the life of Jesus; all our primary first-hand approaches to him have to be made through those who misapprehended who and what he was and so failed to grasp his purpose or his mission. Moreover, as they listened to him, their concept of him as the potential Jewish Messiah, could not have failed to influence what they remembered, but even

more the interpretation which they put upon his words. They have drawn his picture as the Jewish Messiah, but they were mistaken. Whatever else he was or claimed to be, he was not that.[24] Yet from this portrait of him and what has come through with it must be determined what he was, what he sought to accomplish, and his real significance. This problem has not yet been successfully solved. Such is the admission of the foremost New Testament scholarship of our time.[25] And from the nature of the data a completely satisfactory solution can hardly be expected.

One thing has emerged from the sketch given above: the religion of the Jewish messianic followers of Jesus could not be described as an ethical religion, since it provided for saving the Jews alone and for saving them as a nation to the exclusion of others. But this religion came to an end. To that extent its discussion has now only an antiquarian or academic interest. Its end may be ascribed first to Jewish apathy, secondly to the activity of St. Paul, and finally to Titus and the Roman legions in 70 A.D. Henceforth the Christian religion is for all practical purposes a Gentile movement.

It was called Christian, that is "Messianic," because St. Paul not only opened the door to the Gentiles on an equal basis with the Jews, but, by carrying over the concepts and the interpretations of Jesus held by the Jewish Nazarenes, interpretations which he gained from Peter [26] and others of less repute, gave the movement its basic terminology. To St. Paul, Jesus was above all the Messiah, but when he expresses this idea to the Gentiles in Greek, the name appears not simply as "Jesus the Messiah," but as "Jesus Christ," "Christ Jesus" or "Christ" alone. Thus for all who read Greek, "Christ" (Messiah) became a part

of the proper name and, as its most important part, it was adequate to stand alone.

Since there was no sufficient background of meaning in Greek for either Jewish "Messiah" or Greek "Christos," the doctrine of the Second Coming—the return of the Messiah from Heaven—had to be treated in Greek thought theologically; thus the divinity of Christ became a foregone conclusion. That is to say, any person who, after living on the earth, had gone to Heaven, and who was expected to return to earth to judge the world, would from the standpoint of Greek thought necessarily have the quality of divinity.

For St. Paul himself there was no such necessity of thought. His carrying over of the messianic idea to the Gentiles, however, strongly modified most of his basic Jewish conceptions, including that of the Messiah. This is seen first of all in his changed conception of Israel. The believers in Christ now constitute the true Israel,[27] but that "Israel" might include people from all nations under the sun. The problem of Christ's return to rule as Messiah over such a scattered conglomeration was one which, needless to say, Jewish messianism had never contemplated. To be sure, if all the nations had been converted there would have been no serious difficulty, but with Christianity a struggling minority in St. Paul's day and with a doctrine of Christ's imminent return, there was no evident way open for a messianic kingdom on the earth. The doctrine of God's wrath,[28] taken over from Jewish apocalyptic nationalism—originally, therefore, God's wrath against the Gentiles—was now interpreted by Paul as God's wrath against an unbelieving world and it called for judgment when Christ returned, a judgment so sweeping in character that it is conceived by him in the cataclysmic

terms of Jewish apocalyptic in its more pessimistic phases, and leaves no room for a kingdom of any sort in this world. Christ's messiahship was therefore reduced to the brief scene of his return and the Judgment. "Then cometh the end when he shall deliver up the kingdom to God even the Father,"[29] "that God may be all in all"[30] in the realm of the spirit. The first disciples had warned the Jews to repent and accept Jesus as the Messiah because they had, though unwittingly, slain the Lord's Anointed. This became an entirely new problem when Christ was presented to the Gentiles.

The approach for St. Paul grew out of his struggle against the Jewish Nazarenes (Judaizers), in which he championed the right of Gentiles to become Christians without accepting the Jewish Law. The ritualistic Law of the Jews was officially recognized as adequate to clear the Jews of sin and, theoretically, to restore outward prosperity to the nation. Actually the Law had failed to do the latter, and, for Paul, the Jews had sinned beyond the reach of the Law to help, for they had not only unwittingly slain the Messiah but, worse still, they had afterward, for the most part, persistently refused to accept him. Had the Jews quite generally recognized Jesus as the Messiah, it is fairly clear that St. Paul would have found no fault with the efficacy of the Law so far as the Jews were concerned,[31] for Paul recognizes clearly the efficaciousness of sacrifices to atone for sin. But in regard to the Gentiles, Paul looked upon Christ's death as a sacrifice which took the place of the Law; for why should they keep the Law when it had not brought the Jews to Christ? The Jews were, therefore, sinners for whom Christ had died, the Law having proved inadequate to save them. Therefore Christ had died for all men. Paul could not deny the

efficacy of ritualistic sacrifice; when faced by the inadequacy of the Jewish ritual he could only propose a greater sacrifice in its stead. In place of the animal sacrifices of the Old Testament, he therefore put the greater human sacrifice of Christ. By this means Paul accomplished two things: first, he provided himself with a compelling substitute for the Law in the case of the Gentiles, and, second, he gained a satisfying explanation of the disturbing enigma, why should the Messiah have to die as he did? Actually St. Paul introduced no new or higher principle in religion. On the contrary, his interpretation of Christ's mission greatly increased the emphasis on the principle of ritualistic sacrifice as already maintained by the Levitical Law. This result tended to push traditional Christianity even further away from ethical religion than was Pharisaic Judaism.

2. The Gospel Records and Their Portrayal of Jesus

We are thus thrown back on the gospel sources for whatever light may fall on the life of Jesus. As already noted, the first disciples' primary interest in Jesus as the Jewish Messiah compelled them to draw his portrait as the Messiah, and so to recall such acts and words of his as they regarded to be in harmony with this conception. It was inevitable, therefore, that no matter what else Jesus actually was, the figure of him as the Jewish Messiah would be regnant in the gospel tradition. But by the time our gospels were written and Jerusalem had fallen, the term "Jewish" had disappeared from his title, while "Messiah" remained; or following the interpretation of St. Paul, we may say that the figure of the Jewish Messiah remained, though he was now made available to the whole world. But in making this extension the function of

Messiah as ruler is transformed into that of Savior and Judge of mankind, whose chief business henceforth is to wind up the affairs of this world.

Going back then to the first disciples—since it is now evident that they were mistaken in their basic conception of Jesus there is a definite presumption that, whether he was more or less than they conceived him to be, in any case they failed to grasp what he was. That being so, the question remains as to how much, if anything, of what he really was may have filtered through in spite of the disciples' misconception, and because they did not perceive that certain items reported by them were incongruous with their conception of him.

The same kind of a problem has been recognized in connection with Zoroaster. His followers and interpreters are admitted to have construed his character so as almost entirely to obscure his real person; nevertheless they allowed certain source materials which they did not understand to be transmitted, and from this material[32] it is now possible to restore his true personality and teachings. The task in the case of Jesus is admittedly more difficult. There is good reason to believe that Zoroaster himself did write something that has been preserved, but for Jesus we must rely upon the impressions of him which others received without realizing their true meaning.

We may begin by noting those features of the gospel story of Jesus that were no part of the stereotype of messianic expectation. One such item was Jesus' interest in alleviating the physical ills of the poor. To be sure, this is exploited in the gospel narrative as an evidence of his magical power, a power that coincided with the requirements needed if the Messiah were, for example, to overcome the Roman Empire; but none of the cures, no

matter how much emphasized, point the way to political power or dominance. Rather they begin and end with the individual concerned. Another characteristic feature is Jesus' custom of going about the countryside, accompanied by disciples, teaching and preaching. This marked a revival of the methods of earlier prophets, but there was nothing about the procedure to indicate a political ruler. Finally, there was the crucifixion, which beforehand seemed to the disciples to be the complete negation of messiahship.[33]

We come then directly to the sayings attributed to him in the New Testament. These are presented as the accounts of eyewitnesses who heard him speak, but it can scarcely be overemphasized that such reports became available to us only after they had been repeated and interpreted for over a generation, when they were finally written down, as we have them, by persons who had never seen Jesus or heard him[34] and entirely in another tongue[35] than that spoken by Jesus.[35a] Furthermore, the evidence goes to show that many of the sayings of Jesus were originally transmitted without either time or place being specified and that they were fairly brief, such as could be recalled from memory. No single complete address or sermon could be expected from such a process. The so-called "Sermon on the Mount," the largest formal unit as recorded in Matthew, can easily be read in ten minutes, and it is generally recognized that even this is an artificial grouping, since the same material, though found also in Luke, is without unity and widely scattered. We cannot, therefore, hope to get a complete picture of Jesus' mind and thought. Many things he said were probably forgotten; some things remembered and later recorded may now be obscured to a certain extent by lack of context

and setting; others may be distorted by artificial settings or by explanations later given them.[36] Some things attributed to him may be due to the disciples' false conception of what he was. For example, since they believed him to be the Jewish Messiah, we should expect him to be represented as loyal to the Law of Israel, and he is so represented,[37] in spite of the fact that in the same context he quotes the legal usage only to set it aside by a different standard.[38]

In like manner, since the first disciples, after his death, had staked their faith in Jesus as the Jewish Messiah on the imminence of his apocalyptic return, it is unthinkable that they should represent him either as ignorant of his role in the Second Coming or as not sharing the apocalyptic philosophy, which alone could make it possible. This outcome was the more inevitable, whatever Jesus taught, because the doctrine of the Second Coming was free to play upon the tradition about him for a full generation before it reached its present written form. The question whether Jesus actually shared this viewpoint has, therefore, to be faced afresh.

After a generation of complacent acceptance of apocalyptic as an assured part of the mental furnishing of Jesus, it is almost startling to discover in New Testament circles the beginning of a tendency to veer away from this point of view[39] and to see in this matter "the very crux of interpretation in all New Testament research at the present day."[40]

To what extent this changed point of view may come to be accepted by New Testament scholars the future must decide, but from the standpoint of the ethical religion of the Old Testament it is primary and fundamental. The Jesus of "thoroughgoing eschatology" is and

remains a deluded fanatic,[41] who "ceases to command respect as a moral and religious leader."[42] This is, we believe, none too strong language, for in the light of the preceding ethical religion such a Jesus automatically falls below the level of Old Testament prophecy; and immediately the New Testament is involved in hopeless contradiction, for there is in the New Testament a religious level still higher than that of the prophets of the Old.

Apocalyptic can only be properly assessed as an extreme phase of nationalism in Judaism, a phase that extended from the second century B.C. through the first century of our era. Once admitted as a legitimate expectancy of help, such a power theoretically has no limits. But inasmuch as it remained a theory, while the need for divine intervention from the standpoint of nationalism became ever more desperate, it naturally lent itself to wishful thinking to the *n*th degree. The repression, persecution, and humiliation suffered by the Jews could find considerable relief and much satisfaction in picturing the dire penalties that God would vent on their foes. The cry for vengeance and the lust for power, regardless of all humane considerations, had full play in apocalyptic, to make it the most ruthless and bitter national and religious philosophy that men have ever held.[43] It was an instrument of thought that was able to transform all that the Jews had suffered into fierce hatred and vengefulness against their oppressors; furthermore, it made them feel themselves to be supremely religious in such attitudes, so that its nonexistent ethical qualities are made conspicuous by their opposites.

As a philosophy apocalyptic was difficult to adapt to a messianic consciousness, since the desired outcome of the future depended not on human activity but upon divine

intervention. Human effort without such intervention would be futile, but when the supernatural did break through to help, the role of the human was not to assist but to be ready to inherit the results of such intervention in human affairs. Moreover, it was impossible to tell when the Divine would act. There had been need enough of divine aid for centuries if nationalism was to triumph, but nothing had happened; indeed, conditions had grown steadily worse. How then, from the point of view of thoroughgoing apocalyptic, could a person become Messiah-minded? To be a Messiah involved active leadership. But, under apocalyptic, the opportunity to exercise leadership depended on divine intervention, and yet when this would come no one could foretell. The most that any would-be messiah could say was, "If and when God intervenes I feel myself destined to be the Messiah." But that would never make a messiah out of anyone, since the initiative depended solely on God. If a person went further, and said he believed himself to be the coming Messiah and that God would intervene to make the belief a reality, the initiative was still with the Divine, since man could not force the hand of God and the most that the human candidate could do was to stand ready. This is well illustrated by the Christian doctrine of the Second Coming. Attempts to fix the date were the chief activity, and these only led to disillusionment. Actually, therefore, apocalyptic could never call forth the dynamic leadership which is involved in the idea of a real Messiah. On the contrary, it provided an atmosphere and climate well adapted to produce spiritual Micawbers.

Thus apocalyptic, true to the conditions out of which it arose, was suited only to situations where effective human action was deemed impossible, and where, there-

fore, only the supernatural intervention of Omnipotence could give hope for the larger future. Furthermore, a thoroughgoing faith in apocalyptic made a Messiah less and less necessary. This is proved by the gradual disappearance of the messiah figure from later apocalyptic. For if the future depends solely on the supernatural, reliance on the arm of flesh is as unnecessary as it is futile. This is expressed in another way in apocalyptic by making Jehovah the king,[44] and so eliminating the messiahship.

If Jesus believed himself to be the Jewish Messiah and relied on apocalyptic for the realization of this belief, he was not only deceived about himself, but he was equally deceived about the nature of apocalyptic as applied to messianism. He was evidently worse deluded than any of the many would-be messiahs who arose either before or after him, none of whom seem to have been particularly misled by apocalyptic. Had he shared the apocalyptic outlook, that in itself would have made him less significant than any of the ethical prophets of the Old Testament, for it would have aligned him with nationalism in religion. There would then have been no reason for him to have looked forward to his own violent death and subsequent return to earth. Apocalyptic envisaged a power so great as to make such events entirely unnecessary and unthinkable, by destroying the enemies of the Jews supernaturally. Hence the doctrine of the Second Coming in the gospels can in no case be attributed to Jesus himself. If Jesus believed himself to be the Messiah and relied on apocalyptic, we should expect him to be devoted to the ritualistic Law and to have no real inkling of the ethical religion of the great prophets who preceded him.

The assumption that the ideas of nationalism and the highest ethical teachings of the prophets could be held

simultaneously by Jesus, or by any one else, is probably a product of the primary moral confusion already found in the basis of Judaism. It was inevitable, under the circumstances, that Jesus should be represented as the Jewish Messiah. In like manner it was equally necessary, regardless of his own outlook and teaching, that he should be portrayed as an apocalyptist.

But these things do not necessarily tell us anything of his real person, for it must be noted that, however much the disciples may have hoped that he might be the Messiah, while he was with them in the flesh only the most impetuous of them is reported to have openly expressed this as a conviction in his presence.[45] And immediately afterward that disciple received such a stinging rebuke from the Master[46] that, according to the synoptic tradition, no other disciple made a like confession. One of their number was completely disillusioned and betrayed him to the police, perhaps as an imposter.[47] And when Jesus was arrested the disciples all left him and fled.[48]

His death caused some of his followers to lose all hope of his being the Messiah,[49] and only after the appearances that followed did they become emboldened to declare him the Messiah.[50] This, however, was only possible for them on the ground of his apocalyptic return. It was evidently these later experiences, entirely extraneous to the life of Jesus, which finally convinced them of his messiahship, whereas his life and teachings had failed to do so. Moreover, it was through these ideas gained after his death that his followers viewed and interpreted his life and words.

On the one hand, the disciples, aided only by memory, were under such circumstances inwardly compelled to represent Jesus as having been during his lifetime the

Messiah they came to accept after his death. This trend of thought is shown by our earliest Greek gospel (Mark) in its open and avowed purpose to convince the reader that Jesus was the Messiah from his baptism onward, chiefly by reason of his power to heal the sick. Matthew and Luke go further and carry the argument back to his birth; John carries it to preëxistent eternity.

On the other hand, much that Jesus had said to the disciples was evidently quite puzzling to them. This is seen from the fact that the very parables that he used to elucidate his teaching[51] are described in the gospels as enigmas to the disciples.[52] It is assumed that anything else would have been more understandable;[53] and they frequently failed completely to grasp his meaning.[54] But when, after his death, they became thoroughly convinced that he must in spite of his death, be the Messiah, that fact caused them to review and reëvaluate their memory of his words. Much that seemed paradoxical and strange to them at the time, much that would not fit any pattern of their thought—even less that of a messiah—could now be allowed, for he was surely now the Messiah; and any striking sayings that did not on the face of them contradict messiahship could be used to emphasize the challenging and the mysterious in that awe-inspiring figure momentarily awaited from Heaven. There was thus room for considerable material to filter through whose import was either beyond the grasp of the disciples or whose significance was misunderstood.

3. The Search for the Distinctive Ideas of Jesus

A search for the distinctive ideas of Jesus might proceed in various ways, but since there is no reason to suspect that his thinking ever went outside of Israelitish, not to

say Jewish, patterns of thought, it will suffice for our purpose to ask whether his thought transcended nationalistic legalism, which was the orthodox standard of his day. More specifically, we must ask do his utterances reveal that he made a discrimination between the Law and the Prophets? And is that discrimination sufficient to show that he appreciated the ethical viewpoint of the prophets as opposed to nationalistic religion? If this proves to have been so, we can be assured that we are dealing with a real personality, unique in his day; for there is no evidence that any other thinker of the first century A.D. was able to make that distinction. Prophecy was indeed recognized in that age, but only as an adjunct and support for the religion of the Law. If by this test Jesus is proved equal to the ethical prophets of Israel, it will be proper to test by the same kind of a standard whether and in what respects he surpasses them.

Jesus is occasionally called a prophet in the gospels,[55] and he himself implies that he was one.[56] The term, however, tells us nothing as to the character or teachings of Jesus, since it does not indicate whether an ethical or a nationalistic prophet is meant.

It is clear at the outset that Jesus did not feel bound by the letter of the Law.[57] Moreover, he did not hestitate to displace certain prescriptions of the Law by others that not only definitely flouted the spirit of exclusive nationalism[58] but, if adhered to, would have inevitably brought it to an end. If all men loved their enemies, for example, there could be no more enemies in the world. And for the Jews of Jesus' time this was specific, for their arch-enemies were the Romans. If they were not to resist them, and, what was beyond their power even to conceive seriously, if they were to love them and pray for their welfare,

then they could not only not resist them, but they could not even pray God to destroy them. Thus that last bitter solace of apocalyptic national hope would be denied them; and with it also, under the circumstances, all hope of either a militant or an apocalyptic messiah of any sort would disappear.

Jesus could not have openly said to the Jews of his day, "Love your enemies," without realizing that he was saying to them, "Love the Romans." His consistent attitude of refusing to be caught by any questions or in any situation that would bring him into conflict with the Romans[59] confirms this thought. Therefore, when he made the statement above he knew that he was setting himself squarely against half a millennium of pent-up Jewish national hatreds born of persecution and national frustration, most of which were already enshrined in their scriptures, especially in the Psalms.[60] But the bitterest spirit of all was in the apocalyptic literature, much of which was definitely messianic.[61] To deny thus the right of nationalism to exist by prescribing the opposite he must have known would expose him to the charge of being a national renegade, and to the likelihood of having heaped upon himself the very hatreds he had denied legitimacy against non-Jews. Here alone was more than enough to account for his untimely death at the hand of the Jews. Without doubt he must also have known, as all later readers and interpreters should have known, that messianism in that age lived and throve on such national hatreds; and he had prescribed the formula for their destruction. By what deviousness of thought could any one suppose that he could thereupon conceive himself to be the God-sent instrument of the hatreds and the bitter nationalistic spirit which the messiah idea had come to embody!

Jesus did, then, very definitely transcend the nationalistic spirit of the Jews; and, since nationalism was always the very soul of Judaism, it is not too much to say that he transcended Judaism. For this attitude to enemies Jesus has been labelled a pacifist. That he taught pacifism to the Jews of his time there would seem to be no shadow of doubt. It should be remembered, however, that it was a very specific situation, comparable to the position of the Jews in Europe today. What he would have said to the Jews in the Maccabean period, for example, is an entirely different matter, with several things to indicate[62] that he would have been a staunch Maccabean.

But in saying, "Love your enemies," did Jesus realize that he had gone beyond the ethical prophets of the Old Testament? For no prophet before him had ever gone so far. Also, what was Jesus' attitude to ritualistic legalism? Was he able to assess the ethical significance of the Law in relation to the Prophets? In other words, was it a mere accident that he said, "Love your enemies," without realizing the relation of that exhortation to the religious thought of the past?

The reports in the gospels indicate that Jesus was conversant with both the Law and the Prophets and that he frequently considered them together. His appraisal of them reveals that he regarded the great prophets as primarily ethical rather than nationalistic, which shows that he had in mind especially the prophets of the eighth–seventh centuries B.C. and that he was able to distinguish their messages from later nationalistic additions. Advanced Pharisaic thought in the days of Jesus had already gone so far as to summarize the Law in terms of human conduct apart from ritual, and to express it in terms of inward attitudes toward God and man.

Jesus himself is reported to have made a summation of

both the Law and the Prophets—a much more comprehensive and significant task. When asked what command was greatest in the Law, he said, following a Pharisaic formula, "You must love the Lord your God with your whole heart, your whole soul, and your whole mind. That is the great, first command. There is a second like it: You must love your neighbor as you do yourself." He then added, "These two commands sum up the whole of the Law and the Prophets."[63] On another occasion he said, "Therefore you must always treat other people as you would like to have them treat you, for this sums up the Law and the Prophets."[64] In the first statement he summarizes the Law and the Prophets in terms of personal attitudes that determine conduct toward both God and man. In the second he resolves both Law and Prophets entirely in terms of human conduct. The motivation of Jesus in making these equations and the legitimacy of his conclusions may serve as tests of his understanding of both Law and Prophets.

We may ask at this point why Jesus should thus try to make a synthesis of the Law and the Prophets. The Jews had never attempted such a synthesis nor from their appraisal of the Law could they have felt the need of doing so. We know the Law and the Prophets constituted the two main divisions of the Jewish Scriptures; and, as has been pointed out, there was a fundamental antithesis between them that involved the Scriptures in basic contradictions. Jesus' effort to bring them into unity is one evidence that he appreciated their true natures. To be sure, if the two terms were contradictory, the simplest solution might seem to have been the exclusion of one of them. In other words, if the ritualistic religion of a narrow nationalism is correct, then exclude the liter-

ature of ethical religion; but if ethical religion is true, cast out the ritualistic books. Theoretically, this would have been a correct procedure, but actually, under the circumstances, it was impractical and could only have resulted in misunderstanding and bitterness, for both Law and Prophets were formally accepted as of like authority, although the theory of their being so never held in practice.

Ethical prophecy always involved responsible conduct. The religion of the Law presupposed a sure way of escape from the unpleasant results of past conduct by means of symbolic action that had nothing to do with conduct. If a man is responsible for his conduct, then the Law, as a method by which to escape from that responsibility, is a contradiction in terms, and therefore cancels out. Nevertheless, the aim of the Law, to secure release from the results of wrong conduct, was not only highly desirable, but necessary if there was to be a stable, ongoing human society. This end, however, was not gained by forgiveness for the repentant sinner which ethical prophecy provided. For in a human society the results of wrong conduct have also to be atoned for on the purely human plane, and it is this requirement which causes all the evils, ranging from personal frictions and animosities on up to world conflicts. A genuine working formula called for a higher synthesis. Let the Law and the Prophets be actually thrown into the melting pot and what will result? The answer is found in the words of Jesus. For it was at this stage that Jesus made a synthesis that went beyond both the Law and the prophets who preceded him by proposing to obviate the ills of misconduct at their source. Wrong conduct as it affects others is largely due to animal selfishness and disregard for the welfare of others. Jesus

said, when every one treats his fellow man the way he himself would like to be treated, the aim of the Law and the Prophets on the human plane will be accomplished.

Jesus did, thus, grasp the essential nature of the Law and the Prophets, and his synthesis proves it. He made ethical conduct regnant, because it corresponds to the nature of God. That is why when some other substitute, like the ritualism of the Law, is proposed as a coördinate and the two are put together, only ethical conduct emerges. The substitute is in effect eliminated, in accordance with the higher standard. This also shows that Jesus made his synthesis on the ethical level of the prophets before him. And he thereby, in theory, cleared the ground in his day for the establishment of an ethical religion.

The conclusion that Jesus must have known and absorbed the prophetic teaching in order thus summarily to dispose of the Law as he did is confirmed by his direct reference to the Prophets. When, for example, he said: "Go and learn what this means, I desire mercy and not sacrifice,"[65] he put his finger unerringly upon the very heart throb of the book of Hosea.[66] Furthermore, there cannot be the slightest doubt as to either the meaning of the passage or the use of it made by Jesus. The incident is an unconscious witness to Jesus' complete understanding and his sharing of the prophetic point of view. It also helps to explain how, without any assumption of superiority, he could, as in the Sermon on the Mount, treat the Law with such complete freedom in modifying its prescriptions; yet all of this was done in the interests of higher ethical standards. Again, his reference to the prophet Jonah[67] shows that he was conversant with that book; and if he could grasp the ethical significance of the book of Hosea, there is no reason to think that he would not be

able to do the same with the book of Jonah, especially since it contained a message that differed from that of Hosea in degree rather than in kind. His understanding of this book is further assured by his selection of the "sign of Jonah" to the Ninevites. Above all, if he wished to convey the idea that he had any supernatural sign whatever to offer, Jonah was not the book from which to draw an illustration. He had, however, just said that the people of his day were wicked and perverse in asking for a sign. And then he made his meaning absolutely certain by citing the incident from Jonah wherein it was crystal clear that there was not the slightest trace of a sign. The Ninevites had only the words of Jonah to guide them, and they were exceedingly few words at that. Therefore, in the matter of signs or any outer authentication of himself or his message, Jesus took his stand with the best tradition of Old Testament prophecy. The greatest prophets never appealed to signs or miracles of any kind for their authentication. And Jesus specifically took his stand with the writer of the most universally ethical book in the Scriptures. His followers after his death would appeal to signs and wonders attributed to him, as the evidence of what he was. But, to judge from the episode described above, we can no more think of him doing so than we can imagine the Old Testament prophets making such a claim for themselves. Ethical teaching has to be its own authentication, because there is nothing higher to which it can appeal. To assume that occult or magical powers can add to it is a contradiction in terms. Jesus shows that he appreciated this fact as well as did the prophets before him.

His selection from Jonah has another bearing on his ethical message. He chose an illustration which empha-

sized the fact that a people who represented the archetype of wickedness of the Gentile world repented as one man at the message of Jonah. It cannot be supposed that he did not realize that this incident completely transcended the nationalism of his own day. And anyone who accepted it would have no reason to doubt that all mankind, including even the Romans, could be converted, the more so because the story of Jonah finds completion in a representation of God, who is compassionate and who yearns to forgive all men, being particularly tender toward all the little children of the human race.[68]

A final argument to show that Jesus knew and appreciated the prophets is the fact that he did go beyond them. The prophets had concentrated on the ethical character of God and the conduct required of the nation in order to save it from overthrow. In the exile, and beyond, the voice of ethical prophecy emphasized the mission of the Jews to the rest of the world in order that all men might know and serve the one and only God. At first no attempt was made to say what the response of the Gentiles would be. But the writer of the book of Jonah had expressed his faith that they would all repent if given the least encouragement. None of the prophets had tried to define the human relations between Jew and Gentile, nor had they considered the problem of Jews and Gentiles living together as a unified community.[69] Thus, up to the time of Jesus, ethical religion had posited a universal ethical God, had provided a plan whereby all men might come to know him, and had expressed the faith that all men would accept and serve him once the knowledge reached them. It thus looked forward to the universal reign of God in the hearts of men and, therefore, to a religious community of mankind. But it made no attempt to deter-

mine what effect the universal acceptance of an ethical God would have upon human relations, or to decide how believers ought to treat one another or how they should treat those who had not accepted their God. The problem of the relation of Jew and Gentile remained to be solved, as well as the question of the larger relation of believers and potential believers. Here lay the unfinished portion of the plan of a universal ethical religion. If the plan were ever to function as a reality the human side would have to be completed.

Jesus accepted the teaching of the prophets about God, including the belief in the universal fatherhood of God,[70] without argument or apology. He cleared the way for an ethical religion for the Jews by summations of the Law and the Prophets which would eliminate ritualistic religion. By extending the Jewish love of neighbor to include all men[71] and by declaring that each man must, therefore, treat everyone else the way he himself would like to be treated, regardless of the other party's race or religion, he consciously made this a requirement of a universal religion.

When Jesus began his public career by saying, "Repent for the reign of God is near," he used a terminology that had long been familiar to the Jews. To the average Jewish nationalist of the time this concept meant the restoration of Jewish independence, a king of the line of David sitting on a throne in Jerusalem. Even that, however, called for a definite tinge of apocalyptic thought, for this ideal also demanded the expulsion of the Romans from Palestine and there appeared to be no way of effecting that short of supernatural intervention. To the extreme apocalyptic nationalist, the reign of God could only come near through a cataclysm that would wipe out not only the

Romans but all the rest of the Gentiles, and leave the Jews in undisputed possession of the world. To a disciple of the ethical prophets the statement of Jesus would have connoted the coming of a living allegiance of men everywhere to God.

On the basis of these circumstances, we believe that Jesus came with a new vision of the reign of God, and that it was that vision which made him speak. His public career was too short and the reports we have of it too brief and fragmentary for us to assume that we can discover separate phases of his mental outlook. The reign of God which Jesus heralded, we can be quite sure, was not nationalistic. Ethical prophecy excludes that. It was also, therefore, not political or messianic. And it was certainly not apocalyptic in character, since it did not depend upon the manifestation of God's omnipotence by a breaking through of the order of nature. Nor did it rest simply on men's acceptance of God as an ethical God. The crux of the matter depended on man's neighborly treatment of his fellow man, on his learning to see that the highest self-interests of the individual are only truly served by his treating others as though their interests were his very own, and on making this the test of having accepted an ethical God. This represented a new and untried technique in the days of Jesus, as it does pretty much still, two thousand years later, among ourselves. Jesus probably hoped that it would make more rapid progress than it has, but the assumption that he expected the reign of God to become universal in his lifetime rests upon the false conception that he shared apocalyptic ideas. If we make this assumption after what has been indicated, Jesus becomes an absolutely contradictory character. Such a procedure, however, is unfair, and unwarranted as a

method of treating any historical person unless there is no other alternative to be discovered. We have already seen the alternatives; and they are not hard to discover; they are, indeed, very difficult to escape.

Jesus was justified in saying, "The reign of God is near," because he was proclaiming that reign and showing the only means by which it could come to be. There were two basic factors involved. The first, the fatherhood of God, could not alone assure the result. The divine factor was to Jesus a constant in the problem, like the father in the parable of the prodigal, but at a certain point the father could do nothing more than mark time and wait. The human factor was the uncertain variable, for Jesus was calling upon men to perform a new function, so to speak. He had learned and was able to point out to others how to stand upright and to walk spiritually erect. The rest of mankind were still creeping on all fours, each man mostly by himself. Jesus called upon men to stand upright and to walk not alone, but hand in hand, since it is every one's best and highest interest to be, in a sense, his neighbor's keeper.

Jesus cannot be thought to have been unaware of the tremendous obstacles to the coming of the reign of God to be found in Jewish nationalism and ritualistic legalism. These hindrances were so great as to provoke the question, why did he not turn to others? But to whom else could he go? The Jews alone had the Scriptures, in which his message was grounded. And had not the Jews' world mission been proclaimed centuries before him by Deutero-Isaiah, the very kind of mission he would have them perform?

It called for no superior insight on the part of Jesus to realize that his declaration that the reign of God was

near would almost certainly arouse strong nationalistic hopes and might attract great crowds, a fact which would enable him to speak to large numbers of people. He knew, however, that when they saw that he had no nationalistic message, many would probably withdraw and lose interest in him. In like manner he must have recognized that his message would stimulate messianic hopes, but that if he gave his hearers no encouragement in this respect, the militant-minded would presently desert him. Since just such phenomena are reported in the gospels in relation to him, it would seem that the crowds were not deceived by any claims of Jesus for himself. But while the multitudes withdrew, a number remained, drawn by something in him that was different than anything they had expected to find, yet which held them without their being able to tell precisely what it was. Some of his disciples undoubtedly continued to follow him because of a vague hope that he might after all turn out to be the Messiah.

In Jesus' proclamation there is, thus, evidence of strategy to gain a hearing. A similar strategy characterized the great prophets of the Old Testament, from Amos onward. They were apt to begin with what the people would most like to hear, as the prelude to their own very different purpose and message.

4. The Man and His Message

As matters stand in the preceding assessment, Jesus came forth as a mature person, flushed with the greatest ideal for man that man has ever had, but with no illusions as to the difficulties in the way of its realization. He took as his starting point and text the hope of his people: the reign of God, so deeply desired, so long deferred, so vividly imagined. He challenged his hearers by declaring that

it was near. Probably no other note he might have struck could have had such a universal appeal. It conjured up a vision that had been taking shape and gaining in vividness for more than five centuries.

Jesus shows his grasp of this theme by his reply to the query concerning when the reign of God was coming. He answered, "The reign of God is not coming visibly and people will not say, Look! here it is! or, There it is, for the reign of God is within you."[72] For one thing, this reply rules out apocalyptic, which was nothing if not spectacular. It also rules out any political form of organization, and therefore any messianic role for himself or anyone else. Moreover, this is not an isolated or sporadic element in his teaching. On the contrary, it fits into his entire analysis of human motivation and attitudes. It shows his grasp of the truth that God's will can only prevail on earth when it comes from inner compulsion within men, and particularly when men see in the welfare of others their own highest self-interest.

The shortness of the ministry of Jesus permits no true perspective of the adaptation of his teaching to the problem to be solved. Indeed, this very factor has tended to obscure any real perspective that was originally there. His later interpreters could not think of him as unaware of his approaching end; therefore in their accounts his ministry is hardly more than well started when forebodings of coming disaster, like gathering storm clouds, begin to obscure the situation; from then onward attention and perspective are increasingly focused upon this approaching catastrophe, an attitude which inevitably encouraged an apocalyptic cast of thought.

On the other hand, the parables of Jesus give us very clear insight into his basic ideas of God and man.[73] So,

in the application of his teaching to human living, his parables of the kingdom greatly clarify his intent. An outstanding feature of these is the idea that the reign of God is a thing of natural growth,[74] something that begins like a mustard plant, which springs from the tiniest of all seeds and yet which, when it develops, becomes the greatest of all plants.[75] The figure compels the emphasis to be laid upon the growth of an ideal within the inner life of man considered as a social organism. There is no break with natural processes and no ultimate castastrophe. The same idea appears in the parable of the yeast,[76] except that here the emphasis is upon its universal application.

In the parable of the wheat and the weeds,[77] though the principle of growth is regnant, the chief emphasis is upon the fact that there may be hindering forces to retard or curtail the growth of the good seed; but there is to be no cataclysmic eradication of the evil. In the end, the principle of the maturing of the good seed is the only solution of the problem offered.

Another group of parables—those of the hidden treasure,[78] the pearl of great price,[79] and the fisherman's net[80]—emphasize the relation of the kingdom to the inner life of the individual in the sense of the personal discovery of something whose possession and use is of supreme value for the individual. This corresponds to the saying, "The kingdom of God is within you," and reveals the very essence of the nature of the reign of God according to Jesus. Also, these parables may well reflect something of the surprise and elation of Jesus over the discovery and revelation when the concept first came into clear shape in his own mind. The idea was of supreme significance because of its universal application to mankind. But it so transcended and completely submerged any national or

political features that when Jesus came saying that the reign of God was near, the words of this announcement gave only the slightest glimmer of the greatest and most audacious message that men have ever heard. It was indeed near. It was so near that one great person had grasped its significance; and thereafter all that he said and did was so implemented, deepened, and exalted by it that he spoke with authority although a humble artisan, so that men said of him that he spoke as never man spoke, even though they only partly grasped his meaning. The revelation so touched his emotions that his sympathies went out to all the suffering and afflicted, until there was healing in his very compassion. Misery and suffering were everywhere, but it was worthwhile to do something about them, because all of life had been potentially recapitalized by the approaching reign of God. This new potentiality went so far as to make it possible to reverse most of the usual estimates of well-being, and thus to declare happy the poor, the hungry and thirsty, the sad and mourning, the hated and the persecuted.[81] For as surely as men come to treat other personalities with the same deference they accord their own, the main causes of persecution and hatred, poverty and hunger, and the worst of human sadness will necessarily disappear.

In thus aligning himself with the higher prophecy of the Old Testament Jesus inevitably made his first and most immediate task a determined effort to save the nation, his own people, the Jews of Palestine. It was true that by this time the Jews were scattered throughout the Mediterranean world. Nevertheless, the Jewish center in Palestine, as long as it persisted, was largely determinative of the course of Judaism in the world. The condition of the Jews as individuals under Roman rule in the days of

Jesus was probably as good on the whole as anything they had experienced since the fall of the nation. Evidence of this is seen in the ease with which Jesus himself, together with his followers, moved about the country at will, without restraint of movement or hindrance of public assembly under the most varied circumstances. The very fact that the Jews felt free to raise the question in public of whether they should pay tribute to Caesar or not shows a degree of freedom that no assembly of Jews on the continent of Europe today would think of exercising.

But, from the standpoint of nationalism, the position of the Jews was the most precarious and threatening they had yet experienced. They had behind them the memory of a brief independence under the Maccabees, and it had been gained by daring the might of an empire. The road to the realization of nationalistic ideals was now solidly blocked by the Roman Imperium, but there were leaders and would-be leaders half intoxicated by the strong wine of wishful apocalyptic thinking who would have liked to emulate the Maccabees and so to flout Roman rule. Subsequent events showed how suicidal this desire really was, and anyone not obsessed by a religious nationalism like that of the Jews should have had little difficulty in realizing this in Jesus' day. The Jews therefore had to be saved first of all, if possible, from a head-on collision with Rome. Wherever this problem appears in the gospel narratives—and it was not a matter of direct interest to those who gave the gospels their present form—Jesus' attitude, as we have seen,[82] is straightforward and consistent.

It has been suggested that the present context of the statement, "Love your enemies," might imply a local application only. Actually, the context of these words varies considerably in Matthew and Luke, which means

that their original setting is not now discernible. But no matter what the original local context, a comparable setting today for such a speech, if uttered seriously, would be the Third Reich. The same sentiment expressed among the Jews there, no matter in what group or private context, would be found to have one unavoidable national reference.

This attempt by Jesus to save the Jews from immediate tragedy and national ruin would have been puerile if he had not based it in a larger plan for the salvation of mankind. Evidence for this intention may be seen in the parables of the wicked husbandmen,[83] and the spurned invitation.[84] In the first of these the nation is definitely challenged,[85] and threatened with rejection by God for failing to live up to its responsibilities. The nation's unique privilege and opportunity as the custodian hitherto of the vineyard of the Lord is clearly stated. The failure of the Jews to bring forth fruits worthy of their unique status will, if continued, cause them to lose every prerogative that has been theirs, along with the favor of God. This arraignment in the first century A.D. corresponds strikingly to the message of threatened doom to the nation uttered by the Old Testament prophets.

The second parable contains the same national implication, but it goes beyond the first by pointing out the effect of slighting the invitation that called them to a larger privilege, which would as a result go to others. This parable has no proper setting even in the terms of private conversation in which it is now cast. The figure of the banquet has no specific reference that can be seen, but it is not difficult to perceive in the story the refusal of the Jews to respond to any urging of Jesus to reach out beyond their domestic nationalism. Various other inci-

dents in the gospels may originally have had a national bearing, such as the incident of Jesus weeping over Jerusalem[86] and the woes pronounced on the scribes and Pharisees,[87] to mention only two, but these possibilities are obscured by the fact that the existing account of Jesus' life is oriented from the standpoint of the risen Christ, now in Heaven, but imminently returning to earth.

The story of Jesus' attitude and relation to the Jews is conditioned by the tradition that the Jews were responsible for the crucifixion. They had, therefore, rejected Jesus during his lifetime, and after his death those who accepted him soon became the party of Judaizers in opposition to St. Paul's teaching; then the Jews as a whole became the party of opposition to Christianity in relation to the early church. It was in the presence of these last phases that the gospels took their present form, and the Jewish attitude of studied opposition characteristic of that later time is carried back to the days of Jesus. Something of this appears to be reflected in the account of the scribes and Pharisees. In Matthew 23, for example, they are utterly condemned, as though unalterably opposed to Jesus, but in the corresponding narrative in Luke[88] we see that it was a Pharisee who in a friendly manner warned Jesus of personal danger. To the writers of our gospels, the significance of Judaism had become largely historical. Its militant nationalism seemed to have received its death blow in 70 A.D. It had steadfastly refused to accept Jesus as the Messiah to be, but that did not matter, for the larger world was increasingly accepting him. In spite of the fact that Jesus had spent his entire life within the circle of Judaism, it could not interest these writers to search for any larger purpose that he could have had in regard to the Jews.

Since, as they conceived it, Jesus had claimed to be the Messiah and the Jews had rejected him as such, any other approaches that he made to the Jews had to be regarded either as in the nature of personal episodes or, at most, class or factional encounters. From the standpoint of these writers there could be nothing wittingly in the gospels to indicate that Jesus spoke anything as an ethical prophet to his own nation that, if accepted, would have made them the instruments of a world purpose.

It is all the more remarkable, therefore, that evidence is to be found of this very phenomenon. On the whole, the dominant ideas of the writers of the gospels have made the sequence within them a strange medley, which reflects no definite aim on the part of Jesus. This is outwardly palliated to a certain extent by the miracles listed by Mark in order that men might believe that Jesus was the Messiah, by Jesus' itineraries, especially those given in Luke,[89] by the indications in all of the gospels of the early and growing awareness of Jesus of his approaching end, by Jesus' choice of a small group of disciples who thereafter make a general focal point of the narrative, and by personal controversies between Jesus and the scribes and Pharisees. None of these components clarify the main purpose or strategy of Jesus; altogether, indeed, they quite thoroughly obscure it. But if we assume that Jesus started out by announcing the imminence of the reign of God and then defined and qualified that ideal by the ethical teaching now found in the gospels, there can be little doubt as to his general method of procedure, if we are to allow him any consistency at all.

The absence in the gospel material of any formal, clear-cut procedure or objective on the part of Jesus has made it particularly difficult to distinguish the words of Jesus

himself from those put into his mouth by his interpreters. And it has furnished one impressive argument for thinking that Jesus shared apocalyptic thought.

The high ethical level of his teaching makes it impossible to believe that he could either have missed or ignored that issue. But his immediate followers, having failed to catch his vision of the kingdom, were unaware of the problem and hence unable to provide us with a record of his method of attack upon it. Nevertheless, all of his significant teaching can be fitted into his approach to the nation and can thereby attain a unity and proportion to be gained in no other way.

We have already seen his preparation for this approach in his treatment of the Scriptures when he declared the formal equivalence of Law and Prophecy. We saw him plan the disarmament of the militant nationalism of his people by advocating nonresistance. We have seen him lay down a rule of human conduct that would make it impossible for any group or nation, including the Jews, to claim exclusive rights or privileges or the especial favor of God. In religion, his alignment with the prophets in requiring mercy, and not sacrifice, denied any efficacy to the ritualistic religion of the Law and, hence, also removed any special favors to the Jews which they thought to acquire by that means. Consideration of these measures, when they have been assembled and focused upon his own race, can scarcely leave a doubt that Jesus in his thinking had provided for the complete annulment and liquidation of Jewish nationalism by such a complete reorientation of the individual to all other individuals on the ethical plane that, when achieved, the natural and historical result could and would become the universal reign of God on earth, regardless of nationality.

This outline of his immediate purpose is now obscured, distorted, and almost completely submerged by the attempts in the gospels to interpret Jesus as a national political figure, the Messiah, a figure that on the whole has no more ethical significance than any other political despot who aims at universal power.[90]

The messianic interpretation, however, has been undermined and wrecked by its own presuppositions. The gospels and the New Testament generally admit that, in order to be convincing, it requires the return to earth of the Messiah in their immediate future, and accordingly the whole concept is built with that idea as the chief cornerstone. Since that event did not occur, and since it is no longer possible for it to occur so as to satisfy the requirements of the New Testament, that interpretation has collapsed of its own weight. All historical students recognize the wreck of this idea. What has been needed for a long time has been its removal in a renewed search for the real Jesus beneath and behind it. But New Testament students have been loath to lay hands on it because of the tradition that Jesus himself both shared and promoted the idea of his messiahship; and therefore they have left the wreck as a monument—a monument to the shortsightedness and the self-deception of Jesus. To act thus, in view of the high ethical teaching of Jesus and quite apart from his concept of the kingdom, is to do him the greatest injustice.

But there has been still another reason for scholarly reluctance to disturb this messianic view of Jesus. As has already been seen, in order to formulate that view in any convincing manner, it was necessary for the writers of our gospels to provide for his speedy return to earth, but this could only be done by utilizing a fundamental strain

of apocalyptic thought which *ex hypothesi* could not be conceived of as not shared by Jesus. Thus, as an apocalyptist and a messianist, he was bound to share the worst obsessions of wishful, unethical, nationalistic thinking. From this standpoint, any idea of Jesus' having a life purpose to be carried out by the forces of history becomes a triviality unworthy of serious consideration. But with the full range of apocalyptic added to the messianic portrait of Jesus, the historical personage is blanketed with fog and therefore appears at most only momentarily.

The wreck, however, of the messianic concept from this point of view becomes still more monumental. Jesus, according to this, was the dupe of a fantastic obsession of the Jewish mind at a certain period, from which the Jews themselves later recovered. The obsession was superlatively nationalistic in character and yet the Jews recovered from it without giving up their nationalism. If Jesus shared this obsession, he too had to be nationalistic, and so could be no advocate of ethical religion.

The facts speak otherwise. His ethical teachings, flatly contradicting nationalism, stand unchallenged on the ethical level. On the other hand, apocalyptic messianism failed to materialize, and by that very failure became *ex hypothesi* a delusion, a fantastic dream. It is no more deserving of respect than any other well-authenticated vagary of the human mind. Least of all should it be respected because Jesus was made to share it, since, as has already been indicated, it was psychologically impossible for the gospel writers to formulate it without making him share it, and since it was inevitable that they should make him share it when it was formulated after his death. His protection from this claim is the consistency and the high level of his ethical teaching. In other words, the

distortion and confusion of the gospel narrative due to the incorporation of messianism and apocalyptic as applied to the life of Jesus will, if allowed to do so, eliminate themselves as unreal by means of the very claims upon which they have been made to rest, and particularly because those basic claims were founded, not upon the historic life of Jesus, but largely upon events and circumstances lying beyond his earthly career.

We are thus free to consider Jesus and his gospel of the kingdom as it applies to human living on the earth. It is true we may never be able to restore fully the outer course of his life or the sequence of his thought as he sought to adapt his message and purpose to the conditions of his hearers. But the details of time and place and the sequence of events are beginning to take on a new definiteness. We can know his principles, we can be assured of his aims, and we can find illustrations of their application in the gospel material, always keeping in mind that he was speaking directly to Jews under the conditions of the first century of our era.

CHAPTER X

ETHICAL PROPHECY AND THE TEACHINGS OF JESUS

AS has already been indicated, the teachings of Jesus bring to a climax roughly eight centuries of higher religious development. It is also noteworthy that the relation of Jesus to prophecy was from the beginning the chief reason why the Christians accepted the Jewish Scriptures as their own. This connection between the Old Testament and the New has ever since remained the strongest bond between them in the Christian tradition. Nevertheless, it has never outwardly connected Jesus with the ethical prophets, since traditionally the emphasis has always been laid on his relation to nationalistic prophecy. In brief, the argument is that the coming of the Messiah-prince, foretold in the Old Testament, is fulfilled in Jesus in the New. Thus Old and New are regarded as complementary and mutually authenticating.

The pattern and framework of this argument was the work of pre-Christian Jews, who formulated it as a means of identifying the future Jewish Messiah. It was based for the most part upon nationalistic prediction of the post-exilic period. The Jews thus gathered up the characteristics to be looked for in the coming leader. The Jewish followers of Jesus, led by Peter and the first disciples, proposed that these had been consummated in Jesus as the expected Jewish Messiah, and this was the basis of their

appeal to their fellow Jews. The Jews however, on the whole, refused to be convinced, and the Jewish advocates of Jesus, when the apocalyptic conditions upon which they felt obliged to stake his messiahship failed to materialize, themselves gave up their advocacy and became once more indistinguishable from their fellow Jews. Thus the argument, both in theory and application, was a strictly Jewish proposition, formulated and used by Jews to convince the rest of their kinsmen that Jesus was their national Messiah, but both its proponents and the Jews as a whole eventually rejected it. Yet before that result was fully accomplished, the argument had arrived at the written form it now has in the New Testament.

The Gentile Christians, primarily through St. Paul, took over this alleged proof that Jesus was the Messiah. But both they and all Christians since have agreed with the Jews that Jesus was not the national Messiah whom the Jews expected. The task of restating what was meant by the term "messiah" was then disposed of through Greek thought, by reinterpreting Jesus as a semidivine being, now in Heaven, whose chief function was to save men from the perils and dangers of the hereafter. This completely removed from Jesus the functions of a messiah as historically conceived and in the sense that his first followers claimed him to be.

The result of this process was actually to destroy completely the proposed relation between Jesus and Jewish nationalistic prophecy, since both Christians and Jews have rejected it. The language has been preserved as if it were a description of fact, but it is agreed by all hands that another meaning than the literal must be given it. This position thus completely exonerates the Jews for rejecting Jesus as presented to them. It is little wonder

that the average Christian does not know the meaning of the term "messiah," while the relation of Jesus to Old Testament prophecy appears to be largely a matter of theological speculation.

The whole process when completed would seem to sever entirely the formal link between Jesus and the Old Testament, but, in reality, by eliminating Jesus' relation to nationalistic prophecy, it clears the ground for making a genuinely vital bond between him and the ethical prophets—a relation which primitive Christianity did not sense and was unable to appropriate.

We have already seen how the thought of Jesus connects directly with these earlier prophetic teachings and then how he extended their application until they expressed universal truths, particularly in the field of human relations as a requirement of religion.

Since ethical prophecy was not foretelling, it was not subject to fulfillment in any single objective event. But considering ethical prophecy as a growing concept, an unfolding revelation of the character of God and of men's consequent relation to him and to one another, Jesus brought the incomplete ideal of the prophets to a full rounded whole, thereby effecting the completion of an ideal for humanity, an ideal capable of making humanity a harmonious working entity, a kingdom of God on earth.

There is therefore a living connection between the Old Testament and the New on the highest religious plane. The difficulty has always been that while the various items composing this higher level of religion can be identified in both Old and New Testament, they have never been sufficiently grasped as parts of a whole. Yet it is absolutely necessary to do this before even the parts can be properly appraised.

According to the situation just described, we have every right to say that the teachings of Jesus constitute the capstone of the pyramid of ethical religion in the Bible. His teachings are indeed recognized as exalted on high, where a pyramid's cap ought to be, but there is no pyramid in sight. His admonitions, therefore, seem to float in the air—beautiful, lofty, and awe-inspiring to look upon—and, so far, at least most of his followers have regarded them as impractical of attainment in actual life. In like manner the ethical teachings of the prophets are recognized, when pointed out, as worthy of admiration and praise, but they seem to lead to no constructive result. This is not to be wondered at, since they are not now in order in the Bible and are frequently separated from each other by generations and even centuries of time, as well as by competing ideas of religion. Consequently, they do not, as they stand, build the pyramid. This, therefore, we must do for ourselves by putting together the summary of their separate contributions, in chronological order, beginning with the eighth century B.C.

To the prophet Amos, the founder and first architect of ethical religion in Israel, God is a completely just Being, one who transcends all personal favoritism and who can thus have no chosen nation. All men are equally his creatures. God cannot be pleased or appeased or influenced by rites or ceremonies or gifts, including animal sacrifices. He cannot be pleased at all unless men deal fairly and justly with one another in all their relations, regardless of their station in life. If they do this, however, nothing can please God more, and if they fail to do it, nothing else can make up for it. The widespread and continued disregard of such conduct by a people will bring national disaster. Amos thus conceives of religion as a

matter that can always be tested in terms of human relations, and it is made to rest on a principle that seeks to safeguard the rights of personality in others, because this principle of justice is part of the nature of the universe. Religion, with Amos, has already swept beyond the national boundaries of Israel and risen, in certain respects, as high as it can ever go. In reach and scope the structure of ethical religion has already begun to assume a definite form.

The poet-prophet Hosea experienced the added vision of ethical love as the inmost quality of the divine nature, a quality that finds its human counterpart in the term sometimes rendered "loving-kindness." This quality constitutes the strongest inner bond between God and men. It involves intimate understanding, moral discernment, sympathy, loyalty, and fidelity. There is no way of pleasing God without it. There are no substitutes. The true inwardness of justice is incomplete without it. Since it is necessarily the outward expression of an inward state, it invalidates ritual offerings and sacrifices and all merely external acts of devotion. Its expression, like that of justice, has full validity only in human relations. If, therefore, it is lacking in the attitude of an individual toward other individuals, it is also lacking in his relations with God. Where it is absent in a human society, that society is in a dangerous state of disintegration and is cutting itself off from God. If this state continues, even the loving-kindness of God will not be able to save that society from disaster.

Ethical religion with Hosea has become a thing of inward motivation. It is not enough that men be fair and just in their dealings. There is equal need of sympathy, compassion, long suffering, and patience, for these are but

the feeble reflections of God's attitude toward men; but in order for that attitude to be effective, men must reciprocate in the only way possible, that is, toward each other. What the religion of Amos has in loftiness and breadth of application, the religion of Hosea equals in depth and inwardness by its intuitive understanding of the nature of God and of man.

This double contribution to higher religion arose in North Israel and was offered as a means of saving the nation from destruction. In neighboring Judah the prophets Isaiah, Micah, Jeremiah, and Ezekiel championed this higher faith and used it until the captivity to warn their countrymen of national ills manifest in Judah. The added contributions of these southern prophets was slight in comparison. All the ethical prophets strove heroically to save the nation, but in vain. The people refused to listen and the nation fell.

Up to this point ethical religion has made its chief task the salvaging of the nation. From this point onward it no longer concerns itself with the nation as such, with either its attempted resuscitation or its future status. On the other hand, through the great unknown prophet of the exile, it formulates theoretical monotheism and frankly comes face to face with humanity as a whole. Continuity with the past is maintained through the prophet's concept of Israel as God's servant and chosen instrument, "that my salvation may reach to the ends of the earth." Here, for the first time, ethical religion envisages universal application to mankind as its main task.

In the pre-Christian era higher religion takes one further step with the book of Jonah, when the author chides the Jews for running away from their true mission to the Gentiles and voices his faith in the readiness of all

men to repent and in God's eagerness to pardon. This implies not only the possibility but the reasonable prospect of the reign of God in the hearts of all men in the here and now.

Thus our structure of religious idealism firmly and solidly rises to a height from which a universal view of God, his requirements of men, and their obligations come clearly into view. The extent of the problem of religion has been compassed and the ends to be achieved stated. Nothing more remains to be said of the character of God or the nature of man. The question therefore presents itself, Is not the structure already complete and can anything more really be added to it?.

The theory was indeed complete in form and scope, but the fact remained that ethical religion had not yet been able to bring God and men together on any real working basis of life. Actually, ethical religion still remained a theory, with only here and there a lone advocate, like a voice crying in the wilderness. Not only did age-old customs and hoary religious traditions hold it back and the economic clash of social groups, nations, and empires in their struggle for existence block its realization, but it lacked actual implementation and specific application to everyday life. How was the justice of an Amos or the loving-kindness of a Hosea to be generated and kept at work in the life of the average individual? The situation was somewhat like that of a ship, ready for the launching but with no means as yet for getting it into the water.

We have already seen the evidence that Jesus alone, in the first century of our era, fully appreciated and correctly evaluated the contributions of the prophets and that he was also clearly aware of the difficulties in the way of their practical realization. It has been shown that Jesus

formulated definite principles that were adequate to eliminate both ritualistic religion and Jewish nationalism, so that messianic and apocalyptic hopes would have no foundation or function. Far-reaching and drastic as these measures were, they were only preliminary, the necessary clearing of the ground of local obstacles within the Jewish community if religion was to make any new advance. Did Jesus realize what further needed to be done in order to create, within the individual, an ethical self-motivating force that would work as steadily and efficiently as the law of physical self-preservation?

As long as the nation Israel existed, any appeal could be made to act in a certain way in order to preserve the nation, but after the nation had fallen, so far as ethical religion was concerned, the center of authority and of motivation in religion was restored to the individual. But the difference from now on was that, instead of conceiving of the individual as by himself and as against all the world in the struggle for existence, prophetic religion had begun to regard him as a reciprocating unit in a potential world society. It recognized that this world is governed by a moral order, and that when that order is disregarded, penalties and disaster inevitably follow in this life. St. Paul recognized the problem but he saw it as a hopeless struggle between the warring forces of the spiritual and the physical within the indiviual. That is, he saw no solution of the human problem, but regarded the body as doomed and could only proclaim deliverance after death.

How can a man, who knows so little of his own past and nothing of his future, decide what is best for himself in the long run? Clearly only omniscience would be able to achieve completely such a goal. But if a man cannot be

sure of selecting what is best for himself, he can be quite sure of choosing what will often be very bad for others; therefore enmity, resentment, and reprisals, unless offset by some compensating factor, are bound to be the order of the day and, if unchecked, will, we now know, finally end in world wars. There can be no doubt that Jesus realized and fully appreciated this problem, since he alone has supplied an adequate formula for its solution. Jesus approached it naturally from the advance position of the Pharisaism of his day, which had already made a distinction in the Law between personal attitudes and ritualistic requirements and had summarized and given preference to the former in terms of supreme love to God and love for one's Jewish neighbor as for oneself.

Jesus extended this neighborly relation to the limits of mankind, and so envisaged the entire world as a neighborhood—a neighborhood of acknowledged obligation and mutual self-interest. This outlook was not due to any new or basic principle which Jesus introduced, but rather to the logical extension of the idea of brotherhood, resulting from accepting the universal ethical character of God. And it provides the evidence that Jesus realized the full implication of his God concept. Since it requires that God love all men equally, regardless of race, color, nationality, creed, or protestations of loyalty and devotion to him, he can have no favorites. All human beings are equally his children, made in his image. This ties up directly with the first great commandment, for how can a man claim to love God supremely and yet lightly esteem, disregard, or hate any other person, whose interests and welfare he knows God has at heart as much as he does his own. There can therefore be no question at all about the logic of Jesus' summation of brotherly requirements, if faith in an ethical God is to be seriously maintained.

Jesus was thus the first to be able to visualize the problem of universal human relations on the ethical plane, and this was the necessary initial step to its solution. But simply as an ideal his diagnosis was always more than offset by individual selfishness in the struggle for existence. Jesus attacked this riddle from the angle of self-interest. He saw the individual, not as a divided personality with warring members, but as a working whole. He saw that self-interest was natural, legitimate, and necessary in a society of free moral agents. The trouble with self-interest had always been, not that it was inherently bad, but chiefly that it was shortsighted. It was shortsighted for two main reasons: first, because of ignorance, and second, because of wilful disregard of others. Ignorance is bound to be damaging according to the degree and the amount involved, but it can gradually be overcome if the personal rights of others are not knowingly or wilfully infringed upon. That is to say, the really serious menace to amicable and helpful human relations is the premeditated clash of personalities on the basis of self-interest.

Both Confucius and the Jews had already said: Do not do to others what you would not have them do to you. This shows that they were conscious of the problem, and were trying thus to solve it. Such a negative rule, at its best, would tend to curb recognized evil practices, but it would not promote human coöperation. On the contrary, it would act to curtail social relations, and it could only work perfectly when one did nothing. It was bound, therefore, to remain individualistic and completely self-centered in the narrowest sense. It recognized no obligations to others, and hence it was unsocial. Shortsighted selfishness would not be essentially changed by it, but only held in check to a certain extent by the fear of reprisals.

In the face of this issue Jesus, applying his vision of God and man logically, said: "You must always treat others as you would like to have them treat you." This formula is centered in the individual and is for his protection. It tells him how to act. It is universally social and it applies to all other persons without distinction. It senses that the clash of self-interest constitutes the greatest danger to human welfare. It points to conduct that invites retaliation as the main cause of personal clash. It assumes that men have a common origin and a common destiny, and therefore this interest which each one shares with others is his largest interest. Finally, it safeguards any given individual's self-interest by requiring that he make room for self-interest in everyone else as a matter of his own highest self-interest.

The formula does not seek specifically either to level up the social classes or to level down the possession of wealth. It does not, when followed, guarantee perfect human relations at any given time, since its working is always dependent on the judgment of the individual. It does promise that, if followed, human relations will not become worse, and it holds out a very definite prospect that they may be expected steadily to improve. It is in this that its golden character inheres.

But this is precisely what has not happened in the history of society. Instead of improving, human relations in the large have, in spite of popular education, international agreements, and religion, progressively deteriorated, until civilization itself is today in jeopardy. Almost every other conceivable form of social adjustment has been tried through the ages, but without appreciably changing the general trend and tendency toward the worse.

On the other hand, the principle of the Golden Rule

is not something first introduced at the beginning of our era. Whatever success man has had throughout the ages in social organization has been in proportion to the degree to which this principle was utilized. It is manifest in primitive times in the clan and tribal organization, where the good of the individual was sought and found in the common good of the larger body. It is illustrated in the marriage relation. Where there is love and mutual consideration, marriage still remains the strongest social bond. It is only when these factors are lacking that it breaks down. Whatever fraternal organizations or brotherhoods have proved lasting and fruitful have been based on this principle. The nation, the largest stable social unit of mankind thus far, has maintained itself by utilizing the principle to the extent of fusing, however imperfectly, self-interest and loyalty to the state. Organized Christianity definitely professes to be actuated by it, but unfortunately sectarianism has prevented Christianity from becoming, even among its own adherents, a conspicuous or convincing example.

It is from this angle that we can see that Jesus does supply the capstone to the structure of ethical religious teaching. The new element he contributed was universality of application. For Jesus this emerges as the logical corollary of his extension of love of neighbor to include all men. If this love be genuine it calls for action in accord with it, for Jesus had already said, "By their fruits, you shall know them." To love one's neighbor as oneself predetermines the standard of behavior in regard to him. Jesus might therefore have said, You must always treat others the way you treat yourself. This would have been the literal corollary of the principle in question, but it would have introduced as a standard of social conduct the

mean and cramping necessities which the struggle for existence often imposes. But love represents an ideal attitude even toward one's self. Accordingly Jesus put the matter in the more generous terms that love requires, the treatment of others as one would want to be treated under like conditions. The merit and significance of this prescription do not inhere in the unusual demands that it makes on the individual, but rather in the fact that what it prescribes, for the first time in human history, provides for that universal reciprocity of good will without which human society periodically tends to crumble and to destroy itself by its own antitheses. At last the elements of the problem of personal relations were adequately covered and a solution formulated that is universally applicable. A sound plan for personal living whether on earth or in Heaven, but primarily adapted for human living on this planet, was thus brought into being.

CHAPTER XI

ETHICAL RELIGION—CHRISTIANITY'S BURIED TALENT

THE servant who, in the parable, buried in the ground the talent committed to him may have been sincere, but by his neglect he was deprived of the ability to use what had been his chief asset. The entire contribution of ethical religion as here outlined has now been in the custody of Christendom for almost two thousand years; all the elements composing it are known and acknowledged; but so far they have never been put together as a working whole and given practical application. As Judaism used prophecy primarily to promote Jewish nationalism and hence missed the real purpose and significance of ethical prophecy, so traditional Christianity has made use of Jesus to promote a theological salvation in the hereafter and has hence been unable to utilize, or even to be fully aware of, his possible significance for mankind here and now.

This result has not been due to insincerity or wilful negligence on the part of anyone. It began with the first disciples, who, being deprived of any real understanding of ethical prophecy, could see in Jesus nothing greater than a national figure. St. Paul accepted him as the national Messiah, but when the Jews rejected Jesus, Paul offered him to the Gentiles. His rejection by the Jews necessitated, however, that his return to earth be conceived for judgment; therefore, in place of the coming

King of the Jews, St. Paul presented Jesus as king of the Day of Judgment. From that moment the major Christian attention has been focussed on the realm of the world to come; out of that mold of thought virtually all Christian theologies have taken their rise, and the practical significance of Jesus for human living has been curtailed accordingly.

As one result, the Golden Rule is on exhibition today as the great museum display piece of the New Testament. It is on view there, isolated and without historical context, like a beautiful antique gem. This attitude toward it goes back to the first disciples, for with their foreshortened apocalyptic future they saw no opportunity for its serious application to life as a whole. For the most part the Christian conscience has excused itself from attempting seriously to apply this principle because the early Church, after the death of Jesus, accepted certain rites and doctrines as necessary for salvation, but the Golden Rule was not one of them. It was not one of them because it did not fit the philosophy of life of the early Church. If one followed this rule the chief business of life would necessarily become a matter of the correct practice of human relations, but the Church did not believe that human relations were going to continue. There were, therefore, other much more important matters.

Moreover, the Golden Rule offered no opportunity for preferential treatment for anyone. In that respect it made no distinction between the Church and the world, between Christian and heathen, between those in the ark of safety and those floundering in the depths. In an environment where preferential treatment in the immediate future was regarded as of paramount importance, there was no working place for such a rule.

Again, there was no direct penalty attached for not keeping it. It looked difficult of achievement and it seemed innocuous if left alone. We are just beginning to realize that the penalty for delinquency in this matter is staggering to the imagination.

As a second result, Christians have always assumed that salvation was assured by the initiatory rite of baptism, by communion, and by the acceptance of certain prescribed doctrines. In the early Christian period, when the end of the world was momentarily expected and Christians constituted only a small minority of the population, there seemed to be no possibility of testing the validity of these requirements until the Judgment Day. But as the ages of man have continued and whole states and nations have become officially Christian, a test laid down by Jesus has become operative and effective, "by their fruits you shall know them." The application of this test to the claims above is grimly illuminating.

In general, throughout the ages, Christians have never refused to any significant extent to engage in aggressive warfare against fellow Christians. This has become the more noticeable in our time since wars now so easily take on world proportions. Two world wars within one generation, regardless of the outcome, are marks of a declining, disintegrating civilization, and both have started among Christian nations. Traditional Christianity has shown no capacity to avert these periodical castastrophes. Its chief interest in them in the past has been the support of its nationals on all fronts. It has had nothing effective to say before war has been declared, and it has had no significant voice in determining the kind of peace to follow. In times of peace Christians have unconsciously profited by the causes that lead to war and have failed to

provide any effective safeguards against its repetition. Traditional Christianity has thus demonstrated its inability to save the civilization that bears its name from these progressive acts of suicide. Its profession of love and brotherhood has not been able to prevent the recurrent wholesale slaughter of Christians by other Christians and the indiscriminate mass destruction of helpless women and children and the aged, whether Christians or not, on an ever-increasing scale. The horrors and barbarities of ancient pagan warfare were bad enough, but they were as child's play compared to the hideous cruelties and wholesale destruction of these latter Christian times.

Startlingly, the deeper fact emerges that the traditional rites and the doctrinal requirements of organized Christianity have through two millennia shown no power to check or assuage the ultimate clash of personal, economic interests *in the large,* among Christians. On the contrary, this has greatly increased in intensity and virulence the older Christianity has grown. In this respect Christianity has exhibited no advantage over other faiths, or over the older pagan beliefs. The traditional requirements of salvation have not saved men who accepted them from destroying each other's property, each other's rights, each other's lives with an ever-mounting horror. No matter how devoutly religious men may be, so long as they can be persuaded that it is their mutual duty at certain times to do these things, there can be no assurance of security in this life, as there can be no assurance of the continuance of civilization under such conditions.

But this result bears directly and definitely upon the outlook for the remoter future. In whatever sense ecclesiastical requirements have provided for personal salvation in a world to come, the religion that cannot keep men

from denying every human right to fellow Christians, to say nothing of outsiders, cannot be expected to work differently in any other setting or environment, whether on earth or in Heaven. If the idea of Christian character signifies one thing above another, it is that a stable, well-established pattern of life may confidently be expected to repeat itself as freedom and opportunity permit. "By their fruits you shall know them" here or hereafter. The Christianity that has failed to produce enduring peace and good will even among its own adherents through the generations can offer no assurances that the fruits of religious rivalries and ruthless violence will not reproduce themselves in whatever existence they are permitted to act. Even the handful of Christian pacifists who refuse to engage in human bloodshed, no matter what is at stake, offer no real way of escape for themselves or the rest of society. For the most part they find themselves in the dubious role of all those who, by a common neglect, become jointly responsible for the outbreak of a great conflagration, but who, since they do not believe in conflagrations, refuse to endanger their lives to put it out or to save others from its ravages.

The salvation that is reduced to these results declares its own bankruptcy. If there be any validity in the charge of its foes that religion is the opiate of the people, this should have been listed as a banner demonstration. For this is the religion that has lulled the mass of believers through the ages into a false sense of security, but has now proved on a world scale its inability to save them from the worst sufferings that men can inflict on each other.

This failure of traditional Christianity to save its followers throughout the total range of human relations

is not strange when we note that the ecclesiastical requirements for salvation are primarily ritualistic and theological in character. There is thus no attempt to take care of human relations in a kingdom of God on earth. At this point we are faced with the anomaly of Jesus, a teacher of the highest ethical religion, made responsible for requirements which stand out in sharpest contrast to that religion.

To be sure, the contrast is now outwardly obscured by attributing these requirements to Jesus himself, though most of them were ascribed to him after his death and in complete disregard of the moral self-contradiction in which they place him. These things have thus been allowed to supersede the primacy of the ethical teachings of Jesus, just as the Jews allowed the ritualistic Law to crowd out the Prophets. The one has brought increasing disaster to Judaism; the other has already begun to result in world-scale disaster to Christendom.

Christianity has in its custody a priceless treasure for the saving welfare of mankind. But when its Lord went away to the Far Country it buried its treasure, for all practical purposes, in the earth, and here the analogy with the parable ends. Christianity has not even been aware that it has buried its talent.

Insofar as these things are true, this is not the first time that sincere and earnest men have played a trick on themselves and their kind in matters that pertain to religion. We have already chronicled the terrific and devastating defeat suffered by religion in its apparently easy victory over magic. We have seen early man deceive himself for ages about the nature of God because of a misunderstanding of the physical forces of the world. We have noted the nationalism in religion predominant in

the Old Testament due to the inability of devout men to grasp the significance of an ethical God. We have observed modern scientists deceived until the twentieth century about the mechanistic character of the universe. We have every reason therefore to scrutinize the processes of Christian thinking.

Is there evident any hiatus of Christian thought sufficient to account for a serious basic miscalculation? An initial Christian assumption of this sort appeared when it was taken for granted that man's salvation depended solely on God's attitude of forgiveness and readiness to pardon the repentant sinner. There can be no quarrel with this as a necessary condition, but that alone cannot determine the outcome. Omnipotence is not powerful enough to settle from without what free moral agents shall do or become from within without destroying their freedom. The surety that a given individual wishes to be saved from his sins is not enough.

On the human side, organized Christianity has claimed to save men individually by the use of words, gestures, assent to doctrine, by confession and profession. These things have value, but only as a promissory note has value. They are able to express attitudes of mind, intentions, resolves, but they do not insure at all the "goods and services" which they symbolize. And without these, in the current coin of daily human conduct, all such assertions become either meaningless magical phrases or, worse still, unconscious hypocrisy.

It has further been assumed that repentance and forgiveness will bring about the regeneration of the individual. A changed life based on such premises is a reasonable expectancy, but nothing more. That the reality salvation stands for is determined by verbal profession is

therefore an unwarranted, not to say a false, assumption. This is not to minimize personal emotions or convictions as the basis of profession. These are the legitimate starting points, but the sufficient evidence of the changed life is continuous human conduct as measured by the way the person comports himself under the stresses and strains of daily living. No matter, therefore, what God may do to make it possible or what man may say to encourage it, salvation in the realm of the spiritual, as in the physical, is and remains an achievement, a continuous daily achievement, of the individual, and it can only be fully authenticated in terms of human relations. No institution can guarantee it nor can any organizaton make it certain.

Another Christian assumption, that a saved condition can be perpetuated by worship, by symbolical rites and ceremonies expressed toward God alone, is likewise unwarranted. It has nothing Christian about it. It is, on the contrary, nothing but the claim of all primitive religions, which assume that when men know how they can do something to the Deity that will actually change him, because he is changeable, and hence that they can move him to take attitudes and to be willing to grant things which he would otherwise not consider. This is not only primitive religion, it is primarily primitive magic dressed up in a surpliced gown.

If we are to think in terms of an ethical God, then nothing that men may do or say can change him or his attitude in the least, whether due to their love or their hate, their vehement protestations of loyalty to him or their studied indifference. To say to God or to ourselves or to one another that we love God is not the same thing as loving him. The reality of that love cannot be contained in words. It can only find adequate expression and

proof in deeds that involve human relations. The evidence therefore that a man loves God is the measure of love that he accords to all other human beings, and nothing else can take the place of this test.

From primitive Christian times men have voiced the prayer that the kingdom of God might come and his will be done on earth as in Heaven. They have on the whole assumed that this desirable event was cataclysmic in character and therefore dependent solely on God. But in so doing a most important saying of Jesus has been overlooked: "The kingdom of God is not to come visibly and people will not say, Look! here it is! or, There it is! for the kingdom of God is within you." According to this saying, whether God's kingdom comes or not depends *solely* upon men, since it is located within men and therefore in the realm which men control and which God can only control through men. Furthermore, since only Christians are supposed to be concerned about the kingdom of God, the responsibility for its coming must always rest primarily on the shoulders of the professed followers of Christ. Emphatically is this true in areas where there is no rival faith and where Christians clearly constitute a majority.

These five assumptions of Christian thought are not only seen to be fallacious and unwarranted, but they have in common a complete minimizing of the significance of human effort and human responsibility for the achievement of individual salvation and the coming of the reign of God. It is assumed that salvation is a free gift, that it costs the individual nothing but his sincere acceptance, and that the very act of acceptance will bring about such a regeneration in his life that his future status can be assured by the more or less regular performance of certain

technical observances, which are in themselves without ethical content or significance.

At the same time, no ethical test or procedure has been provided by religion to see whether these assumptions were warranted by their fruits. A very simple kind of proof was always at hand. Could those who professed to be saved live together in peace and unity? This test not only is easy to apply but it furnishes an absolutely necessary criterion, which religion has so far almost completely ignored. And that is that men must not only be saved from the wrath of God but also from the wrath of each other. In the secular world this has already become the great issue of world civilization. But it is equally vital in religion. Yet it is a test which Christians have never been able to pass. They have never even been able to admit to fellowship more than a small part of those who claim the same salvation. Christian unity has always lagged far behind the common secular interest expressed in political unity.

The lack of Christian unity has resulted in religious rivalries, competition, hatred, persecutions, and savage religious wars. And quite probably the reason religious wars are less prevalent than formerly is that the larger political unities are able to demand that religious factions at least abstain from blows and bloodshed.

The Christian ideal of the kingdom of God on earth has so far been rendered completely impossible of realization by Christians themselves, first of all because they have never been able to agree who should belong to that kingdom. It also has to be emphasized that the fundamental things which divide Christians are not the ethical requirements to be a Christian, but the nonethical matters of religious theory. Yet since these prevent unity and keep

Christendom in a chaotic feudal stage of society in matters of religion, they are not merely nonethical but positively unethical in their significance, and therefore a major cause of divine displeasure sufficient to render doubtful, from that viewpoint, the salvation professed.

If Christians had realized that they were not saved till they were saved from each other, and if they had then proceeded seriously to accomplish this, they would have been obliged to put their religious emphasis where Jesus placed his. It is safe to say that speculation and divisive doctrinal controversy as to just how God accomplishes his part in the saving process would then have fallen into the background, would have disappeared from view, even as it is absent from the teaching of Jesus. But there is no way merely of saving men from each other. In order to persist the individual must coöperate with his kind; this is as true in the realm of the spiritual as in that of the physical. There is no such thing as insuring oneself against men by laying hold upon God. The only possible way therefore of our being saved from each other is by a more thoroughgoing coöperation. The fact that in the present world conflict thirty nations are arrayed against a common enemy illustrates the necessity for coöperation. And that phenomenon as an illustration of human cooperation is a greater achievement than the religious forces of the world have ever even dreamed of. Its only shortcoming is that it is not enough. It may prove sufficient to save the world from a sweeping reversion to barbarism, but it is not enough to prevent the greatest losses that civilized man has ever sustained. It is not enough to save millions of the choicest youth that our world can produce from inevitable slaughter. There is only one kind of coöperation that can suffice, and that is a co-

operation which will make such a conflict impossible. Until that is achieved there can be no ultimate salvation for anyone. Jesus set out to transform the world into a single coöperating society based on mutual respect and reciprocal good will in all its parts. He stated what would be required in language that a child can understand. In stating it he spoke as never man spoke. No one has ever improved upon it, and no one has been able to show that he misjudged the seriousness of the problem or miscalculated the requirements necessary to meet it. Christianity's buried treasure here lies revealed in the presence of the world's appalling need.

This result stands regardless of all controversies and theological theories about the person of Christ, since these in no way affect the outcome. It stands irrespective of the uncertainties and the future conclusions of New Testament source study, since the kind of data utilized in achieving it may indeed gain greatly in historical perspective by such means but cannot lose its force by the analysis of sources.

The stages of ethical religion from the eighth century B.C. to the Christian era are precisely attested by the prophets. We know the measure of its stature and what it still lacked. During the early decades of the first century of our era that concept of religion attained to a completeness that was adequate, and requisite, to provide for a world-wide brotherly coöperation of mankind, in the form of an ethical kingdom of God on earth. The materials which provide for this outcome are now imbedded in the Gospels. And since these items are more significant and climactic than any earlier single contribution to ethical religion, we have no more reason to doubt that they presuppose an original personality than we have to

doubt in our day that the doctrine of relativity presupposes an Einstein. Moreover, if greatness and originality may be gauged by their possible significance for mankind, there can be no reasonable question but that the first century of our era produced a matchless personality.

This result also stands in spite of the fact that after nineteen hundred years we still live in an essentially pagan world. That is to say, the significant teachings of Jesus still remain unrealized, among his followers as elsewhere. This has happened because the self-confident assertion of discipleship to him has, through two millennia, been based primarily upon his importance for *another* world. The least censure for this outcome is: This thing ye ought to have done and not left the others undone. The severer condemnation to which the facts point is: You have missed the mark, you are yet in your sins. If this is doubted it is only necessary to consider the total present world, which a *laissez-faire* interpretation of religion has helped to undo. Both indictments, however, in the end amount to the same thing. The highest ethical religion known to mankind has never had a trial on a community scale any where, at any time.

CHAPTER XII

ETHICAL RELIGION AND THE COMING AGE

WE live today in a conscious world community the like of which has never before been known. The majority of the nations on every continent of the globe are committed to a common enterprise for their own self-preservation. They recognize the one thing they unitedly seek to avoid and they are all in constant and instant oral communication around the world to effect their common purpose. This is all the more impressive and significant because opposing powers seek to enslave the entire world under a barbarous and inhuman regime. It matters not how transitory or fleeting this sense of a world community may prove to be, the fact that it has been sufficient to cause nations to band together on a world scale to meet a world threat promises a potential world interest that can never be forgotten. The hoped-for attainment of freedom from the present menace cannot, however, in itself insure that another menace like it, or a worse, will not again arise. There are therefore good reasons, on the ground of self-preservation alone, to expect a continuing interest in increasing world coöperation. But how can this be assured?

It cannot be forgotten that one world war was motivated and climaxed by a well-meant slogan and followed by a perverse treaty and a league that could not hold together. The clash of broad human interests cannot be prevented by rules of etiquette or by any merely external code. The

only manifest way that full coöperation can ever be hoped for among nations and races, as among individuals, is by their realization of mutual interests that are clearly seen to be superior to any particular aims. To be sound and genuine this calls for a universal evaluation of men as human beings in the light of their common destiny. Only religion is capable of making such an evaluation. But what religion today is fitted to undertake this task? Obviously only the so-called "world" religions can hope to qualify.

Mohammedanism has a universal God, called the Merciful and Compassionate, but Mohammed sanctioned the use of the sword as an effective means for extending the sway of Allah. The resultant theory that might makes right prevents the use of this religion as a universal yardstick of human values.

Buddhism has a world outlook grounded on pity for the world's pain, but its basic principle that all existence is suffering engenders a fundamental pessimism that makes it incapable of discerning, let alone measuring, abiding human values.

Gentile Christianity has always claimed the world as its field, but it suffers from a twofold handicap. First, it early gave up this world as hopeless, and, secondly, owing to its complicated religious theory, it has never been able to hold together as a coöperating unit more than a small fraction of its own followers. It is therefore in no adequate position to face the present world task.

It is all the more astonishing, therefore, to discover that Christianity throughout its long history has nevertheless carried within its basic tradition the pattern and the plan, the specifications and the dynamic designed to meet just such a pressing world problem as that with which we are now confronted.

Jesus said that the reign of God is near, that the kingdom of God is within you. We can be sure he meant that the realm of the reign of God is the human spirit in all men, here and now, for he urged his disciples to pray: "Thy will be done on earth as in Heaven." We can also be sure that Jesus did not mean that the coming of the Kingdom of God depended solely on God's action and that when men had prayed for it long enough God would bring it about, because if the reign of God is to be within men then this is primarily a problem of God's rule within human personality, which depends directly upon the individual. How can a person be assured that God's will is dominant within him? It is not enough that he desire it. It is not sufficient that he declare his devotion to God. It is too easy to be self-deceived by mere words.

If we are to think in terms of an ethical God there is a very definite test that is always available. God's will can only be complete in an individual when his relations to all other persons are fair and righteous, and hence justifiable in God's sight. If this were achieved by all men then the reign of God would be complete on earth, but to the extent that these relations remain unjust and unrighteous, God's will is not done, and all the ills that arise as a result of the thwarting and the disregard of justice go on accumulating.

All the historic faiths have proclaimed a way of salvation, but, regardless of their claims, only in so far as they make for the solution of this difficulty can they avail for man's ultimate salvation. No historic religion has, however, recognized this as its main objective. It is therefore noteworthy that Jesus shows that he had grasped this as the unfinished task of religion, and that he then pointed out the necessary provisions for accomplishing it.

In the first century of our era the ideal of the kingdom

of God on earth appeared to be a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, and men decided that it was not worth the trouble. Again, in our day, the ideal presents itself, but the choice now is take it and go all out for it or *take the opposite,* a foretaste of which is to be found in any war and especially in this greatest of all conflicts. The hope of the future of civilized man depends upon the clearness and the inevitability with which these alternatives can be brought home to all thinking people. *There is no neutral, third choice.* The world, through the science of technology, has gained the capacity to act as a totality, either for its weal or its woe. The socialized forces of the world are now so integrated and poised that if allowed to come together blindly, like drifting ice floes in a storm, they have the power to grind and crush each other to bits (that process has already gone dangerously far); but if they are guided and directed by the intelligence which is now available they may become like an orderly fleet of ships moving in unison toward a desired haven. That intelligence contains two elements. First, current political leadership, aided by political science, has gained sufficient insight and experience to give expression to some peacetime form of world unity. Furthermore, when peace comes there will have been—it is still reasonable to hope—enough new experience gained to make it clear that no world unity can be maintained by external force but only by some kind of inner cohesion. The second element of intelligence available for this task is the ethical religion that has here been traced; its true significance and potentiality may be readily assessed by a comparison with current religion as a present resource.

The task set by ethical religion from the time of Amos to the days of Jesus was to get the will of an ethical God done in the lives of men on earth. Not one of its pro-

ponents ever made it his objective to assure salvation in another world. In fact, the great ethical prophets of Israel and Judah show no evidence of a doctrine of immortality. Jesus did not come to reveal immortality. A century and a half before his time a doctrine of immortality had been framed by the Jews.[1] It had during his own generation been given classical expression in literature, with an assurance of faith and a loftiness and sublimity of diction unsurpassed in the later Christian writings.[2]

All the prophets insisted that the task of getting God's will done among men was a human one, which men were capable of performing and for which they would be held responsible because neither God nor angels nor any other creature could do it for them. These men knew what they meant by the will of God and they stated it in terms that were unmistakable. It was put most simply by Amos, as a demand for justice between man and man in all personal relations. Later on other qualities were incorporated, but all applied to the same human problem. They all held that the will of God could be achieved in human society.

Early Christianity never believed in this proposition. It was, furthermore, completely pessimistic about it. At this point organized Christianity unconsciously, but clearly and definitely, turned aside from the ethical religion of the prophets which had culminated in Jesus. Its claim to the authority of Jesus and its self-confident protestations of loyalty to him cannot alter the verdict, since in spite of these things it has never been able to accept as its primary objective the main task which Jesus announced and which he set out to accomplish: the establishment of the reign of God on earth among men.

It is a hopeful sign that many religious bodies are today

seeking to unite forces, partly for self protection and partly because of a bad conscience due to a lack of cogent reasons why they should any longer remain separate. But if all Protestants were to unite, even if all Christian sects including Greek and Roman Catholics were to agree to form one body, it would not rehabilitate the Church or restore it to place or power in the councils of the nations in the time to come. The only discernible means that could accomplish that feat would be to go back to the objective of ethical religion as expressed in the proclamation of Jesus and proceed to make that Christianity's primary business. As the main drive of the life of Jesus becomes clearer, there remains no other way of expressing genuine loyalty to him. Any other course can only represent either misunderstanding or unconscious lip service. Further, there is no other way of promoting the kingdom of God either here or hereafter. This life remains the unavoidable proving ground of all theories of salvation; its products can neither be denied nor ignored. Accordingly, only so much "salvation" as can be demonstrated in this life is proved genuine or certain for a life to come.

That organized religion will be able to make such a revolutionary transition strains the imagination of the most ardent well-wisher of his kind. The immense overturning of age-old authority, prestige, special privilege, and power that is required is too great to expect it to originate in the class which represents the vested interests of religion, which would stand to lose its prerogatives.

Sectarian Christianity in relation to the world situation of today is in much the same position as were the Jewish Nazarenes in relation to the Roman Empire of that time. They proved unable to think in terms larger than the Jewish nationalism of which they were a part and in

which they had been reared; and as a result they were eliminated and the religion passed to the Gentiles.

It is currently assumed by Christian leaders that the desperate problems of today and tomorrow will be solved if the present religious forces will only exert themselves more zealously along the lines they now pursue. The Christianizing of the entire world according to existing patterns would not, however, so far as can be seen, appreciably alter the world problem of tomorrow, since the only two world wars have both started among Christian nations.

It remains to be seen whether the nations themselves will be able to sense their own highest welfare and to promote it before the heirs of religious promise do. Since for the former it is becoming increasingly clear that it is to be a matter of life or death, they may succeed. For if the post-war nations should come to regard themselves not as sovereign states but as coördinate and participating units in a world organization, the ideal of the kingdom of God on earth would probably have been advanced more than it has been in the last two thousand years.

The supreme test in this greatest of all human ventures to date will center in the kind of inner cohesion that can be put into effect. Unity will not be established as a matter of convenience or commercial gain, through the acquirement of natural resources or of a place in which to expand at other people's expense. It is here that the principle of ethical religion must inevitably assert itself in any lasting world unity. Before such a goal is attainable it will first be necessary to generate universal good will among men. Our age has learned to produce most material goods in mass-production form, but the spiritual economy of civilization has so far been based, to the threat of its own

undoing, on the principle of a scarcity of the commodity of good will. Jesus of Nazareth was the first person to propose the mass production of this article, and his followers have ever since regarded him as impractical, at least in that regard. But it is now rapidly becoming clear to all thinking persons that there must either be good will or ill will among men, that men cannot remain neutral about this, that whichever it is it will have to be on a world scale, and that, if there is not a positive and determined striving for good will, ill will is sure to come without striving.

In ages past epidemics of disease were regarded as plagues due to divine wrath. We now know that in general they represent the results of transgressing certain sanitary laws of nature. Most such diseases are now under human control and men are aware that the cause and cure are a human responsibility. The laws of the ethical sanitation of the human spirit have been the last to be seriously studied. Perhaps the most infectious and potentially dangerous affliction of personality is ill will, which, if unchecked, has a tendency to turn into a fever of consuming hatred; and this then takes on epidemic proportions that can seldom be stopped short of a wholesale decimation of human life. The actual mortality from this cause easily tops the list among communicable diseases at the present time. Man has learned to curb virtually all others. This one alone remains unchecked, rampant, deadly, and world devastating. It is most fatal to the strongest, finest youth and to men in their prime. More virulent today than ever before in man's history, neither women nor children nor the helpless and aged are immune from its ravages. Furthermore, it sweeps away the wealth and the natural resources of the world and

leaves behind an ever more terrifying impoverishment of the earth, until all that man has achieved is threatened by it.

The founder of Christianity has sometimes been called the Great Physician. The title has, however, been regarded even by his followers as largely figurative; that Jesus had correctly diagnosed and prescribed for the most universal and destructive scourge that ever plagued mankind has never penetrated the Christian consciousness. The universality of his teaching, its revolutionary character, and its probing of the depths of human motivation have baffled the mind and the imagination of men for ages.

As the sweeping nature of his message becomes clear, it begins to appear that religion as a process of adjusting the deepest reality within man's personality to the most significant realities without for the purpose of preserving the values of personality, here reaches a new level and arrives at a new technique, whose meaning and use have not yet been fully grasped. The persistent cry of religious men throughout the ages has been, "O that I knew where I might find Him." And this is only another form of the deeper thirst of the soul of man for reality. When, therefore, Jesus says that the religious requirements of the Law and the Prophets can be summed up in the treatment of one's neighbor, the quest after the reality of God seems at first to be denied.

The real problem that emerges at this point is: How can an ethical God manifest himself in a human world like our own? Nature with her capricious moods has never proved adequate for this purpose. Men have long sought the divine Presence at places set apart, in ornate temple and holy fane. They have thought to find him

in the performance of common rites as well as by gathering to pray and to sing his praise. None of these means express ethical qualities or values, and hence they permit no responses in accord with the ethical nature of God.

It is a well-known saying that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself, and hence it is granted that for a brief span of years God was especially revealed in our world. But if the kingdom of God is to be found within men, and if the reign of an ethical God is to come to earth, then he must have a continuous and universal manifestation in and through the lives of men. To the extent, therefore, that men do justice and show kindness, the will of God will be done, and where his will is expressed there his presence will be found. For where justice and love are regnant there God is, and there can be no clearer manifestation of him among men. Should all men attain to this level, God's presence would be universally perceived among them.

Human relations, accordingly, here begin to appear as the *necessary channel* for the fuller realization and the practice of the presence of God. Conversely, if justice and love are lacking in a human society then there is no way whereby an ethical God can manifest himself except in the penalties that come from their denial, penalties such as those which are now being visited upon our present world with such terrifying and devastating effect.

The full ethical treatment of one's neighbor has in it, therefore, the highest religious possibilities and is the true basis for knowing God. The assumption that there is any available access to God which ignores this relation results in the denial of God's ethical character. Jesus once said: "First be reconciled with your brother, then offer your gift on the altar."

If in any community there is obvious injustice and resultant ill will and hatred, the well-being of that community is endangered both spiritually and physically, and no amount of religious exercises of whatever sort can restore it to health or give any basis for assurance that its members enjoy the favor of God. Just as no amount of formal religious acts will cleanse a polluted water supply or correct defective sanitation, so with the ethical sanitation of man's life. Nothing done for man's spiritual health in ages past can make up for present delinquency, which in our world is beyond any doubt appallingly great.

Organized religion, if it is not to become a negligible quantity, if it is not finally to deny its Lord, must make the goal of ethical religion its *main* task. Sectarianism has outlived its usefulness. In the establishment of justice and good will among men, as a requirement of the will of God on earth, there can be no theological, sectarian, or ritualistic distinctions.

In the beginning of man's career it was through social organization that he gained his first ideas of God. Through organized social life man finally grasped the concept of an ethical God. It now begins to appear that the only way God's will and man's weal can be achieved is through a socially unified world based upon the principles of justice and good will. The lessons of current world experience, the apocalyptic dream of Christian tradition and the moral imperative of ethical religion all converge upon the coming age. There is very little disagreement as to the recognized need. There is no doubt as to the desired goal of human coöperation. The great lack is a want of faith in ethical religion on the part of its formal custodian, traditional Christianity.

This lack is twofold. First, it is an unconscious want of faith in an ethical God, that is, a Being who can only be

dealt with on the basis of ethical principles, whose full acceptance cannot come without a denial of the efficacy *per se* of all ritualistic acts. Put in nontheological terms, this lack is a denial of the moral order of the universe, which, if real, must be regnant in human affairs regardless of what men do or do not profess in religion. Second, this attitude reveals an equal lack of faith in human nature and human capabilities.

But the truth of ethical religion has now been proved in common human experience. Civilization in the large has to date demonstrated the moral order of the world on its negative side. Wherever there has been a lack of justice and human consideration which threatened to become world-wide, there has been increasing world chaos. The larger the scale the more complete the demonstration. The converse has been made equally clear by the verdict of history. It can safely be said that the measure of well-being enjoyed by any given society or political order, other things being equal, has been in direct proportion to the amount of justice and consideration for personality thereby expressed.

Men are therefore responsible for their conduct whether as individuals or as groups, and there is no escape from that responsibility. If responsible, then they have the capacity, and therefore the duty, to conserve the values which life has conferred upon them. The primary implementation of ethical religion is the demand for the exercise of that capacity in all men, toward all men, for the good of all men. The assumption that men can make their peace with God without first establishing a just and brotherly attitude toward their fellows is a perversion and an essential denial of the significance of ethical qualities whether in God or in man.

For millenniums men have pictured the felicity of a

Golden Age. For the most part it has been painted either in the sunset colors of a day that is gone forever or in the celestial brightness of endless day beyond the bourne of time and sense. Ethical religion alone has caught the vision of the golden age of man as the growing light of dawn—the dawn of a possible new day for all mankind. It is, however, stated only as a possibility, based upon very definite requirements. If that day is to become real, the prospect of a growing political unification of the world will have to be supplemented and undergirded by such a reorientation within the individual as will enable him to see that the interest which he shares with all men is his greatest interest, and therefore that his treatment of others must conform to all that he could wish for himself. This is not the place to discuss the immense and sweeping changes thereby to be necessitated in politics, in economics, in education, and in formal religious usage.

It remains to be seen whether the horror and the terror of the present world conflict will be able to shock our generation out of its complacency, its self-righteousness, its narrow selfishness, and its false sense of security sufficiently to make it realize that its own lasting good can only be assured in the good of all men. For if, and when, that time comes it will be found that religion has reasserted itself as a process of relating the reality within man to the greater realities without to the extent that it has finally led him to see that the only way to be sure of preserving the values of personality here or hereafter is religiously at all times to seek their preservation in all men and to make this man's chief business in life.

The goal toward which such striving points is fittingly expressed in the vision of an ancient seer:

Then I saw a new heaven and a new earth, for the first

heaven and the first earth had passed away and there was no longer any sea. And I heard a loud voice say, Behold! God's dwelling is with men and he will live with them. They will be his people and God himself will be with them, and he will wipe every tear from their eyes. The old order has passed away.[3]

Jesus began his career by saying, "The reign of God is near," but after two thousand years the world still waits for it. Again, in our day, there is a certain appropriateness in saying that the reign of God has come near. There is first of all a conscious and growing appreciation of a world need for that better order. The religious ideas and ideals of men which have prevented its realization hitherto are at last becoming clear. The conditions and efforts requisite to its achievement are seen to be well within human capacities and powers. And, finally, the vision just quoted is no longer the far-off hope of an ancient seer, but in part the chronicle of actualities.

The world order of which we have been a part, including the heavens, the earth, and the sea that we have known, is passing away before our eyes. We can no longer lift our gaze with the same calm assurance to the blue dome set with friendly stars, for out of those depths at a moment's notice may come the hurtling destruction of bursting bombs. The skies have become the main express highways of the world, whether for life or for death. The old heaven has already passed away. The earth that we have known is also passing away, made up as it was of an old world and a new, each composed in turn of countries and continents separated from each other by lofty mountain ramparts and far-flung seas which extended over three fourths of the globe. Travel, except over certain well-worn paths, was slow and arduous, and communica-

tion precarious and limited. All that has passed away. For purposes of travel the continents of the world now constitute essentially a single land mass. The mountain barriers have crumbled. There is no more sea (of separation)—that has been bridged. London is now nearer New York than Chicago was less than a decade ago. Communication by word of mouth is potentially instantaneous and world-wide at will. The ruler of the tiniest ancient city-state could never command his subjects with anything like the speed with which the whole world can today be informed of events at a moment's notice. The old human order has passed away. Man by his mechanical cleverness has eliminated the old heaven and the old earth and furnished the setting for a new world order. But a new human order commensurate with this new setting waits to be born.

In view of the findings of ethical religion, the bringing forth of such a human order is and henceforth remains a human responsibility. Either it will come, or a worse chaos will follow the chaos of war. A Day of Judgment on mankind is therefore drawing near, which may well decide for all time whether or not man is just a clever animal—clever, but not clever enough to choose the things that are necessary for his own proper being (*homo sapiens!*). That assize may also decide, for ages to come, whether the reign of God based upon justice and kindness is to merge with the human order on the earth. Granted the possibility, it may be asked: What should be the signs of its coming? First, when there is due consideration of all men by all men, the will of God will at last stand revealed and his presence be realized to an extent of which we today know virtually nothing. Secondly, if and when these things happen, the life of man

will be enriched beyond the power of imagination at present to conceive. Not a thousandth part of the fruits of universal human coöperation has ever yet been realized. This will not be chiefly an increase in material goods, great as that would undoubtedly be, but the enhancement of the worth, the dignity, and the sacredness of human personality.

This goal has been impossible of achievement hitherto mainly because of three factors: first, competition in economics; second, national sovereignty in politics; and third, aiding and abetting both, traditional sectarianism in religion. Each of these in turn has in the past been a conserver of human values, when applied on a certain limited scale. All have undergone modification whenever the original scale of their application has been expanded. None of them remains normative or practical when applied on a universal scale. The present chaotic state of the globe is directly traceable to the failure of their world-scale operation. The only hope of deliverance and of a restored livable order of existence now admittedly rests upon the fullest possible human coöperation. Thus the insistent demand of ethical religion, since the beginning of the Christian era, is at last unwittingly admitted by a desperate world to be the one reasonable hope of a better day for all mankind.

Toward this far-off divine event the human race throughout the ages has been often blindly yet incessantly striving. For this task religion, always seeking to conserve the values of the human spirit, has furnished both chart and compass. Men have frequently missed the way. At times they have despaired of reaching the goal; and when the conditions in this life have been too severe, they have pinned their faith to another world. Religion has always

called for a measure of human coöperation. Ethical religion demands that this be universal. This is no hare-brained utopian urge. Isolationism has proved both impractical and impossible. Therefore the only other alternative to coöperation is human exploitation on a world scale, which if achieved could only degrade and dehumanize both the exploiter and the exploited. In this unparalleled world crisis in human affairs a single example of nationalism in both politics and religion, considered as an end in itself and abetted by the highest modern technical skill, has more than sufficiently demonstrated its capacity to destroy civilization for generations to come. The one means evident by which the rest of mankind can avert this castastrophe makes the formal coöperative requirements of ethical religion an immediate practical necessity. Thus it has come to pass that the message of the Nazarene as it reaches across the years deepens, amplifies, and clarifies the single bright hope for the preservation of human decency and human dignity in our time; and thereby for the age to come it flashes the one clear signal that beckons toward a new and permanently better human order, an order at least capable of testing the practicality of a kingdom of God on earth.

NOTES

Chapter I

[1] See E. S. Brightman, *A Philosophy of Religion* (New York, 1940), pp. 15–17.
[2] Heb. 1:8, 12; cf. 13:8.
[3] Cf. Jainism and primary Buddhism, which lack the God idea.
[4] See W. F. Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity* (Baltimore, 1940), p. 126.
[5] See *Monastery of Epiphanius at Thebes*, Part II (New York, 1926), No. 199, MMA.

Chapter II

[1] BAASR (1932), pp. 17 f.
[2] See Andrew D. White, *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom* (New York, 1896).
[3] BAASR (1934), p. 5.
[4] General J. C. Smuts, BAASR (1931), pp. 2 f.
[5] *Op. cit.*, pp. 14 f.
[6] BAASR (1934), p. 10.
[7] BAASR (1931), p. 3.
[8] *Op. cit.*, pp. 2, 4, A. S. Eddington, *Science and the Unseen World* (London, 1929), p. 20.
[9] BAASR (1931), pp. 4 ff.
[10] *Op. cit.*, pp. 5 f.
[11] BAASR (1934), p. 5.
[12] BAASR (1931), p. 10.
[13] *Op. cit.*, p. 17.
[14] BAASR (1934), p. 5.
[15] *Op. cit.*, p. 3, Eddington, *op. cit.*, pp. 24 ff.
[16] BAASR (1931), p. 15.
[17] *Op. cit.*, p. 14.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 9.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 15.
[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 14–16.
[22] BAASR (1934), p. 15.
[23] BAASR (1931), p. 12.
[24] *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 16.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 17 f.
[27] See Sir James Jeans, *The Mysterious Universe* (New York, 1930), pp. 158 f.

Chapter III

[1] Cf. ch. I, p. 3.
[2] See *The Haverford Symposium on Archaeology and the Bible* (New Haven, 1938), pp. 164, 165; Albright, *op. cit.*, pp. 99 f.; 105 f.
[3] See J. G. Frazer, *The Golden Bough*, Vol. I of abridged edition (New York, 1922), pp. 62–78; and see Index under "Magic."
[4] Frazer, *op. cit.*, ch. iii–vi.
[5] See "Babylonian Creation Epic" in R. F. Harper, *Assyrian and Babylonian Literature* (New York, 1901), pp. 284, 287, 291, 293; cf. pp. 372 ff.; Exodus, ch. 7–9.
[6] See H. R. Hall, *The Ancient History of the Near East* (London, 1913), p. 178; cf. Frazer, *op. cit.*, p. 9.
[7] See D. D. Luckenbill, *Ancient Records of Assyria and Babylonia* (Chicago, 1926), Vol. II. Monotheism in Egypt came through another channel.
[8] See R. F. Harper, *The Code of Hammurabi* (Chicago, 1904), p. 3.
[9] See J. H. Breasted, *A History of the Ancient Egyptians* (New

York, 1935), pp. 108 ff.
[10] See G. F. Moore, *History of Religions* (New York, 1922), I, 272 ff.
[11] *Op. cit.*, pp. 283 ff.

Chapter IV

[1] Jd., ch. 5.
[2] Jd., ch. 6–8.
[3] Jd., ch. 19–21.
[4] See H. R. Hall, *Cambridge Ancient History* (Cambridge, Eng., 1925), Vol. III, ch. xii.
[5] Jd., ch. 14–16.
[6] I Sam., ch. 1 and 3.
[7] I Sam., ch. 4.
[8] Ju. 7:12, 14.
[9] I Sam. 7:7, 10.
[10] I Sam. 13:19.
[11] I Sam. 13:20 f.
[12] I Sam. 10:5; 19:20.
[13] I Sam. 9:15 f.; 10:1.
[14] I Sam. 10:11.
[15] I Sam. 10:10, 12.
[16] I Sam. 10:10.
[17] I Sam. 19:23.
[18] See Albright, "The Report of Wenamun," in *op. cit.*, p. 232; J. H. Breasted, *Ancient Records of Egypt* (Chicago, 1906–7) II, 557 ff.
[19] I Sam. 13:6–7.
[20] I Ki. 22:6.
[21] I Ki. 18:19.
[22] I Ki. 22:10–12.
[23] Gen. 6:5–7.
[24] Gen. 3:17.
[25] Gen. 6:13.
[26] Gen. 9:20–24.
[27] Gen. 12:1–2.
[28] Gen. 12:3.
[29] Gen. 25:26.
[30] Gen. 27:1–4.
[31] Gen. 28:3–4.
[32] Gen. 25:29–34.
[33] Gen. 27:37.
[34] Gen. 30:31–31:21.
[35] Gen. 32:13–21.
[36] Gen., ch. 34.
[37] Gen. 28:12–16.
[38] Gen. 28:20–22.
[39] Gen. 32:24–30.
[40] Num. 23:21b.–24.
[41] Num. 24:5, 8–9.
[42] Gen. 12:19.
[43] Gen. 20:1 ff.
[44] Gen. 20:2.
[45] Gen. 20:12.
[46] Gen. 20:6.
[47] Gen. 27:6–13.
[48] Gen. 28:11 ff.; 31:11 ff.
[49] Gen. 3:8.
[50] Gen. 18: 1 ff.
[51] Gen. 18:22 ff.
[52] Ex. 33:11; Num. 12:8.
[53] Job 4:13–16.
[54] Cf. I Ki. 11.29 ff. with LXX; and A. T. Olmstead, AJSL. (1913), pp. 17 ff.
[55] II Ki., ch. 9–10.
[56] I Ki. 22:14–23.
[57] See I Sam., ch. 8.
[58] Am. 7:14.

Chapter V

[1] Am. 7:14.
[2] Am. 3:7.
[3] Am. 3:2.
[4] Am. 9:7.
[5] Am. 1:1; cf. 7:12.
[6] Am. 7:14b.
[7] Am. 7:13.
[8] Am. 7:2, 5.
[9] Am. 2:6–7; 3:10; 4:1; 5:7, 11, 12, 15, 24; 6:3, 6, 12; 7:8; 8:4–6.
[10] Am. 2:7.
[11] Am. 2:11, 12.
[12] Am. 2:8; 3:9; 5:10.
[13] Am. 5:24.
[14] See A. T. Olmstead, *History of Assyria* (New York, 1923), p. 191.
[15] See J. H. Breasted, *The Dawn*

of Conscience (New York, 1934), pp. 182 ff.
[16] Cf. D. W. Riddle, JBR, VIII (1940), 71.
[17] I Ki. 21:2–3.
[18] Ex. 21:2 ff.
[19] Am. 5:10, 12.
[20] Cf. Am. 8:4, 6.
[21] Am. 2:14, 16.
[22] Am. 5:27.
[23] Am. 3:2; 5:14, 18, 25.
[24] Am. 5:14.
[25] Am. 7:10 f.
[26] Am. 5:5; 7:13.
[27] Am. 5:25–27.
[28] See J. M. P. Smith, *The Prophets and Their Times* (Chicago, 1928; second edition revised by W. A. Irwin, 1941), p. 62.
[29] Am. 4:4, 5; 5:5, 21–24.
[30] See seventh-century summary in Mic. 6:6–8.
[30a] See Am. 5:24 BAT.
[31] Am. 3:2.
[32] Am. 9:7a.
[33] Am. 9:7b.
[34] Am. 1:6–2:2.
[35] Hos. 1:2.
[36] Cf. Hos. 2:2–4.
[37] Hos. 3:3. Cf. L. Waterman, The Marriage of Hosea, JBL XXXVIII (1918), 203.
[38] Cf. J. M. P. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 71 ff., and A. T. Olmstead, *The History of Palestine and Syria* (New York, 1937), pp. 437 f.
[39] Hos. 5:6.
[40] Hos. 2:5.
[41] Hos. 8:13.
[42] Hos. 6:6a.
[43] Hos. 6:6b.
[44] Hos. 4:13; 5:3.
[45] Hos. 4:14; 5:7; 6:10; 7:4; 9:1.
[46] Hos. 4:8; 5:1; 6:9.
[47] Hos. 4:13b–14; 9:1.
[48] Hos. 7:7.
[49] Hos. 7:1–4; 8:4, 10.
[50] Hos. 5:13; 7:11; 8:9.
[51] Hos. 9:3; 10:5–6.

Chapter VI

[1] Mic. 1:5–6.
[2] Mic. 3:12.
[3] Mic. 2:2, 8–9; 3:1–3, 9–11.
[4] Mic. 1:7.
[5] Mic. 2:1–2, 8–9; 3:1.
[6] Mic. 3:5–7.
[7] Jer. 26:16–19.
[8] Is. 8:9; 10:5–34; ch. 13–14; ch. 24–27; ch. 34.
[9] Is. 2:2–4; 9:1 ff.; 11:1 ff.; 13: 17–19; 14:1 ff.
[10] Is. 9:1–7; ch. 11; 32:1–8.
[11] I Sam. 10:1.
[12] Am. 9:8b–15.
[13] Hos. 1:10–2:1; 2:14–24; Mic. 1: 12–13.
[14] Is. 1:21.
[15] Is. 1:15–17, 21, 23; 3:14–15; Is. 5:8, 18, 20, 23; 10:1–3.
[16] Is. 6:1–3.
[17] Cf. Is. 36; see Harper, *Assyrian and Babylonian Literature*, pp. 72 f.
[18] Jer. 1:14; 6:22–24, and cf. J. M. P. Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 133, note 4.
[19] Zeph. 1:4–18; 3:1–7.
[20] Zeph. 1:4–6, 9.
[21] Zeph. 1:8, 9b; 3:3.
[22] Zeph. 3:1.
[23] Zeph. 1:9b; 3:5.
[24] Zeph. 3:4.
[25] Zeph. 3:4b.
[26] Jer. 1:1; 32:7; I Sam. 20:20–23, II Sam. 8:17; I Ki. 1:7; 2:26.
[27] Jer. 1:14; cf. Smith, *op. cit.*, ch. vii.
[28] Jer. ch. 43–44.
[29] Jer., ch. 24.
[30] Jer. 29:1–9.
[31] Cf. Jer. 29:1–9, and v. 15 f.

[32] Jer. 29:14.
[33] Jer. 29:7.
[34] Jer. 2:1–22.
[35] Jer. 2:23–25; 3:1–10.
[36] Jer. 7:17–18; 11:13.
[37] Jer. 7:22.
[38] Jer. 29:7.
[39] Jer. 31:29–30.
[39a] See H. G. May, "The Biographer of Jeremiah," JBL (1942), LXI, 150.
[40] Jer. 1:18–19.
[41] Jer. 40:1–4.
[42] Jer., ch. 44.

Chapter VII

[1] See I. G. Matthews, *Ezekiel* (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 12 ff.; for the literature of criticism see pp. viii ff.
[2] Jer., ch. 29.
[3] Ezek., ch. 2–3.
[4] Ezek. 18:2–3, 30–31.
[5] Ezek. 18:3, 30.
[6] Cf. Matthews, *op. cit.*, p. xlviii, 2.
[7] Ezek., ch. 25–32.
[8] The assumption that Jewish nationalism could be revived in that day without some new religious dynamic goes against all the analogies of history.
[9] Ezek. 18:31; 33:11.
[10] Hos. 9:5; II Ki. 5:17.
[11] Ezek., ch. 44.
[12] Ezek. 44:7–8.
[13] Ezek. 44:9–27.
[14] Is. 40–55. The remaining chapters are strongly and definitely nationalistic in character. There is evidence that points to nationalistic editing of 40–55, but it never obscures the original writer's main thesis.
[15] Is. 40:2; 43:25; 44:22.
[16] Is. 40:16.
[17] Is. 41:8–9; 44:21; 49:14–15.
[18] Is. 42:22.
[19] Is. 42:18.
[20] Is. 50:4–9.
[21] Is. 49:5–6a.
[22] Is. 49:6b.
[23] Is. 45:1.
[23a] Cf. L. L. Waterman, "The Martyred Servant Motif of Isaiah 53," JBL (1937), LVI, 27–34.
[24] Ezek., ch. 47.
[25] In spite of 42:22 and 47:6 which are stated from the point of view of the nation.
[26] Is. 51:1, 7, 16.
[27] Is. 53:10b, ARV.
[28] Is. 44:28–45:2.
[29] Is. 46:1–2, 6–7, 9.
[30] Cf. Jer. 29:10–14.
[31] Is. 40:9; 43:14; 44:6. In contrast cf. 41:11–12 (which breaks the context), v. 15–16; 42:13; 43:3–4, 23–24 (ritualistic) 45:14, 17; 47:6–7, 49:23, 26; 51:17–23; 52:3–5; ch. 54; 55:3b–5. In these passages the figure of the servant and his mission are lost in nationalism and point to a nationalistic supplementer; see note 14.
[32] See Olmstead, *History of Palestine and Syria*, pp. 555 ff.
[33] Cf. Zech. 6:9–15 in ARV. and BAT.

Chapter VIII

[1] Cf. W. Bousset, *Die Religion des Judentums* (Berlin, 1926), p. 223.
[2] Obadaiah, v. 15–16.
[3] Joel 3:1–13; Zech. 14:1–8; Ezek., ch. 39.
[4] Jonah 3:4b.
[5] Jonah 3:10.
[6] Jonah 1:2.
[7] Jonah 1:3.
[8] Jonah 3:1–3.

[9] Jonah 3:4b.
[10] Jonah 4:5.
[11] Jonah 4:1.
[12] Jonah 4:2.
[13] Jonah 3:3.
[14] Ps. 139:19.
[15] Ps. 139:21.
[16] Ps. 139:22.
[17] Ps. 149:6–7.
[18] Ps. 137:8–9.
[19] Hag. 2:21–23; Zech. 4:6–7; cf. 6:14.
[20] Zech. 14:9; Is. 33:22; 24:33.
[21] Is. 49:6a.
[22] Is. 49:6b.

Chapter IX

[1] Cf. Olmstead, "The Chronology of Jesus' Life;" ATR, XXIV (1942), 1–26, especially 4, 9, 26.
[2] See Olmstead, JNES, I (1942), 41–75, and Edgar J. Goodspeed, JNES, (July, 1942), pp. 315–340, and cf. Goodspeed's *New Chapters in New Testament Study* (New York, 1937), Ch. 6.
[3] See Olmstead, *op. cit.*, p. 44, note 7.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 71.
[5] See A. Jülicher, *Introduction to the New Testament* (London, 1904), p. 356.
[6] Mt. 13:10; 13:34, 36; 16:5–12; 20:18–21; 26:22; Jno. 16:25, 29.
[7] Mt. 16:16; 20:21–23; Mk. 10: 35–37.
[8] Mt. 20:56; Lu. 24:21.
[9] Mt. 28:9, 17; Lu. 24:21 ff.
[10] Acts 1:6.
[11] Cf. Acts 1:10–11.
[12] Cf., for example, the doubts about the resurrection: Mt. 28:17; Mk. 16:11, 13; Lu. 24:37.
[13] Mal. 4:5; cf. Mt. 11:14; Mk. 9: 11–13.
[14] Mt. 14:1–2; 16:14.
[15] Acts 1:12–26; 2:44–47.
[16] Acts, ch. 2, especially v. 36.
[17] Acts 2:41.
[18] Gal. 1:18–19; 2:6–12.
[19] Gal., ch. 1–2.
[20] Acts 2:14 ff.; Gal. 2:7–8.
[21] Gal. 2:9, 12.
[22] Gal. 2:12.
[23] Cf. Gal. 2:7–9.
[24] See Frederick Grant, *The Gospel of the Kingdom* (New York, 1940), pp. 63, 154.
[25] See C. C. McCown, *The Search for the Real Jesus* (New York, 1940), pp. 284–286.
[26] Gal. 1:18–19.
[27] Rom. 9:6–8; Gal. 3:7; 6:16; Phil. 3:3.
[28] I Thes. 1:10.
[29] I Cor. 15:22–24.
[30] I Cor. 15:28.
[31] Rom. 3:31; 8:4.
[32] The Gathas; cf. Albright, *op. cit.*, pp. 276 ff. J. H. Moultin, *Early Zoroastrianism* (London, 1913), pp. 343 ff.
[33] Mark 8:32.
[34] Mark, recognized as our oldest gospel, shows that our gospels supposedly by Matthew and John cannot be the work of the disciples who bore those names.
[35] Greek.
[35a] Aramaic.
[36] Cf. Lu. 11:29–30 with Mt. 12: 39–40.
[37] Mt. 5:17–18.
[38] Mt. 5:21–48.
[39] See F. C. Grant, *op. cit.*, p. 170; M. Goguel, *Life of Jesus*, English translation (New York, 1933), pp. 569 f; B. S. Easton, *Christ in the Gospels*

(New York, 1930), p. 176; H. J. Cadbury, JR., XXI (1941), 414.
[40] See Grant, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
[41] See *ibid.*, p. 156.
[42] *Ibid.*
[43] Cf. Is. 63:1 ff; Ps. 2; 137:8–9.
[44] Ps. 47; Is. 33:22; Zech. 14:9, 16, 17.
[45] Mt. 16:16.
[46] Mt. 16:23.
[47] Mt. 26:47 ff.
[48] Mt. 26:56.
[49] Lu. 24:21.
[50] Acts 2:14 ff.
[51] Mt. 13:13.
[52] Jno. 10:6.
[53] Jno. 16:25, 29.
[54] Mt. 16:5–11; 19:25; Mk. 9:32; Lu. 9:45; 18:34; Jno. 6:60; 12:16.
[55] Mt. 21:11; Lu. 7:16; 13:33; 24:19.
[56] Mk. 6:4; Lu. 13:33; Jno. 4:44.
[57] Mt. 5:21 ff., 27 ff., 33 ff.
[58] Mt. 5:38 ff., 43 ff.
[59] Mt. 22:17–22; Jno. 6:15.
[60] Pss. 5, 7, 10, 17, 18, 21, 35, 40, 41, 44, 53, 54, 55, 57–60, 64, 69–71, 74–76, 79, 83, 94, 109, 129, 137, 140.
[61] Is., ch. 11, 24, 34, 63; Joel, ch. 3; Ob.; Zech., ch. 14.
[62] Mt. 10:34–39; Jno. 2:14 ff.; cf. Mt. 23:13–36.
[63] Mt. 22:36 ff.
[64] Mt. 7:12.
[65] Mt. 9:13.
[66] Hos. 6:6.
[67] Mt. 12:38–39; Lu. 11:29–32.
[68] Jno. 4:11.
[69] Cf. Is. 2:2–4; Is. 19:19–25.
[70] Wis. of Sol. 2:16–18.
[71] Lu. 10:25–37.
[72] Lu. 17:20–21.
[73] Cf. Lu. 10:30–37; 15:11–32.
[74] Mk. 4:26–29.
[75] Mk. 4:30–32.
[76] Mt. 13:33.
[77] Mt. 13:24–30.
[78] Mt. 13:44.
[79] Mt. 13:45–46.
[80] Mt. 13:47–48.
[81] Mt. 5:1–11.
[82] Cf. Note 59.
[83] Mt. 21:33–43.
[84] Mt. 22:2 ff.
[85] Mt. 21:43.
[86] Mt. 23:37–39, but Cf. McCown, "Gospel Geography," JBL LX (1941), 22.
[87] Mt. 23:23–36.
[88] Lu. 13:31; cf. Goguel, *op. cit.*, p. 350.
[89] See C. C. McCown, JBL., LVII, (1938), 52 ff.
[90] Cf. Ps. 2.

Chapter XII

[1] Dan. 12:2.
[2] Wis. of Sol. 1: 13–2:8.
[3] Rev. 21:3–4.

Abbreviations

AJSL American Journal of Semitic Languages
ARV American Revised Version
ATJ Anglican Theological Review
BAASR British Association for the Advancement of Science Reports
BAT The Bible an American Translation
JBL Journal of Biblical Literature
JBR Journal of Bible and Religion
JNES Journal of Near Eastern Studies
JR Journal of Religion
MMA Metropolitan Museum of Art

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